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2.14 Newspaper clipping: Östersunds-Posten, 29 November 1930. . . . . . 120
2.15 Swedish National Socialist election poster, 1930s . . . . . . . . . . . 121
2.16 Borgerliga (Conservative Right) election poster, 1932 . . . . . . . . . 121
2.17 Evolution of potential confounders, 1917-1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
2.18 Robustness to excluding each county . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
2.19 Registry of incoming correspondence, 1927 (excerpt) . . . . . . . . . 127
2.20 Incoming correspondence, 1925-1934 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
2.21 Sweden Democrats election poster, 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.1 Involvement in the Thirty Years’ War and citizens’ elections of councils166
3.2 Involvement in the Thirty Years’ War and council size . . . . . . . . 166
3.3 Sovereign territories in the German lands, 1300-1800 . . . . . . . . . 167
3.4 The Peerage example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
3.5 Family tree example - the Lords of Braunschweig and Lüneburg, 1582-
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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters. While the chapters address distinct questions using different
historical settings, and as such should be read as independent pieces of research, some commonalities
can be identified. The chapters share the overarching themes of democratisation and the functioning
of early democracies. In their combination of historical data and modern econometric techniques,
the three chapters additionally have a common methodological foundation. Finally, though these
chapters are works of economic history, it has been my goal throughout to not lose sight of questions
of interest within economics more broadly conceived.
In the first chapter, I examine how interaction costs shape the diffusion of social move-
ments. During the thirty-year period 1881-1910, Swedish society underwent two transformative
developments: the large-scale roll-out of a national railway network and the nascence of social
movements which came to dominate social and political spheres well into the twentieth century.
Using event-study and instrumental variables methodologies, I document the causal impact of prox-
imity to the newly constructed railway network on the spread and growth of membership in these
social movements. Well-connected municipalities were more likely to host a local movement or-
ganisation and saw more rapid growth of membership per capita. By reducing least-cost distances
between municipalities, railways intensified the influence exerted by neighbouring concentrations of
membership, thereby enabling spatial diffusion.
What determines the efficacy of identity-based propaganda, and how long-lasting are its
effects? In the second chapter, I shed light on these questions by studying the impact of the Swedish
State Institute for Race Biology’s popularisation of race biology on right-wing ideology in the short
and long run. In a popular book edition of its systematic classification of the Swedish population
according to “Nordic purity”, the Institute identified particularly “pure” areas of the country.
Implementing a differences-in-differences strategy, I document the effect of the publication on right-
wing ideology: following the publication, election districts of above-median “purity” exhibit a 3.4
percentage point relative increase in the vote share of right-wing parties. This effect is concentrated
in areas with little immigration, suggesting that insular communities may be particularly susceptible
to this type of racial rhetoric. Finally, the rightward turn appears to persist over time: present-day
municipalities in formerly above-median “purity” regions exhibit a higher relative vote share for
the Sweden Democrats, a populist party with roots in the extreme right.
In the third chapter, which is joint work with Sascha O. Becker, Andreas Ferrara and Luigi
Pascali, we study the effect of warfare on the development of state capacity and representative
institutions using novel data on cities and territories in the German lands between 1200 and 1750.
More specifically, we show that cities with a higher conflict exposure establish more sophisticated
tax systems, and also develop larger councils, councils that are more likely to be elected by citizens,
and more likely to be independent of other local institutions. These results are consistent with the
idea of a trade-off between more efficient taxation and power sharing proposed in earlier work. We
make headway on establishing a causal role of wars by using changes to German nobles’ positions




Railways and the Spread of Social Movements
1.1 Introduction
Social movements can be powerful forces for change. In the context of European
democratisation, grassroots pressure on elites was instrumental to an extension of
the franchise (Aidt and Jensen (2014), Aidt and Franck (2015)). Collective action
has the power to end absolutist monarchies, as in Denmark during the upheavals
of 1848, and topple economic systems, as in the case of the abolition of Austrian
and Hungarian serfdom (Stearns, 1974). More recently, grassroot-level political
organisation was crucial for the successes of the Civil Rights Movement (Morris,
1986) and for popular mobilisation during the Arab Spring (Beinin and Vairel,
2013).
Despite the importance of social movements in shaping societal, political
and economic developments, many questions remain open about the nature of their
This chapter has benefited greatly from discussions with Sascha O. Becker, Kerstin Enflo,
James Fenske and Noam Yuchtman. Participants at CAGE AMES Seminar (Warwick), ASREC
Europe Conference (Luxembourg), Sound Economic History Workshop (Gothenburg), the Work-
shop on Urban, Regional and International Economics (Southern Denmark), the Oxford-Warwick-
LSE Economic History Workshop (Warwick), the Graduate Seminar in Economic History (London
School of Economics), the Workshop on Political Economy (ifo Dresden), the Workshop on Culture
and Comparative Development (Luxembourg) and the RES Ph.D. Meeting (Westminster Business
School) provided valuable comments.
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evolution and spread. In theories of collective behaviour, the organisation of in-
dividuals with mutual interests is key (Olson (1965), Tilly (1978)), and relies on
information about the actions of others (Granovetter (1978), Jackson and Yariv
(2007)). Facilitating communication between agents in such models, however, need
not necessarily lead to better mobilisation outcomes (Gould (1993), Hassanpour
(2014)). The question therefore naturally arises: how do reductions in the cost of
interactions between individuals shape the spread and growth of a movement, and
what are the mechanisms underlying this social contagion of ideas? Further, to the
extent that the goals of disparate organisations do not perfectly align, there is scope
for competition between movements (Axelrod (1997), McAdam (2010)). How are
strategic interrelationships between different movements shaped by the technologies
underpinning social interactions?
These are questions which I seek to answer in this chapter, taking a natural
experiment from Swedish history as a testing ground. In the period 1881-1910,
the large-scale roll-out of a national railway network radically transformed Swedish
society (Heckscher, 1907), with the total length of the network increasing from
6,000 kilometres in 1881 to 14,000 in 1910 (Kungliga järnvägsstyrelsen, 1956). At
the same time, nascent social movements emerged which came to define the Swedish
economic, social and political fabric at least until the Second World War (Lundkvist,
1977). These movements included a rich network of leftist organisations and labour
unions, as well as free churches and temperance movements. By 1910, their combined
membership was 700,000 from a population of approximately 5.5 million (Andrae
and Lundkvist, 1998). Combining these concurrent developments, I study how the
large decrease in travel costs granted by the railway system facilitated the diffusion
of these movements.
I use rich historical data, combined from several sources, to construct a panel
covering more than two thousand municipalities over the thirty-year period 1881-
1910. I reconstruct the Swedish railway network and measure each municipality’s
2
access to rail each year based on historical railway maps. I combine this with detailed
data on social movements from the Swedish Social Movements Archive (Andrae and
Lundkvist, 1998), covering the yearly presence and membership of various groups
in each municipality. Finally, I supplement these data with full-count censuses as
well as a host of geographical data.
Equipped with this dataset, I estimate the causal effect of improved railway
access on the spread of social movements using two main empirical frameworks.
First, I use an event-study approach to estimate the effect of the arrival of rail in the
proximity of a municipality. Second, I implement an instrumental variables strategy
in which I use proximity to initial proposals for the railway network to instrument
for actual proximity to rail.1 I document the crucial role played by improvements in
transportation infrastructure in shaping the diffusion of social movements on both
extensive and intensive margins. Following a reduction in the distance between a
municipality and the railway network, the probability that a movement spreads to
the municipality increases, the growth in membership and the number of distinct
organisations per capita rises, and the concentration of membership within a single
group decreases.
To explore the mechanisms underlying this result, I operationalise a “mar-
ket access” framework inspired by Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016). The movement
membership in a given municipality can be thought of as a travel cost-weighted
function of movement membership in other municipalities. I show that as travel
costs decrease due to railway expansion, access to and influence from social move-
ments in nearby municipalities intensifies, which facilitates diffusion. This effective
shrinking of distance to nearby movement membership is robust to accounting for
more traditional population-weighted measures of market potential. I supplement
this analysis with station-level data to demonstrate that the spread of social move-
ments is predicted by passenger arrivals in a municipality but not by freight arrivals.
1This instrument was first used by Berger and Enflo (2017), and is explained at length in Section
1.4.
3
The contagion effect therefore is one driven by the mobility of individuals, and not
by local economic activity more broadly.
Finally, given the richness of my data, I am able to investigate the interre-
lationships between different types of movements. I document strong complement-
arities between temperance and free church organisations, while labour unions and
leftist parties act as substitutes for temperance movements. Temperance organ-
isations were often religiously motivated, and were therefore “crowded in” by the
presence of free church organisations. The political goals of labour organisations,
however, were sometimes misaligned with those of the temperance movement. Their
presence in a municipality, therefore, worsened the prospect of entry for temperance
organisations. The latter substitutability disappears completely with improvements
in railway access, which suggests that facilitating interactions between individu-
als weakens the ability of incumbent organisations to prevent entry of potentially
opposing groups.
This chapter is related to recent work by Garćıa-Jimeno et al. (2018), who
document the role of information diffusion in shaping collective action during the
U.S. Temperance Crusade of 1873-1874. They find that social interactions drive the
diffusion of protests against liquor dealers, and highlight complementarities between
railway and telegraph technologies. Their analysis takes these networks as given,
and identification derives from temporary closures of the network due to strikes and
accidents. I take an extensive-margin approach, and exploit the construction of new
railway lines. This difference speaks to the conceptual distinction between diffusion
(spread along existing network ties) and brokerage (spread along newly created
network ties) drawn by McAdam (2003). In this terminology, Garćıa-Jimeno et al.
(2018) speak to diffusion, whereas my identification comes from brokerage.
My focus on the transmission of ideas via railway technology, abstract-
ing from pre-existing postal and telegraph communications, is appropriate for the
brokerage setting. The establishment of new network ties and the spread of move-
4
ments along these newly formed ties required a level of in-person interaction infeas-
ible by post or telegraph. Indeed, personal visits were key for spreading the word
of the new movements, as noted by Lundkvist (1977). In this period, the mobility
granted by rail transformed both economy and society beyond existing communic-
ation technologies (Heckscher, 1906). In this chapter, I document its crucial role in
the spread of the ideas embodied in the fledgling social movements.
Another distinction between this chapter and the paper of Garćıa-Jimeno
et al. (2018) is the nature of the data used. The protest event data used by Garćıa-
Jimeno et al. (2018) is ideal for studying short, intense periods of collective action,
whereas the systematic membership data employed here is better suited for studying
the evolution of involvement in social movements over several decades. In addition, I
observe data for a menu of different social movements, which allows me to study the
strategic interactions between these movements directly. As such, while the present
work and that of Garćıa-Jimeno et al. (2018) are similar in setting and underlying
conceptual frameworks, they speak to different aspects of the same social interactions
and how improvements in technology shape these interactions.
Social movements, and the spread of ideas more broadly defined, have re-
ceived considerable attention in the economics, sociology and political science liter-
atures. Charles Tilly provided an early abstract conceptualisation of the conditions
under which social movements can successfully mobilise and reach political goals by
way of collective action (Tilly, 1978). Organisation is key to mobilisation: the ex-
istence of networks connecting individuals with shared characteristics or interests is
crucial to establish “groupness”. Improvements in transportation infrastructure can
aid the diffusion of social movements by facilitating the formation of such networks.
It is well-understood that ideas spread by popular movements can have far-
reaching economic, social and political consequences. As noted above, the grassroots
threat of revolution was instrumental in Europe’s democratisation period (Aidt and
Franck, 2015). The movement of people and ideas is crucial for growth, as demon-
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strated by Andersen and Dalgaard (2011) in their study of temporary cross-border
flows of people. The existence of dense networks of social capital need not neces-
sarily have positive outcomes, however, as noted by Satyanath et al. (2017) in their
study of the role of grassroots social clubs in aiding the rise of Nazism in Germany.
Nevertheless, social movements are key transmitters of ideas, and therefore
the technology by which ideas spread plays a crucial role in the movements’ success.
In the modern era, the availability of information and communication technology
shapes patterns of political mobilisation (Manacorda and Tesei (2018), Campante
et al. (2017), Enikolopov et al. (2017), Acemoglu et al. (2018)). In the Swedish
setting, geographic distances between political agents were key for the historical
proliferation of labour unions and fledgling social-democratic organisations (Hed-
ström (1994), Hedström et al. (2000)). I argue that by reducing effective distances,
the expansion of the railway network facilitated the formation of networks underpin-
ning the organisation and mobilisation of such groups. Increased interconnectedness
of actors helped overcome the coordination problems of collective action described
theoretically by Olson (1965) and identified experimentally by Cantoni et al. (2019).
Railway infrastructure, therefore, is a key technology in the process of transmitting
ideas, which shapes the pattern of social movement diffusion. This chapter con-
tributes to our understanding of this pattern of growth by exploiting exogenous
variation of railway access to causally estimate its effect on both the intensive and
extensive margins of spread. The particular historical setting leveraged here allows
me to study the impact of technology on diffusion over several decades, in contrast
to existing literature that has focussed on short-run bursts of engagement in social
movements.
The study of transportation infrastructure, and of railways in particular, has
a long-standing tradition in economics and economic history. In his pathbreaking
work, Fogel (1964) introduced a social savings methodology to argue that railways
only had a moderate effect on the U.S. agricultural sector. Using a different concep-
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tualisation of social savings, Fishlow (1965) reaches a more optimistic conclusion.2
In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in the effect of railways on the
economy. Inspired by Fogel’s early work, Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) reconsider
the impact of railways using modern econometric techniques and GIS methods and
provide evidence for their transformational impact on the U.S. agricultural sector.
While the study of the economic impact of railways began with a focus on
the U.S., a growing body of work documents the impact of railways on the growth
experiences of a range of countries. Studying nineteenth-century Prussia, Hornung
(2015) finds that railways were a key driver of urban population growth. Bogart
et al. (2018) document the spatial reorganisation of population and occupational
distributions triggered by rail in nineteenth-century England and Wales, and argue
that the ensuing agglomeration forces fostered further growth. Studying the Kenyan
experience, Jedwab et al. (2017) show that the initial spatial equilibrium generated
by colonial railways persisted even after the disuse of the colonial railway infrastruc-
ture. Closely related to the setting of this chapter, Berger and Enflo (2017) find
that railway expansion in nineteenth-century Sweden relocated economic activity
and had persistent effects on city growth.
Besides their direct impact on local growth, railways affect a multitude of
other facets of economic, political and social life. Perlman (2016) and Andersson
et al. (2017) both argue that railway expansion was a key driver of local innovation
in the U.S. and in Sweden, respectively. Donaldson (2018) combines archival data
with a general equilibrium trade model to show that railways in colonial India sub-
stantially decreased trade costs and fostered interregional and international trade,
with important effects for real income levels. Railways also enabled greater invest-
ments in human capital by increasing the supply of schools, as argued by Atack
et al. (2012). It is my aim to improve our understanding of the importance of rail-
2Concretely, Fogel (1964) compared the U.S. economy with railways to a counterfactual of
extended canal and road networks, whereas Fishlow (1965) used existing alternatives in the ante-
bellum period as the counterfactual.
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ways, and of communication technologies more broadly, by using insights from the
literature on historical economic geography to study the spatial pattern of social
movement diffusion.
In this chapter, I contribute to the body of work assessing the role of tech-
nology in shaping social interactions. I do so in a setting that exploits the trans-
formative historical impact of railways in Sweden. The same reductions in effective
distances between locations that drove the spatial patterns of economic growth also
triggered greater intercommunication between formerly distant places. This in-
crease in connectedness promoted the diffusion of ideas and fundamentally shaped
the interactions between disparate groups. Operationalising the particular setting
of late-nineteenth century Sweden in a well-identified econometric framework, I doc-
ument these effects in the salient case of the rise to prominence of Swedish social
movements.
1.2 Historical Background
1.2.1 Social Movements in Sweden
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, social movements were an
important part of the Swedish social and political fabric. From humble beginnings
as local grassroots organisations in the middle of the 1800s, various temperance
movements, free church associations, labour unions and leftist parties had grown into
potent social forces before the First World War. By 1910, combined membership
in these organisations totalled around 700,000, a sizeable figure relative to the total
Swedish population of 5.5 million.
These movements played a crucial role in the Swedish democratisation pro-
cess. Free church and temperance organisations were early to voice grassroots de-
mands for representation and an extension of the franchise. By the beginning of
the twentieth century, a significant proportion of the second chamber of parliament
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were free church or temperance members (Möller, 2015). These groups exhibited
significant engagement by women, and were particularly key for the introduction
of female suffrage in 1919. Labour organisations such as the unionist movement
and early social democratic party organisations also increasingly came to demand
extensions of the franchise (Lundkvist, 1977).
An important facet of Swedish social movements in this period is that, while
the movements themselves were national in scope, membership tended to be local.
That is, local branches could be set up with relative ease, and associations with just
a handful of members were relatively common. This means that local engagement
can be well-measured by the local presence of or membership in various movements.
I discuss measurement in more detail in Section 1.3 below.
1.2.2 The Swedish Railway Network
Swedish transportation infrastructure underwent rapid change in the second half of
the nineteenth century. Traditionally, transport had taken place on primitive roads
and highly seasonal waterways (Heckscher, 1954). Unpredictable and fragmented
pre-railway transportation networks meant that transshipment was frequent and
costs were often prohibitively high (Heckscher, 1907). The introduction and rapid
roll-out of a national railway network therefore dramatically changed Swedish trans-
portation by offering a faster, higher-frequency option at a lower cost.
Swedish railway construction started relatively late, and the state viewed
itself as having a crucial role to play in directing the expansion of the network. To
this end, several proposals were made for a “master plan” for the roll-out of rail. The
first was put forth in 1845 by Count Adolf von Rosen, who proposed a main trunk
line connecting the two largest cities (Stockholm and Gothenburg), with extensions
and branches for a national network.
After von Rosen failed to raise enough funds to begin construction, the par-
liament of 1853/1854 decided that construction of the main trunk lines would be
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state-financed. A second proposal was made by Colonel Nils Ericson, who was given
“dictatorial powers” to route the main lines (Kungliga järnvägsstyrelsen (1906), see
Berger and Enflo (2017) for a discussion). These plans aimed to connect major
cities and avoided the coast due to military concerns. Despite the significant powers
bestowed upon Ericson to draw the plans, they were ultimately rejected in the par-
liament of 1857. As such, both main proposals ultimately failed. Even so, they
greatly informed eventual railway construction.3
Railway construction began in 1855, and the first short lines were operational
by 1856 (Heckscher, 1954). Following a railway boom in the 1870s, the largest cities
in the southern half of the country were connected by 1880. Nevertheless, several
economic centres remained unconnected (Berger and Enflo, 2017). Throughout the
remainder of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, there
were additional periods of rapid expansion. By the eve of the First World War,
the railway network connected all the major population centres, including those in
the northern parts of the country. This massive expansion is best summarised in
the growth of aggregate railway line length: over the period 1856-1910, the total
combined length of the network increased from 66 to 13,829 kilometres.
1.2.3 Railways and the Spread of Social Movements
The large-scale expansion of the railway network had far-reaching effects. Writing
in 1906, Eli Heckscher mused on the profound social impact of the large increase in
mobility granted by the railway:
“Travel has been extended to infinitely wider strata of the population
... in contrast with the past, transport has an apparent democratising
effect in the present.” 4
3These plans can therefore be used as instruments for actual railways, as in Berger and Enflo
(2017) and Andersson et al. (2017). I discuss this instrumental variables strategy in depth in Section
1.4 below.
4Quotation from Heckscher (1906). Author’s translation. Original text: “resandet har ut-
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One facet of the “democratising effect” of rail is the facilitation of the spread
of ideas and popular engagement with them. Hedström (1994) notes the crucial role
of distance between actors in the diffusion of Swedish trade unionism, and Hedström
et al. (2000) stress the importance of the existence of “mesolevel” networks between
disparate groups of actors for the geographic spread of early social democracy. In
particular, the ability of individual actors to travel was key in spreading the word
of new ideas and movements:
“The channels of communication for the new [ideas] were primarily per-
sonal visits by colporteurs, preachers, agitators and others.” 5
In the Swedish case, the expansion of the railway network reduced effect-
ive distances, increased the mobility of individuals and facilitated the formation
of mesolevel networks, and enabled the spatial diffusion of involvement in social
movements. It is my objective in the remainder of the chapter to obtain causal
estimates of the impact of rail on the spread and diffusion of social movements, and
to elucidate the mechanisms by which this effect operates.
1.3 Data
The main data set used in this chapter is a panel covering 2,270 Swedish municip-
alities over the thirty-year period 1881-1910, for a total of 68,100 municipality-year
observations. Data on key variables of interest are compiled from a number of
sources.
sträckts till oändligt vidare kretsar af folket ... I motsats mot förr verka transportmedlen i nutiden
uppenbarligen demokratiserande.”
5Quotation from Lundkvist (1977). Author’s translation. Original text: “Kommunikation-
skanalerna för det nya var främst pesonliga besök av kolportörer, predikanter, agitatorer och an-
dra.”
11
1.3.1 Data from the Swedish Social Movements Archive
Main outcomes of interest are constructed using the Swedish Social Movements
Archive (Andrae and Lundkvist, 1998). The archive is the output of a research
project that documents the history of four main social movements: temperance or-
ganisations, free churches, unions and left party organisations. 6 For each organisa-
tion, the archive details the municipality where it was seated, its year of foundation
and (if applicable) its year of dissolution. In addition, the archive documents the
number of members in each organisation on 31 December in each year. From this
data, I construct an organisation-year panel that I collapse to a municipality-year
panel for my analysis. For each municipality, therefore, I can observe which of the
four movement types were present in any given year, their membership figures and
the total number of distinct organisations.
I report summary statistics for the social movement data in Panels A and B
of Table 1.1 and show aggregate time series of the spread of and membership in each
movement type in Figure 1.1. Social movements (of any type) are present in roughly
half of municipality-year observations, and this is driven primarily by temperance
and free church organisations. Figure 1.1 illustrates this well: temperance and
free church organisations were already relatively well established at the start of my
sample period, whereas the establishment and diffusion of unions and left party
organisations began in earnest in the second half of the 1890s.
Panel B of Table 1.1 reports social movement summary statistics conditional
on movement presence. This panel illustrates two things. First, there is signific-
ant heterogeneity in movement size across municipalities. Some municipalities have
movements with only a handful of members, whereas the larger municipalities can
have memberships in the tens of thousands. Similarly for the number of organisa-
tions: in some municipalities a movement type is represented by only one organisa-
6These left party organisations formed the backbone of the fledgling Social Democratic Party,
which was founded in 1889 and became a dominant political force in the early twentieth century.
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tion, while in other municipalities many different organisations are active within the
same movement type. Second, the panel demonstrates that unions and left parties
tend to be larger, on average, than temperance and free church organisations.
1.3.2 Data on the Swedish Railway Network, 1881-1910
The main treatment variables in this chapter are measures of proximity to the
railway. To this end, I construct yearly measures of the distance from each mu-
nicipality to the completed railway network. For each year, I digitise the railway
network from maps published in historical accounts by Statistics Sweden (Stat-
istiska Centralbyr̊an, various years). I then calculate the geodesic distance from the
main settlement in each municipality to the nearest completed railway line in each
year. The location of the main settlement is a better indicator of where the mass
of the population is located than, for example, the centroid of the municipality in
computing measures of railway access.
In Figure 1.2, I show the extent of the network at the beginning (1881) and
end (1910) of my sample period. I report measures of railway access in Panel C
of Table 1.1 and in Figure 1.3. The median distance to rail is decreasing stead-
ily throughout the sample period, while the proportion of municipalities within a
reasonable distance of rail is increasing. Aggregate measures disguise substantial
heterogeneity: the distance from rail varies from 0 kilometres (for municipalities on
a railway line) to over 600 kilometres (for remote northern municipalities before the
northward extension of the network).
For the majority of my analysis, I employ an instrumental variables strategy
exploiting proximity to initial railway plans to instrument for proximity to realised
railway lines. This strategy is inspired by Berger and Enflo (2017) and I collect
data on the railway plans from an official publication celebrating the centenary of
the Swedish railway (Kungliga järnvägsstyrelsen, 1956). As with the constructed
railway lines, I digitise the railway plans and then compute the distance to these
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plans for each municipality. Maps of the railway plans and their relationship to
realised lines are shown in Figure 1.4, and the mean distance to the plans is reported
in Panel C of Table 1.1. I discuss the construction of the instrument in more detail
in Section 1.4 below.
In my exploration of the mechanisms underlying the positive effect of railway
access on social movement diffusion (see Section 1.6), I additionally employ station-
level data on passenger and freight arrivals at state-operated stations. Using the
same historical documents of Statistics Sweden (Statistiska Centralbyr̊an, various
years), I identify stations associated with the municipalities in my sample and di-
gitise yearly arrivals of passengers and freight. Summary statistics are reported in
Panel C of Table 1.1.
1.3.3 Other Data
I collect additional data from various sources. I make use of the full-count censuses
of 1880, 1890, 1900 and 1910 (Riksarkivet and Minnesota Population Center, vari-
ous years) to construct demographic controls and to transform social movement
outcomes into per capita measures where appropriate. Since censuses are decadal,
I use a constant growth rate interpolation for non-census years.7
Lastly, I use topographical data from NASA (2009) and land cover data
from Natural Earth (various) to construct various geographical controls, including
elevation, distance to coast, distance to nodal municipalities in the railway network
and distance to the capital.
1.4 Empirical Framework
To estimate the effect of railway access on the proliferation and growth of social
movements, I implement two empirical strategies. The first is an event study design,
7This equates to linearly interpolating logged values. I demonstrate in Section 1.5 that my
results are robust to other interpolation regimes.
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where I explore the impact of the arrival of rail within ten kilometres of a municip-
ality. This exercise motivates the remainder of the analysis by demonstrating that
proximity to rail matters for social movement outcomes. The drawback of the event
study framework is that the “event” needs to be specified, and any distance cut-off
chosen to designate the event is arbitrary.
In the second empirical strategy, therefore, I regress social movement out-
comes on the distance to railway directly. Distance to railway is likely to be de-
termined endogenously with social movement outcomes. Bias arising from reverse
causality and omitted variables would therefore preclude a causal interpretation of
estimates from a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Hence, I propose
an instrumental variables (IV) framework in which I instrument for actual distance
to the railway network using distances to initial railway plans. This instrument was
first used for the Swedish setting by Berger and Enflo (2017) and later by Andersson
et al. (2017). The instrumental variables strategy constitutes the majority of the
analysis, and is described in more detail below.
1.4.1 Event Study
The first empirical strategy I employ is a motivating exercise for the remainder of
the analysis. I define the arrival of the railway network within ten kilometres of
the seat of a municipality as an “event”, and explore its impact in a standard event
study framework.8 Formally, the equation I estimate is:
Yit = αi + γt + αi × t+
5∑
τ=−5
ρt+τ1{Rail within 10km}it +X′it β + εit (1.1)
In this equation, Yit is a social movement outcome of interest. This could be
an indicator for the presence of a movement, a measure of the membership in social
8I conduct robustness checks using different distance cut-offs, which I discuss in Section 1.5.
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movements or the number of distinct organisations operating within a municipality.
The explanatory variable of interest is the indicator 1{Rail within 10km}it, which
switches on when the railway network first expands to within ten kilometres of a
municipality. The sequence of coefficients ρt+τ capture the effect of the arrival of
rail before and after the event.
The terms αi and γt are municipality and year fixed effects, respectively.
The former capture time-invariant municipality-specific effects, while the latter cap-
ture year-specific shocks affecting all municipalities equally. In addition, I include
municipality-specific linear time trends αi × t. Finally, the vector of controls Xit
includes geography and baseline demographic characteristics interacted with year
fixed effects, as well as contemporaneous population controls. These controls are
discussed in more detail as they are introduced.
Identifying Assumptions
Identification in the event study set up relies on the comparison of the evolution
of social movement outcomes in municipalities which experienced the “event” in
a particular year to that in municipalities which did not. Crucially, therefore, it
must be the case that the two groups of municipalities do not exhibit differential
trends prior to the event. Only if the parallel pre-trends assumption is satisfied do
the unaffected municipalities constitute valid counterfactuals to the affected ones. I
evaluate the credibility of this assumption when presenting my event study results
below.
Additionally, to ensure I identify the effect of the railway, no other confound-
ing changes may take place in treated municipalities concurrent with the arrival of
rail in their proximity. The event study design is helpful to alleviate such concerns,
since different municipalities experience the event at different points in time. Any
year-specific confounding effects will therefore be absorbed in the year fixed effects.
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1.4.2 Instrumental Variables
The event study strategy outlined above relies on the arbitrary definition of the
“event” as the arrival of the railway within ten kilometres of a municipality. To
avoid having to make such discrete distinctions, it is possible to regress a social
movement outcome Yit on distance to railway RailDistit directly:
Yit = αi + γt + φ RailDistit +X
′
it β + εit (1.2)
As before, αi and γt are municipality and year fixed effects, respectively, and
Xit is a vector of controls described as they are introduced in the analysis below.
The coefficient of interest is φ, which captures the effect of distance to rail on a
given social movement outcome.
As a concrete example, suppose Yit is an indicator taking a value of one
if any social movement is present in municipality i in year t. Suppose further,
as indeed will be the case throughout the chapter, that RailDistit is the inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation of the distance (in kilometres) to the nearest part of
the railway network.9 The estimated coefficient φ would then capture the increase
in the probability that any movement is present that would result from a doubling
of the distance to the railway. Theoretically, I expect to find φ < 0. If railways
facilitate transportation and interactions between people, then greater access to rail
(that is, lower distance to rail) should cause movements to proliferate.
Estimation of equation 1.2 by OLS is unlikely to yield a causal estimate of
the effect of rail on social movements for three main reasons. First, reverse causality
may generate a spurious relationship between Yit and RailDistit. If local grassroots
organisations were successful in lobbying for railway network extensions in their
vicinity, then social movements may drive railway proximity and not vice versa.
9I use the inverse hyperbolic sine rather than the natural logarithm to allow for zero distances.
The interpretation of the estimated coefficients is similar to that of the natural logarithm. See
Burbidge et al. (1988) for details. Robustness checks using the natural logarithm are discussed in
Section 1.5 and reported in Table 1.12 in Appendix B.
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Second, independent of reverse causality, there may be underlying omitted variables
driving both social movement activity and railway expansion. If these omitted
factors are time-varying, they will not be absorbed by municipality fixed effects. As
a concrete example, some municipal leaders are more progressive than others, and
may want to foster both local engagement in social movements and better transport
connections. This would cause a spurious negative relationship between distance
to railway and social movement outcomes even in the absence of a causal impact.
Finally, since data on the railway network come from the digitisation of historical
maps (as detailed in Section 1.2), measurement error may be a concern. Since errors
arising from the digitisation process are likely to be classical, the resulting bias of
my coefficient estimates will be towards zero. Such bias would make it more difficult
to identify an effect, if it exists.
The three concerns outlined above all suggest the use of an instrument to
generate exogenous variation in actual distance to rail. This variation can be used
to obtain causal estimates of φ in equation 1.2. In particular, I propose to use an
instrument first introduced in Berger and Enflo (2017), which exploits the particular
history of railway building in Sweden. The essence of the instrument is to use
proximity to initial plans of the railway network to predict proximity to the realised
network. For historical background on the railway plans, see Section 1.2 above. The
precise definition of the instrument as well as a discussion of its validity is provided
below.
Formally, RailDistit is instrumented in a first stage equation given by:
RailDistit = αi + γt +
∑
d
δd PlanDisti × 1{decade = d}t +X′it β + νit (1.3)
The terms αi, γt and Xit are municipality fixed effects, year fixed effects and
a vector of controls as before. RailDistit is the presumably endogenous distance to
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the railway network that needs to be instrumented. The variable PlanDisti is the
time-invariant distance to the planned railway network.10 To use this distance in
a panel framework, I interact it with decade fixed effects 1{decade = d}t, taking
1881-1890 as the base decade.11 The estimated first stage coefficients δd should
therefore be thought of as the change in the elasticity between planned and realised
railway network expansion as the network develops.12
The Railway Plan Instrument
As discussed in Section 1.2 above, two main network plans were proposed before
railway construction began (the von Rosen plan in 1845 and the Ericson plan in
1854). While these plans were both ultimately abandoned, they are still good pre-
dictors of where eventual construction took place. Maps of these plans and their
relation to the realised network are presented in Figures 1.4b and 1.4c.
Notably, neither plan made provisions for northward railway expansion, with
the drawback that the plans will be relatively worse predictors for actual railways
in the northern parts of the country. To overcome this drawback, I make use of the
“nodal” destinations targeted in the proposals and construct a set of straight lines
connecting these destinations, as shown in Figure 1.4d.13
Based on these three counterfactual railway networks, I define my instrument
PlanDisti in the following way:
PlanDisti = min{Dist. von Roseni,Dist. Ericsoni,Dist. Nodal Linesi}
That is, the instrument is the distance of municipality i to the nearest of the
10I will take the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of this distance throughout.
11The remaining two decades are therefore 1891-1900 and 1901-1910.
12See Andersson et al. (2017) for a similar use of this instrument in a panel setting.
13The nodal destinations are Stockholm, Gothenburg, Malmö, Östersund and Korsvinger. In
most specifications, I control for the distance to these nodal destinations. Additionally, I report
robustness checks dropping nodal destinations completely in Table 1.15 in Appendix B.
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three counterfactual railway networks.14
Identifying Assumptions
For the two-stage least squares framework described by equations 1.2 and 1.3 to
produce causal estimates of φ, the instruments
∑
d δd PlanDisti × 1{decade = d}t
need to satisfy a number of validity conditions. First, the instruments need to be
relevant. That is, PlanDisti needs to predict RailDistit, and this effect needs to vary
between decades for the time-varying instrument to have bite. In Figure 1.5, I report
the relationship between actual and planned distance to railway in select years. As
expected, the effect is strongly positive in each year, but diminishing over time. A
diminishing effect is intuitive: as the network expands, more marginal locations are
connected, which weakens the predictive power of the early plans.
Second, the instrument needs to be uncorrelated with the error term in equa-
tion 1.2 (εit) to satisfy the exclusion restriction. In other words, proximity to the
railway plans should predict social movement outcomes only via the channel of ac-
tual railway access. This condition intuitively seems to be satisfied in this case,
given that the proposals were drawn strategically to connect major cities. Proxim-
ity to planned railways which were never built should therefore be uncorrelated with
social and political outcomes decades later.15
Third, potential outcomes and potential treatments need to be condition-
ally independent of the instrument. The history of Swedish railway construction is
once again helpful here, since municipalities were not targeted for their potential for
flourishing social engagement. In most specifications, however, I control richly for
geographical and demographic characteristics to guarantee (at a minimum) condi-
14Berger and Enflo (2017) show that the three individual instruments behave similarly.
15I test for this by regressing social movement outcomes prior to railway construction on the
distance to the railway plan. Concretely, I run OLS regressions of the form Yi = δ PlanDisti +
β Xi + ηi, using the first year of the sample only (1881), and only for subsamples of municipalities
which were far from already constructed railways. Results are reported in Table 1.10 in Appendix
B, and support the exclusion restriction of the instrument.
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tional independence.16
The final requirement for a valid instrument is monotonicity (or “no defiers”).
This condition intuitively seems to be satisfied, since proximity to a planned railway
line is unlikely to cause some municipalities to be further away from realised rail
than would have been the case if they were distant from the planned line.
1.5 Main Results
Using the identifying frameworks described in Section 1.4 above, I present results
demonstrating the causal impact of railway access on the proliferation and growth
of social movements. Before formally estimating the event study and instrumental
variables equations, I provide some illustrative correlational evidence. Figure 1.6
presents maps showing the spatial relationships between railway expansion and so-
cial movement presence and membership. At the beginning of the sample period,
in 1881, both rail and social movements were relatively sparsely distributed. Nev-
ertheless, the spatial patterns can be seen clearly: connectedness with the railway
network is associated with a higher density of social movements. After a decade
of railway expansion, in 1890, the relationship becomes even more striking. Social
movements spread along the completed railway network, suggesting a key role for
rail in the diffusion of these movements.
Additionally, I present correlational evidence separately by movement type in
Figure 1.7. Starting with Figure 1.7a, distance to the railway network is negatively
correlated with the probability of movement presence, and consistently so across all
movement types. Figure 1.7b demonstrates a similar negative relationship between
distance to rail and membership. In this sense, railway access is crucial on both the
extensive and intensive margins of social movement proliferation. Finally, in Figure
1.7c I report correlations between access and the number of distinct organisations
16Andersson et al. (2017) show that municipalities with different proximities to planned railway
lines are well-balanced on pre-railway characteristics.
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active in a municipality. The negative relationship presented in this figure suggests
that, in addition to larger total membership, proximity to rail also increases the
local variety of active groups. These results together suggest that mobility is key
to the mobilisation of social movements. In the following sections, I investigate this
relationship more formally.
1.5.1 Event Study Results
I begin by presenting results for the event study framework outlined in equation 1.1.
As discussed above, I define the “event” to be the arrival of the railway within the
proximity of a municipality. Any distance used in the definition of proximity will
be arbitrary, but in the main results I use ten kilometres as the cut-off. I present
robustness checks using different cut-offs in Figure 1.15 in Appendix B.
In Figures 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10, I report results for three different outcomes.
First, in Figure 1.8, I show the impact of gaining access to the railway network
on the extensive margin of social movement spread. The dependent variable in
this regression is an indicator equal to 1 if any social movement is present in the
municipality. The sequence of coefficients I report, ρt+τ , captures the effect of access
before and after the event. Reassuringly, there is no impact prior to the arrival of rail,
suggesting that municipalities which would eventually end up with railway access
were not on a differential pre-trend. In the years after gaining access, however, there
is a small but positive and statistically significant effect on movement presence. As
a concrete example, the coefficient ρt+3 = 0.029 implies that three years after the
arrival of rail, a municipality is around three percentage points more likely to host
a social movement.
To speak to the effect of rail on the intensive margin of social movement
proliferation, I report similar event study regressions in Figures 1.9 and 1.10. In
these specifications, I take as outcomes the number of members and the number of
distinct organisations, respectively. I transform both outcomes using a hyperbolic
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sine transformation, and control for population in both regressions to abstract away
from any mechanical impact of population growth on these outcomes. Both sets
of results support the descriptive evidence presented above: rail plays a signific-
ant role also on the intensive margins of diffusion. To interpret the results, again
take the coefficient ρt+3. The estimated coefficients suggest that gaining railway
access increases membership by almost 16 percent (ρt+3 = 0.157) and the number
of organisations by almost 5 percent (ρt+3 = 0.043) after three years.
1.5.2 Instrumental Variables Results
The event study framework above is illustrative, but has the drawback of requiring a
stark cut-off for the distance to the railway network. To identify the effect of distance
without presupposing the relevant distance, estimating an equation like equation 1.2,
in which social movement outcomes are regressed on distance to rail directly, is more
appropriate. As discussed, however, estimating this equation by OLS is unlikely to
yield causal estimates of φ. I therefore use an instrumental variables framework and
estimate equations 1.2 and 1.3 using two-stage least squares.
I display the first-stage relationship graphically in Figure 1.5, and report
results from a more formal estimation of the first-stage equation 1.3 in Table 1.2. In
column 1, I report a parsimonious specification which includes only municipality and
year fixed effects in addition to the instruments
∑
d δdPlanDisti×1{decade = d}t.17
The decade 1881-1890 is the baseline decade. As expected, the coefficients for the
ensuing decades are negative and highly statistically significant. The negative effects
should be interpreted as the change in the elasticity between the distances to realised
and planned railways over time.
17Throughout, I use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of both actual and planned
distances. Robustness checks using the natural logarithm are presented in Table 1.12 in Appendix
B. I report standard errors clustered on the municipality level. For robustness checks using different
standard error structures, see Table 1.13 in Appendix B. All regressions make use of census data,
either to construct per capita measures of social movement activity or to control for census measures
directly. In my main results, I assume a constant year-on-year growth rate of these measures, but
I demonstrate in Table 1.14 in Appendix B that my results are robust to alternative interpolation
regimes.
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In columns 2, 3 and 4, I gradually introduce different controls to the specific-
ation to probe the stability of estimated coefficients. First I include time-invariant
geographical controls interacted with year fixed effects. These controls capture de-
terminants of the original railway plan proposals, and are therefore key to ensur-
ing the (conditional) independence of the instruments.18 In column 3, I introduce
baseline demographic characteristics interacted with year fixed effects.19 Finally,
in column 4 I add a control for contemporaneous population.20 The estimated
coefficients remain relatively stable and highly significant throughout the successive
inclusion of richer sets of controls.
Having established that the proposed instruments exhibit a strong first stage,
I now discuss the main OLS and instrumental variables results. Beginning with an
exploration of the extensive margin of diffusion in Table 1.3, I take an indicator
for the presence of any social movement as the outcome. This table, like the rest
of the tables presented in this section, takes the following structure: in columns
1, 2 and 3, I report OLS results gradually adding richer sets of controls, and in
columns 4, 5 and 6, I report the same specifications using a two-stage least squares
instrumental variables (IV) framework. The OLS results in columns 1, 2 and 3
suggest the expected negative relationship between distance to railway and social
movement presence. Though coefficients are imprecisely estimated, the coefficients
are negative throughout all specifications.
For reasons discussed above, however, these estimates are likely biased to-
wards zero, so I now turn to the IV results reported in columns 4, 5 and 6.21 The
18In particular, I include distance to the nodal destinations targeted by the military plans used
in the construction of my instrument. As an additional robustness check, I report results completely
dropping these nodal destinations in Table 1.15 in Appendix B.
19These are baseline characteristics in the sense that they are constructed using the 1880 census,
the year prior to the start of my sample period.
20Throughout, I will use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of population.
21Corresponding reduced-form regressions are reported in Panel A of Table 1.11 in Appendix
B. In Panels B-D of Table 1.11, I report similar regressions for other social movement outcomes
(discussed below). The coefficients should be interpreted analogously to those of the first-stage
results discussed above. Unconditionally across all years, social movement outcomes depend negat-
ively on distance to the military plans. The positive coefficients on the interaction of the distance
to the military plans with decade fixed effects therefore capture the attenuation of this negative
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consistent negative relationship remains, and is significantly different from zero.
Taking the richest specification in column 6, the estimated coefficient implies that
doubling the distance to railway reduces the probability of social movement presence
by 20 percentage points. This is a sizeable effect compared to the unconditional out-
come mean of 0.49, suggesting that proximity to rail is instrumental for the extensive
margin of diffusion.
In Tables 1.4 and 1.5, I present evidence for the impact of rail on the intens-
ive margins of proliferation. First, in Table 1.4 I explore the effect on growth of
membership per capita. Consistently across the OLS and IV results, I find that dis-
tance to the railway network negatively impacts growth. The IV estimate in column
6 suggests that doubling the distance to rail reduces the growth of membership by
five members per 1000 inhabitants per year.
Additionally, in Table 1.5 I report estimates of the impact on the growth
of the number of organisations per 1,000 inhabitants. This measure captures the
level of diversity of representation offered by social movements. A greater number
of population-weighted organisations indicates a weakly better match between indi-
vidual and organisation preferences. Consistent with previous results, the estimates
reported in Table 1.5 suggest that proximity to rail fostered a larger variety of local
organisations. Increasing the distance to the nearest railway line is associated with
a reduction in the rate of growth of local richness of representation.
A greater number of local organisations is indicative of an increased ability
of individuals to find a movement that matches their preferences. If one group
captures the majority of the “market share” of membership, however, then a larger
number of organisations masks a de facto concentration of membership. To tease
out the effect on variety of representation per se, I construct an index of within-
movement membership concentration. Formally, I define the within concentration
of municipality i in year t as:





Where k denotes an organisation, and m denotes a movement type. Each




Therefore, Sharekmit is organisation k’s share of the total membership in its
movement type m. The within concentration in municipality i is then the maximum
such share across all movement types. Naturally, this index is defined only for
municipalities where at least one movement type is present. A larger value of the
index indicates greater concentration of membership. It is similar in flavour to
the Herfindahl index, with the attractive feature that it can straightforwardly be
applied to a panel setting where the number of movement types and organisations
are allowed to vary within a municipality over time.
I report estimates of the effect of rail on within-movement concentration in
Table 1.6. The results suggest that, in addition to fostering a greater number of
organisations, railway proximity also reduces the level of concentration. That is,
not only do individuals in municipalities with better railway access have a wider
selection of potential associations on offer, they also choose more broadly from this
selection. As a concrete example, column 6 suggests that doubling the distance
to rail increases the concentration of membership in the largest movement by 9
percentage points.
Comparing OLS and IV results
Throughout the reported results, a striking feature is that the IV results are consist-
ently larger than those from the OLS. This is to be expected for two main reasons.
First, as discussed above, since distances to rail are calculated based on a railway
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network digitised from historical maps, some degree of measurement error is to be
expected. Since this error is likely to be classical in nature, OLS estimates are biased
towards zero. Instrumental variables estimates solves the measurement error bias,
and therefore naturally leads to larger coefficient estimates.
Second, the instrumental variables framework estimates an effect similar to
the local average treatment effect of the “compliers”.22 That is, the estimated
effect of rail on social movement outcomes obtained from the IV comes from those
municipalities which were proximate to the constructed railway network only by
virtue of being close to the planned routes, but would not have been close to rail
otherwise. It is probable that the treatment effect for municipalities which were
connected “by accident” is greater than for municipalities which would have received
network access regardless of proximity to planned routes. In a sense, it is also the
effect of such accidental connectivity which is most interesting to study if we are
interested in causal estimates, since it is the most plausibly exogenous source of
variation in railway access.
1.5.3 Discussion
Across a range of correlational and causal evidence, I have demonstrated the cru-
cial role played by transportation infrastructure in enabling the diffusion of social
movements along both intensive and extensive margins. Not only is railway ac-
cess causally predictive of the entry of social movements into a municipality, it also
drives the growth of membership in these movements. In addition, railway prox-
imity fosters diversity of local representation, as measured both by the population-
weighted number of organisations and by the concentration of membership within
different movement types. In the following section, I probe the mechanisms under-
lying these results. In particular, building on the market access literature, I claim
22The strict interpretation of local average treatment effects applies to binary treatments and
instruments. Here, the treatments and instruments are continuous, and as such the interpretation
of the effect is slightly more complicated, though similar.
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that by reducing effective distances between municipalities, the expansion of the
railway network facilitated a social contagion of ideas.
1.6 Mechanisms: Social Movement “Market Access”
Having established that proximity to the railway network drives the diffusion of
social movements, I now elucidate the mechanisms which underlie this effect. The
historiography of the Swedish railway alluded to in Section 1.2 above suggests two
key forces. Newly established railway connections reduce effective distances between
municipalities, which on the one hand enables the organic spread of social move-
ments from one municipality to the next, creating a social contagion effect. On the
other hand, reductions in effective travel costs also facilitates the directed efforts
of individual actors within movements to target particular municipalities, which
creates a more strategic pattern of diffusion.
I employ a conceptual framework akin to the “market access” measure of
Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) to quantify and disentangle these related but dis-
tinct effects. A general market access measure for municipality i in year t is defined






Here, Costijt is a resistance term, capturing the cost associated with the
least costly path between municipalities i and j in year t. Further details on the
calculations of these costs are provided in Appendix A. The parameter θ is set to 1
by convention. Different interpretations of market access are possible, depending on
the variable chosen for Mjt, allowing me to explore the different mechanisms driving
the main effects.
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1.6.1 Spatial Contagion of Social Movements
A possible interpretation of market access is to set Mjt = Membershipjt. That is,
MarketAccessit is a least-cost path weighted average of movement memberships in
all other municipalities. In this interpretation, the resistance terms Cost−θijt can be
collected in a complete adjacency matrix summarising the network of municipalities,



































This measure of market access relates very closely to the peer effects lit-
erature, and is therefore ideal for capturing the spatial contagion of membership.
Essentially, every municipality is a “peer” of every other municipality, where the
strength of the connection is determined by the transportation infrastructure link-
ing them. The term Cost−θijt × Membershipjt captures the access to and influence
from the movement membership in municipality j on municipality i in year t. As
the effective cost falls or the membership in j grows, a greater peer effect is exer-
ted on i by j, thereby increasing the probability of contagion. I provide details on
the construction of the least-cost matrix used to calculate the cost terms Costijt in
Appendix A.
1.6.2 Market Potential and Strategic Spread
In addition to the peer effects interpretation of market access, a more traditional
reading from the economic geography literature is possible. If Mjt = Populationjt,




ijt × Populationjt, a distance-
weighted average of population which captures a municipality’s market potential.
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With this measure, I can approximate the optimisation problem solved by operatives
of the social movements when strategically deciding where to spread their ideas.
Given two observationally equivalent municipalities, operatives will want to
target the municipality where the potential audience in neighbouring settlements is
greater. This is similar in flavour to the type of strategic behaviour conceptualised
by Hanson and Xiang (2013) to explain the globalisation of Christianity. Under this
interpretation, municipalities with a greater market potential should exhibit greater
movement presence and membership.
1.6.3 Disentangling Contagion and Market Potential Effects
Disentangling these related effects is an empirical task. To this end, I operation-
alise the market access measure within my instrumental variables framework. The
relevant second stage becomes:
Yit = αi + γt + κMarketAccessit +X
′
it β + εit (1.4)
Where MarketAccessit can take one of the two interpretations described
above. Under both interpretations, I expect κ > 0. Since market access is en-
dogenous to social movement outcomes, I instrument for it in the first stage given
by:
MarketAccessit = αi + γt +
∑
d
δd PlanDisti × 1{decade = d}t +X′it β + νit (1.5)
Crucially, the roll-out of the railway network provides me with within-dyad
variation in the MarketAccessit measure over time. As the network expands, con-
nectivity between municipalities improves. To illustrate, Figure 1.11 shows how
least-costs to Stockholm decreased over the sample period. Similar maps can be
drawn for the least-costs to each of the 2,270 municipalities in my sample. In Figure
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1.12, I document that these improvements in connectedness asymmetrically affected
initially worse-connected municipalities. While costs fell by over 20 percent from
1881 to 1910 in the top quartile of municipalities, they fell by close to 40 percent
in the bottom quartile over the same period. This asymmetry speaks to the two
potential channels of transmission for social movements noted by McAdam (2003):
diffusion (spread along existing network ties) and brokerage (spread along newly
created network ties). The wider geographical reach of the railway network and
asymmetric fall in travel costs seems to favour the “brokerage” interpretation.
In Table 1.7, I summarise the impact of different market access measures on
my four key social movement outcomes.23 Columns 1 and 2 provide OLS and IV
estimates, respectively, using the peer effects measure of market access in the full
specifications including the richest set of controls. In columns 3 and 4, I report
the same using the market potential measure. To disentangle the two effects, I use
membership per capita in my market access measure in columns 5 and 6. If the
membership effect in columns 1 and 2 is driven by the population effect in columns
3 and 4, then the membership per capita effect should be zero. This provides me
with an indirect way of testing for social contagion as a key mechanism.
The various specifications in columns 1 and 2 suggest a contagion effect.
Higher access to membership in neighbouring municipalities increases the likelihood
of movements spreading, spurs the growth of per capita membership and the variety
of associations, and reduces the concentration of membership within a single organ-
isation. However, this may be mechanically related to the market potential effect,
which I document in columns 3 and 4. Proximity to higher-population municipalities
also significantly drives the same measures of social movement proliferation.
To net out the population effect from the contagion effect, I report estimates
using a per capita membership market access measure in columns 5 and 6. I still find
a highly consistent and significant effect across all the social movement outcomes,
23All market access measures have been transformed using an inverse hyperbolic sine transform-
ation.
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suggesting that the social contagion effect is not merely an artefact of population
size. These results point to the importance of access to existing hubs of social
movement activity for the continued diffusion of the movement.
1.6.4 Station-Level Results
To support the claim that social contagion drives the growth of social movements,
I use station-level data to demonstrate that an increase in the number of passenger
arrivals in a municipality is associated with heightened social movement presence
and growth. Crucially, the same relationship does not hold for freight arrivals, which
dispels concerns that the diffusion effect I document is simply an artefact of increased
local economic activity. Rather, the effect of passenger arrivals on social movement
spread is indicative of the key role of the mobility of individuals in spreading socially
salient ideas.
As detailed in Section 1.3 above, I use data on the number of passengers and
the volume of freight arriving at each station in each year, and match the station
data to the municipalities in my main sample. I create a balanced panel of the
subset of municipalities which at some point in the thirty-year period 1881-1910
had a local railway station. I then estimate OLS regressions of the form:
Yit = αi + γt + λArrivalsit +X
′
it β + εit (1.6)
The variable Arrivalsit is either the number of passengers or the volume of
freight arriving into municipality i in year t.24 Since my municipality-year panel is
balanced, a municipality will by definition have zero passenger and freight arrivals
prior to the construction of a station. To abstract away from the effect of the con-
struction of a station per se, I control for the presence of a station in all regressions.
The coefficient of interest, λ, therefore captures the effect of an increase in passenger
or freight arrivals on the social movement outcome of interest, Yit. If the movement
24I use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of both types of arrivals throughout.
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of individuals is key to the spread of social movements, then we expect λ > 0 for
passenger arrivals but λ = 0 for freight arrivals.
I report results of this exercise in Table 1.8. Each set of three columns
takes as the dependent variable one of the key social movement outcomes already
discussed. In columns 1-3, for example, I explore the effect of passenger and freight
arrivals on the presence of any social movement organisation in the municipality.
The estimated coefficient reported in column 1 suggests that a doubling of the
number of passenger arrivals in a municipality is associated with a 5 percentage
point increase in the probability that a social movement organisation is present
there. Interestingly, there is no analogous effect of freight arrivals, as shown in
column 2. When both passenger and freight arrivals are included in column 3, the
effect of passenger arrivals clearly dominates.
The remainder of the table repeats the exercise for the three other social
movement outcomes, and a very similar pattern emerges. Movement membership
and organisational density both depend positively on passenger arrivals, but not on
freight arrivals (columns 4-9). While statistically indistinguishable from zero, the
signs of the coefficients in columns 10-12 suggest that the concentration of move-
ment membership within a single organisation is reduced with increases in passenger
arrivals, but not with increases in freight arrivals.
Taken as a whole, these results underscore the crucial role of the mobility
of individuals in the spread and growth of popular movements.25 Viewed together
with the market access results above, a salient mechanism explaining the impact of
railway access on social movement proliferation is revealed. By reducing least-cost
25A potential alternative mechanism consistent with these results is a changing local occupational
structure. Suppose, for example, that industry develops in a municipality due to railway access.
This would result both in greater inflow of migrants and, potentially, of increased social movement
activity as industrial workers organise in unions. To investigate this mechanism, I re-run my baseline
specification with occupational shares in major economic sectors as the outcome. These results are
reported in Table 1.16 in Appendix B. There is no systematic contemporaneous effect of improved
railway access on industrialisation. This is not to suggest that railway access does not matter for
industrialisation, but rather that the process of industrialisation is likely slower-moving than the
diffusion of social movements documented in this chapter and hence cannot be a main driver of my
results.
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distances between places, the railway network facilitated the spread of ideas from
one municipality to the next by enabling individuals to travel.
1.7 Strategic Interactions between Movements
Reductions in effective distances as a result of railway expansion profoundly shaped
the diffusion of social movements in the period 1881-1910. In Section 1.5, I demon-
strated this effect using a variety of empirical strategies, and in Section 1.6 I high-
lighted social contagion as a key mechanism driving this result. In this section,
I explore the manner in which railway roll-out shaped the strategic interactions
between different movement types.
It is theoretically ambiguous whether memberships in different movements
should act as substitutes or complements to one another. If the individual optim-
isation problem is such that membership in one organisation satiates demand for
membership in additional organisations, then the presence of one movement in a
given municipality would preclude the entry of further movements. On the other
hand, if second-mover entry is subject to lower fixed costs than first-mover entry
(due to social capital that has already been established as a result of the first entry,
for example), then movements can crowd in further movements.26
In addition to such theoretical ambiguity, the strategic interrelationships
may be context-specific. In the particular context of Swedish social movements, the
religious underpinnings of some temperance organisations manifested as a symbiotic
relationship between free church organisations and the wider temperance movement.
Such cooperation was less likely with more labour-oriented social movements (even
though many political goals, such as a widening of the franchise, were shared).
To investigate these relationships, I take the temperance movement as a case
study and estimate equations of the following form:
26Stepan-Norris and Southworth (2010), for example, find that competition between rival unions
increased overall union density in the United States.
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PresenceTempit = αi + γt + π
k Presencekit +X
′
it β + εit (1.7)
Here, PresenceTempit is an indicator for the presence of the temperance move-
ment in municipality i in year t and Presencekit is the presence of another move-
ment, with k ∈ {Free church,Union,Left party}. The set of coefficients πk therefore
captures the strategic complementarity or substitutability between the temperance
movement and the other movement types.
I report results from this exercise in Panel A of Table 1.9. Each column
corresponds to a different movement type k, and presents estimates of πk in equation
1.7. Strikingly, there is strong complementarity between the temperance and free
church movements, whereas the presence of labour movements negatively predicts
temperance movement entry.
1.7.1 The Effect of Railway Access on Movement Interrelationships
Having established the unconditional relationships between the different movement
types, I now investigate the role of railway access in shaping these interrelationships.
By decreasing effective travel costs, the expansion of the railway network may also
shape the strategic interactions between the different groups. For example, with
greater ease of travel, it may become more difficult for labour organisations to
prevent the entry of temperance representatives into the community.
In Figure 1.13, I present descriptive evidence that access to rail reduces the
degree of substitution between temperance and labour organisations, while it does
not alter the complementarity between temperance movements and the free church.
The positive relationship between temperance and free church presence is virtually
identical in municipalities proximate to and distant from the railway, as shown in
Figures 1.13a and 1.13b. For labour organisations, however, the substitution effect
present in the full sample seems to be driven primarily by municipalities far from the
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railway network. In municipalities near rail, the negative relationship is dampened
or disappears completely.
I demonstrate this effect more formally in a regression framework in Panels B
and C of Table 1.9. In Panel B I repeat the regression exercises from above only for
the subsample of municipalities that are on average of above-median proximity to
rail during my sample period.27 Similarly, in Panel C I do the same for municipalities
of below-median proximity.
This exercise shows that the complementarities between temperance organ-
isations and free churches hold regardless of railway connectivity. The substitutab-
ilities between labour and temperance organisations, however, are driven entirely by
the low-proximity subsample. This suggests that, in addition to driving a general
diffusion of social movements throughout the period 1881-1910, railway expansion
also fundamentally shaped the interactions between different social groupings. To
the extent that democratisation in Sweden depended on elites being pressured con-
currently by both religious groups and labour organisations, railway expansion and
heightened mobility of individuals may have crucially underpinned such cooperation.
1.8 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I document the impact of improvements in transportation techno-
logies on the diffusion of engagement in social movements. In particular, I exploit
a formative episode from Swedish history to estimate the causal effect of proximity
to the newly rolled-out railway network on the spread of key popular associations.
Rail is instrumental for both extensive and intensive margins of growth: municipal-
ities near the network are more likely to host a movement of any type, and exhibit
greater growth rates of membership in these movements. In addition, a greater
number of distinct organisations operate in these municipalities and membership
27Concretely, I compute for each municipality the average distance to rail over the thirty-year
period 1881-1910 and perform a median split using this average proximity.
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is less concentrated within one particular organisation. Increased connectedness is
therefore predictive not only of extensive- and intensive-margin proliferation, but
also of better-aligned matches between individual and group preferences.
I provide evidence that these effects are driven by a diffusion process char-
acterised by social contagion. Using a “market access” framework, I show that
railway expansion effectively reduced least-cost distances between municipalities.
For a given municipality, these reductions intensified the influence exerted by move-
ment memberships in neighbouring municipalities. In addition, I shed light on the
strategic interactions between movements, and show that improvements in commu-
nication technologies fundamentally shaped these interrelationships by lowering the
degree of substitutability between different movement types.
This chapter speaks to the two long-standing literatures on social movements
and transportation infrastructure, and adds to the small but growing recent inter-
section between these two bodies of work. In so doing, I elucidate the crucial role
played by interaction costs in shaping social phenomena. By combining a unique
historical episode with a well-identified econometric framework, I shed light on the
role of social contagion in the diffusion of ideas. I thereby contribute to our under-




Table 1.1: Summary statistics
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Panel A. Social movement summary statistics
Any movement present 68100 0.49 0.50 0 1
Temperance movement present 68100 0.37 0.48 0 1
Free church present 68100 0.33 0.47 0 1
Union present 68100 0.06 0.23 0 1
Left party present 68100 0.03 0.16 0 1
Total membership 68100 138.77 994.14 0 83570
Temperance movement membership 68100 56.59 207.83 0 9483
Free church membership 68100 50.18 250.39 0 12287
Union membership 68100 18.93 371.73 0 36018
Left party membership 68100 13.07 308.01 0 30327
Panel B. Social movement summary statistics conditional on movement presence
Total membership 33532 281.82 1402.45 1 83570
Temperance movement membership 24888 154.85 320.90 1 9483
Free church membership 22551 151.52 417.10 1 12287
Union membership 3980 323.84 1505.40 1 36018
Left party membership 1808 492.34 1827.34 3 30327
Total number of organisations 33532 3.67 7.09 1 247
Number of temperance organisations 24888 2.55 3.78 1 115
Number of free churches 22551 1.77 1.36 1 28
Number of unions 3980 4.52 8.71 1 135
Number of left parties 1808 1.09 0.31 1 3
Note: Summary statistics for key variables. Panel A contains summary statistics for social movement
outcomes for the complete municipality-year panel (2,270 municipalities, 30 years). The variable “Any
movement present” is an indicator equal to one if any social movement is present in the municipality-year.
The following four variables are indicators for the presence of particular social movements: temperance
movements, free churches, unions and left parties. “Total membership” is the combined membership across
all movement types, and the following four variables decompose this total into membership in the four
different movements. Panel B contains summary statistics for the subset of municipality-years where at least
one social movement is present. The first five variables capture the total membership as well as membership
in individual movement types, conditional on movement presence. The second set of five variables captures
the total number of organisations overall as well as within each movement type, conditional on movement
presence.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics (continued)
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Panel C. Railway summary statistics
Distance to rail (km) 68100 11.80 31.25 0 677
Rail within 5 km 68100 0.48 0.50 0 1
Rail within 10 km 68100 0.71 0.45 0 1
Rail within 20 km 68100 0.88 0.33 0 1
Distance to railway plan 2270 33.92 59.61 0 519
Arriving passengers (thousands) 5190 33.22 100.10 0 2260
Arriving freight (thousands of tons) 5190 15.05 66.47 0 1381
Panel D. Census summary statistics
Total population 68100 2181.13 5855.63 90 282150
Adult population 68100 1237.82 3781.63 57 188932
Share ISCO 1 68100 0.01 0.01 0 0.15
Share ISCO 2 68100 0.02 0.01 0 0.45
Share ISCO 3 68100 0.01 0.02 0 0.33
Share ISCO 4 68100 0.01 0.01 0 0.14
Share ISCO 5 68100 0.14 0.05 0 0.43
Share ISCO 6 68100 0.51 0.15 0 0.97
Share ISCO 7 68100 0.10 0.07 0 0.64
Share ISCO 8 68100 0.04 0.05 0 0.74
Share ISCO 9 68100 0.08 0.08 0 0.81
Share ISCO 10 68100 0.03 0.03 0 0.80
Note: Summary statistics for key variables. Panel C contains railway summary statistics. “Distance to
rail” is a measure of geodesic distance (in km) from the seat of the municipality to the nearest completed
railway line. The following three variables are indicators for whether a municipality is within 5, 10, or 20
km of a railway line in a given year. Finally, the variable “Distance to railway plan” is the time-invariant
distance from a municipality to the military railway plans described in the text. “Arriving passengers” and
“Arriving freight” are station-level variables measuring (in thousands) the number of arriving passengers
and tons of freight in each station-year. Panel D, lastly, provides municipality-year summary statistics from
census data. The variables “Total population” and “Adult population” are the total number of inhabitants
and adult inhabitants residing in the municipality at the time of each census. The “Share ISCO” variables
summarise the proportion of employed individuals working in major ISCO groups. Censuses were conducted
in 1880, 1890, 1900 and 1910. Values outside of these years are interpolated assuming constant rates of
change between census years.
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Table 1.2: First stage
Dependent variable: distance to railway
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance to railway plans × 1890 -0.143∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Distance to railway plans × 1900 -0.186∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Observations 68100 68100 68100 68100
Municipalities 2270 2270 2270 2270
Clusters 2270 2270 2270 2270
Outcome mean 2.323 2.323 2.323 2.323
Mun. FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Geogr. chars. × Year FE Y Y Y
Baseline chars. × Year FE Y Y
Population controls Y
Note: First stage regressions of the form: RailDistit = αi + γt +
∑
d δd PlanDisti × 1{decade = d}t +
X′it β + νit. The dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the distance to the
nearest constructed railway line. 1880 is the omitted decade. Standard errors clustered by municipality in
parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Geographical
characteristics are: distance to the capital (Stockholm), distance to nodal towns, distance to coast, elevation
(all transformed using an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation) interacted with year fixed effects. Baseline
characteristics are demographic characteristics in the baseline 1880 census (adult population, employment
shares in 10 major ISCO groups, average age) interacted with year fixed effects. Population controls is the
inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of contemporaneous population.
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Table 1.3: Railway access and the presence of social movements
Dependent variable: presence of any social movement
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance to railway -0.011∗ -0.009 -0.008 -0.150∗∗ -0.159∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.065) (0.063) (0.073)
Observations 68100 68100 68100 68100 68100 68100
Municipalities 2270 2270 2270 2270 2270 2270
Clusters 2270 2270 2270 2270 2270 2270
Outcome mean 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492
K-P F-stat 56.62 60.35 53.78
Mun. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geogr. chars. × Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population controls Y Y Y Y
Baseline chars. × Year FE Y Y
Note: OLS and IV regressions of the form: Yit = αi + γt + φ RailDistit + X
′
it β + εit. The dependent
variable is an indicator equal to 1 if any movement organisation is present in the municipality. Standard
errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1
percent levels, respectively. Geographical characteristics are: distance to the capital (Stockholm), distance
to nodal towns, distance to coast, elevation (all transformed using an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation)
interacted with year fixed effects. Baseline characteristics are demographic characteristics in the baseline
1880 census (adult population, employment shares in 10 major ISCO groups, average age) interacted with
year fixed effects. Population controls is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of contemporaneous
population.
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Table 1.4: Railway access and the growth of membership in social movements
Dependent variable: growth of membership per 1000 inhabitants
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance to railway -0.717∗∗∗ -0.730∗∗∗ -0.540∗∗∗ -6.420∗∗∗ -6.083∗∗∗ -6.398∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.172) (0.168) (1.951) (1.864) (2.070)
Observations 65830 65830 65830 65830 65830 65830
Municipalities 2270 2270 2270 2270 2270 2270
Clusters 2270 2270 2270 2270 2270 2270
Outcome mean 2.679 2.679 2.679 2.679 2.679 2.679
K-P F-stat 53.38 56.78 51.28
Mun. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geogr. chars. × Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population controls Y Y Y Y
Baseline chars. × Year FE Y Y
Note: OLS and IV regressions of the form: Yit = αi + γt + φ RailDistit + X
′
it β + εit. The dependent
variable is the growth rate of membership per 1000 inhabitants: Δ Total members
Population/1000
. Standard errors clustered
by municipality in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels,
respectively. Geographical characteristics are: distance to the capital (Stockholm), distance to nodal towns,
distance to coast, elevation (all transformed using an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation) interacted with
year fixed effects. Baseline characteristics are demographic characteristics in the baseline 1880 census (adult
population, employment shares in 10 major ISCO groups, average age) interacted with year fixed effects.
Population controls is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of contemporaneous population.
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Table 1.5: Railway access and the growth of organisations per capita
Dependent variable: growth of organisations per 1000 inhabitants
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance to railway -0.024∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.044) (0.043) (0.048)
Observations 65830 65830 65830 65830 65830 65830
Municipalities 2270 2270 2270 2270 2270 2270
Clusters 2270 2270 2270 2270 2270 2270
Outcome mean 0.0964 0.0964 0.0964 0.0964 0.0964 0.0964
K-P F-stat 53.38 56.78 51.28
Mun. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geogr. chars. × Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population controls Y Y Y Y
Baseline chars. × Year FE Y Y
Note: OLS and IV regressions of the form: Yit = αi + γt + φ RailDistit + X
′
it β + εit. The dependent
variable is the growth rate of the number of organisations per 1000 inhabitants: ΔTotal number of organisations
Population/1000
.
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10, 5 and
1 percent levels, respectively. Geographical characteristics are: distance to the capital (Stockholm), distance
to nodal towns, distance to coast, elevation (all transformed using an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation)
interacted with year fixed effects. Baseline characteristics are demographic characteristics in the baseline
1880 census (adult population, employment shares in 10 major ISCO groups, average age) interacted with
year fixed effects. Population controls is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of contemporaneous
population.
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Table 1.6: Railway access and the concentration of membership in social movements
Dependent variable: movement concentration
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance to railway -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.116∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.086∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.043) (0.040) (0.038)
Observations 33453 33453 33453 33453 33453 33453
Municipalities 1850 1850 1850 1850 1850 1850
Clusters 1850 1850 1850 1850 1850 1850
Outcome mean 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912
K-P F-stat 15.95 16.99 21.91
Mun. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geogr. chars. × Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population controls Y Y Y Y
Baseline chars. × Year FE Y Y
Note: OLS and IV regressions of the form: Yit = αi + γt + φ RailDistit + X
′
it β + εit. The dependent
variable is the share of movement membership captured by the largest organisation. See text for details.
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10, 5 and
1 percent levels, respectively. Geographical characteristics are: distance to the capital (Stockholm), distance
to nodal towns, distance to coast, elevation (all transformed using an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation)
interacted with year fixed effects. Baseline characteristics are demographic characteristics in the baseline
1880 census (adult population, employment shares in 10 major ISCO groups, average age) interacted with
year fixed effects. Population controls is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of contemporaneous
population.
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Table 1.7: Market access and social movement outcomes
Market access measure: Membership Population Membership p.c.
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Dependent variable: movement presence
Market access 0.047∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.025 0.899∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.177) (0.016) (0.336) (0.016) (0.198)
Outcome mean 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492
K-P F-stat 37.23 15.79 30.22
Panel B. Dependent variable: growth of membership per 1000 inhabitants
Market access 2.586∗∗∗ 11.414∗∗∗ 1.748∗∗∗ 21.252∗∗∗ 3.308∗∗∗ 12.434∗∗∗
(0.455) (4.176) (0.392) (8.242) (0.526) (4.540)
Outcome mean 2.679 2.679 2.679 2.679 2.679 2.679
K-P F-stat 37.74 14.56 31.92
Panel C. Dependent variable: growth of organisations per 1000 inhabitants
Market access 0.097∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.882∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.103) (0.013) (0.233) (0.016) (0.111)
Outcome mean 0.0964 0.0964 0.0964 0.0964 0.0964 0.0964
K-P F-stat 37.74 14.56 31.92
Panel D. Dependent variable: membership concentration
Market access -0.013 -0.208∗∗ -0.007 -0.495∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.218∗∗
(0.009) (0.084) (0.009) (0.244) (0.009) (0.089)
Outcome mean 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912
K-P F-stat 22.87 5.600 20.10
Observations 68100 68100 68100 68100 68100 68100
Municipalities 2270 2270 2270 2270 2270 2270
Clusters 2270 2270 2270 2270 2270 2270
Mun. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geogr. chars. × Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Baseline chars. × Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: OLS and IV regressions of the form: Yit = αi + γt + κ MarketAccessit + X
′





ijt ×Mjt. Different columns utilise different variables Mjt in the construction
of the market access measure. See text for details. Dependent variables are defined as follows. Panel A:
indicator equal to 1 if any movement organisation is present in the municipality. Panel B: growth rate
of membership per capita: ΔTotal members
Population
. Panel C: growth rate of the number of organisations per 1000
inhabitants: ΔTotal number of organisations
Population/1000
. Panel D: share of movement membership captured by the largest
organisation. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at
the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Geographical characteristics are: distance to the capital (Stock-
holm), distance to nodal towns, distance to coast, elevation (all transformed using an inverse hyperbolic
sine transformation) interacted with year fixed effects. Baseline characteristics are demographic character-
istics in the baseline 1880 census (adult population, employment shares in 10 major ISCO groups, average






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.9: Cross-relationships between different movement presences
Dependent variable: presence of temperance movement
Other movement: Free church Union Left party
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Cross-relationships between movements - all municipalities
Presence of other movement 0.073∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗ -0.046∗∗
(0.012) (0.015) (0.018)
Panel B. Cross-relationships between movements - municipalities near rail
Presence of other movement 0.073∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.022
(0.016) (0.019) (0.023)
Panel C. Cross-relationships between movements - municipalities far from rail
Presence of other movement 0.066∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.053∗
(0.016) (0.023) (0.032)
Total observations 68100 68100 68100
Municipalities 2270 2270 2270
Clusters 2270 2270 2270
Outcome mean 0.365 0.365 0.365
Mun. FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Geogr. chars. × Year FE Y Y Y
Population controls Y Y Y
Baseline chars. × Year FE Y Y Y




it β + εit. The dependent
variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a temperance organisation is present in the municipality. Panel A reports
estimates for the full sample, whereas Panels B and C report estimates for municipalities near and far from
rail, respectively. See text for details. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and
∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Geographical characteristics are:
distance to the capital (Stockholm), distance to nodal towns, distance to coast, elevation (all transformed
using an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation) interacted with year fixed effects. Baseline characteristics
are demographic characteristics in the baseline 1880 census (adult population, employment shares in 10
major ISCO groups, average age) interacted with year fixed effects. Population controls is the inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation of contemporaneous population.
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1.10 Figures













































1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
Left parties
Proportion municipalities Total members (1000)
Note: Summary graphs showing the presence of and membership in four different social move-
ments over the sample period 1881-1910. Solid line (left axis) shows the proportion of municipalities
with a given movement type present. Dashed line (right axis) shows the total national membership
(in thousands) of a given movement type.
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Figure 1.2: Railway network expansion, 1881-1910
(a) 1881 (b) 1910
Note: Maps showing the extent of the Swedish railway network at the start (1881) and end (1910)
of the sample period. These years are chosen to show the full extent of railway expansion over
this period. Main analysis exploits year-on-year expansions of the railway network.
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1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
Med. dist. to railway (km) Prop. within 5km
Prop. within 10km Prop. within 20km
Note: Summary graphs showing railway access over the sample period 1881-1910. Solid line (left
axis) shows the median distance (in km) to rail in each year. Dashed lines (right axis) respectively
show the proportion of municipalities within 5, 10 and 10 km of rail in each year.
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Note: Maps showing the spatial relationship between the actual railway network as of 1881 and
the three counterfactual railway networks used in constructing my instrumental variable. See text
for details.
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0 1 2 3 4 5
Planned distance
1910
Note: Conditional correlations between proximity to railway and proximity to the counterfactual
railway networks used in constructing my instrumental variable. Shown for select years. See
text for details. All variables have been residualised with county fixed effects as well as controls
for longitude and latitude. All distances have been transformed using an inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation.
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Note: Maps showing the spatial relationship between social movement presence and membership
and railway access in two selected years. Black dots denote municipalities. Red circles denote
municipalities with social movement presence. The size of the circle indicates absolute membership
numbers.
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-1 0 1 2 3 4
Distance to railway
Left parties
(c) Number of organisations
Note: Conditional correlations between social movement outcomes by type and railway access.
All variables have been residualised with county fixed effects as well as controls for longitude and
latitude. The “distance to railway” and “membership” variables have been transformed using an
inverse hyperbolic sine transformation.
54






















-5+ -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5+
Years after railway
Note: Event study regressions of the form: Yit = αi + γt + αi × t +∑5
τ=−5 ρt+τ1{Rail within 10km}it + X′it β + εit. The figure reports the sequence of ρt+τ . 95%
confidence intervals shown. Controls include: geography FE (distance to the capital (Stockholm),
distance to nodal towns, distance to coast, elevation (all transformed using an inverse hyperbolic
sine transformation) interacted with year fixed effects), baseline FE (demographic characterist-
ics in the baseline 1880 census (adult population, employment shares in 10 major ISCO groups,
average age) interacted with year fixed effects) and the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of
contemporaneous population.
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Years after railway
Note: Event study regressions of the form: Yit = αi + γt + αi × t +∑5
τ=−5 ρt+τ1{Rail within 10km}it + X′it β + εit. The figure reports the sequence of ρt+τ . 95%
confidence intervals shown. Controls include: geography FE (distance to the capital (Stockholm),
distance to nodal towns, distance to coast, elevation (all transformed using an inverse hyperbolic
sine transformation) interacted with year fixed effects), baseline FE (demographic characterist-
ics in the baseline 1880 census (adult population, employment shares in 10 major ISCO groups,
average age) interacted with year fixed effects) and the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of
contemporaneous population.
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Years after railway
Note: Event study regressions of the form: Yit = αi + γt + αi × t +∑5
τ=−5 ρt+τ1{Rail within 10km}it + X′it β + εit. The figure reports the sequence of ρt+τ . 95%
confidence intervals shown. Controls include: geography FE (distance to the capital (Stockholm),
distance to nodal towns, distance to coast, elevation (all transformed using an inverse hyperbolic
sine transformation) interacted with year fixed effects), baseline FE (demographic characterist-
ics in the baseline 1880 census (adult population, employment shares in 10 major ISCO groups,
average age) interacted with year fixed effects) and the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of
contemporaneous population.
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Note: Maps showing least costs to Stockholm at the start (1881) and end (1910) of the sample
period. Logarithmic scale: a darker colour is twice as costly as the nearest lighter colour. See text
and Appendix A for details on the construction of the least cost measures.
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1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
Bottom Quartile
Note: Graphs showing the reductions in average least costs over time in relation to initial average
least cost (cost normalised to 1 in 1881). Municpalities split according to initial cost as of 1881:
the top quartile contains municipalities with the lowest average cost (i.e. the most connected
municipalities), the second quartile those with the second lowest average cost, and so on.
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Left party presence
(f) Left parties, near rail
Note: Graphs showing the cross-relationships between temperance movement presence and the
presence of the three other social movements, separately for municipalities near and far from the
railway. All presence indicators have been residualised with municipality fixed effects, year fixed
effects and the full set of controls.
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1.11 Appendix A: Calculating Least Costs
Key to the discussion of “market access” in Section 1.6 above is the use of time-
varying least costs between municipalities, Costijt. This Appendix provides a sketch
of the calculation of these cost terms.
The cost terms Costijt are allowed to vary by year, t. Indeed, within- as well
as between-variation in the least costs is crucial for identification in a panel frame-
work. Variation in these terms comes from the expansion of the railway network,
which reduces effective travel costs asymmetrically across municipalities.
Each year, therefore, one can calculate least costs using the following al-
gorithm:
1. Divide Sweden into a 0.1◦ × 0.1◦ grid.
2. Assign a cost to each grid cell using the following criteria: 28
• If the cell contains a major body of water (coast, river, lake), assign a
cost of 0.49.
• If the cell does not contain water, but contains railway, assign a cost of
0.63.
• If the cell contains neither water nor railway, assign a cost of 23.1.
3. Construct a cost raster using the full grid of costs. See Figures 1.14a and 1.14c
for examples.
4. For each of the 2,270 municipalities in the sample, calculate the travel cost
to that municipality from every other muncipality. This is a minimisation
problem over the least cost surface which picks the optimal route. See Figures
1.14b and 1.14d for examples of least costs to Stockholm.
28These cost parameters follow Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016), who in turn follow Fogel (1964).
Perlman (2016) also uses the same cost values.
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Each year, this results in over 5 million pairwise least cost terms, which can


























The sequence of cost matrices can then be used in various “market access”-
style calculations.
62
1.11.1 Figures for Appendix A
Figure 1.14: Calculating least costs
(a) Cost raster, 1881
#
(b) Least costs to Stockholm, 1881
(c) Cost raster, 1910
#
(d) Least costs to Stockholm, 1910
Note: Maps showing the construction of least cost maps and the cost raster used in this construc-
tion for the start (1881) and end (1910) of the sample period. See main text and the text in this
appendix for details.
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1.12 Appendix B: Additional Tables and Figures
Table 1.10: Instrument validity: distance to railway plans and pre-railway social
movement outcomes
Dependent variable: Presence of any social movement Total membership
Distance cut-off: 5km 10km 20km 5km 10km 20km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance to railway plans -0.004 -0.022 -0.034 0.005 -0.072 -0.079
(0.013) (0.019) (0.041) (0.058) (0.091) (0.176)
Observations 1489 981 468 1489 981 468
Municipalities 1489 981 468 1489 981 468
Outcome mean 0.115 0.119 0.150 0.509 0.532 0.685
Population controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geogr. controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Baseline controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: OLS regressions of the form: Yi = δ PlanDisti + X
′
it β + ηi, using the first year of the sample
only (1881). Different columns use different subsamples of municipalities: those further than 5, 10 and
20 kilometres from the constructed railway in 1881, respectively. Columns 1-3: the dependent variable is
an indicator equal to 1 if any movement organisation is present in the municipality. Columns 4-6: the
dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine of total movement membership. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Geography
controls are: distance to the capital (Stockholm), distance to nodal towns, distance to coast, elevation (all
transformed using an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation). Baseline controls are demographic character-
istics in the baseline 1880 census (adult population, employment shares in 10 major ISCO groups, average
age). Population controls is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of contemporaneous population.
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(f) Number organisations, 20km
Note: Event study regressions of the form: Yit = αi + γt + αi × t +∑5
τ=−5 ρt+τ1{Rail within Xkm}it + X′it β + εit. The figure reports the sequence of ρt+τ . 95%
confidence intervals shown. Controls include: geography FE (distance to the capital (Stockholm),
distance to nodal towns, distance to coast, elevation (all transformed using an inverse hyperbolic
sine transformation) interacted with year fixed effects), baseline FE (demographic characterist-
ics in the baseline 1880 census (adult population, employment shares in 10 major ISCO groups,
average age) interacted with year fixed effects) and the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of
contemporaneous population.
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Table 1.11: Reduced form
Dependent variable: see panel headings
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Dependent variable: movement presence
Distance to railway plans × 1890 -0.001 0.008 0.009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Distance to railway plans × 1900 0.032∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Panel B. Dependent variable: growth of membership per 1000 inhabitants
Distance to railway plans × 1890 1.386∗∗∗ 1.233∗∗∗ 1.232∗∗∗
(0.389) (0.360) (0.360)
Distance to railway plans × 1900 0.888∗∗∗ 0.757∗∗∗ 0.756∗∗∗
(0.292) (0.292) (0.292)
Panel C. Dependent variable: growth of organisations per 1000 inhabitants
Distance to railway plans × 1890 0.028∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Distance to railway plans × 1900 0.037∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Panel D. Dependent variable: membership concentration
Distance to railway plans × 1890 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Distance to railway plans × 1900 -0.019∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 68100 68100 68100
Municipalities 2270 2270 2270
Clusters 2270 2270 2270
Mun. FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Geogr. chars. × Year FE Y Y Y
Baseline chars. × Year FE Y Y
Population controls Y
Note: reduced-form regressions of the form: Yit = αi + γt +
∑
d δd PlanDisti × 1{decade = d}t +X′it β +
εit. 1880 is the omitted decade. Dependent variables are defined as follows. Panel A: indicator equal
to 1 if any movement organisation is present in the municipality. Panel B: growth rate of membership
per capita: ΔTotal members
Population
. Panel C: growth rate of the number of organisations per 1000 inhabitants:
ΔTotal number of organisations
Population/1000
. Panel D: share of movement membership captured by the largest organisation.
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10, 5 and
1 percent levels, respectively. Geographical characteristics are: distance to the capital (Stockholm), distance
to nodal towns, distance to coast, elevation (all transformed using an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation)
interacted with year fixed effects. Baseline characteristics are demographic characteristics in the baseline
1880 census (adult population, employment shares in 10 major ISCO groups, average age) interacted with
year fixed effects. Population controls is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of contemporaneous
population.
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Table 1.12: Robustness to different variable transformations
Transformation: Inverse hyperbolic sine Natural logarithm
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Dependent variable: movement presence
Distance to rail -0.008 -0.199∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.222∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.073) (0.005) (0.086)
Panel B. Dependent variable: growth of membership per 1000 inhabitants
Distance to rail -0.540∗∗∗ -6.398∗∗∗ -0.386∗∗∗ -6.938∗∗∗
(0.168) (2.070) (0.142) (2.312)
Panel C. Dependent variable: growth of organisations per 1000 inhabitants
Distance to rail -0.018∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.048) (0.004) (0.059)
Panel D. Dependent variable: membership concentration
Distance to rail 0.001 0.086∗∗ 0.000 0.081∗
(0.004) (0.038) (0.003) (0.042)
Mun. FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Population controls Y Y Y Y
Geogr. chars. × Year FE Y Y Y Y
Baseline chars. × Year FE Y Y Y Y
Note: OLS and IV regressions of the form: Yit = αi + γt + φ DistRailit + X
′
it β + εit. Columns 1 and
2 report baseline results using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of distance to rail. Columns 3
and 4 use the natural logarithm. Dependent variables are defined as follows. Panel A: indicator equal
to 1 if any movement organisation is present in the municipality. Panel B: growth rate of membership
per capita: Δ Total members
Population/1000
. Panel C: growth rate of the number of organisations per 1000 inhabitants:
ΔTotal number of organisations
Population/1000
. Panel D: share of movement membership captured by the largest organisation.
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10, 5 and
1 percent levels, respectively. Geographical characteristics are: distance to the capital (Stockholm), distance
to nodal towns, distance to coast, elevation (all transformed using an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation)
interacted with year fixed effects. Baseline characteristics are demographic characteristics in the baseline
1880 census (adult population, employment shares in 10 major ISCO groups, average age) interacted with
year fixed effects. Population controls is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of contemporaneous
population.
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Table 1.13: Robustness to different standard error structures
Standard errors: Clustered by municipality Clustered by grid cell Conley spatial SE
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Dependent variable: movement presence
Distance to rail -0.008 -0.190∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.190∗∗ -0.008 -0.190∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.071) (0.007) (0.096) (0.006) (0.066)
Panel B. Dependent variable: growth of membership per 1000 inhabitants
Distance to rail -0.540∗∗∗ -6.398∗∗∗ -0.540∗∗∗ -6.398∗∗∗ -0.540∗∗∗ -6.398∗∗
(0.167) (2.007) (0.190) (2.249) (0.181) (3.019)
Panel C. Dependent variable: growth of organisations per 1000 inhabitants
Distance to rail -0.018∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.047) (0.006) (0.068) (0.006) (0.081)
Panel D. Dependent variable: membership concentration
Distance to rail 0.001 0.090∗∗ 0.001 0.090∗∗ 0.001 0.090∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.036) (0.004) (0.039) (0.003) (0.033)
Mun. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geogr. chars. × Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Baseline chars. × Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: OLS and IV regressions of the form: Yit = αi+γt+φDistRailit+X
′
itβ+εit. Dependent variables are
defined as follows. Panel A: indicator equal to 1 if any movement organisation is present in the municipality.
Panel B: growth rate of membership per capita: Δ Total members
Population/1000
. Panel C: growth rate of the number of
organisations per 1000 inhabitants: ΔTotal number of organisations
Population/1000
. Panel D: share of movement membership
captured by the largest organisation. Standard error structure differs by columns. Columns 1 and 2 cluster
by municipality (2,270 clusters). Columns 3 and 4 cluster by 1 deg×1 deg grid cells (232) clusters. Columns
5 and 6 implement Conley spatial standard errors, allowing for spatial correlation up to 100km. ∗, ∗∗ and
∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Geographical characteristics are:
distance to the capital (Stockholm), distance to nodal towns, distance to coast, elevation (all transformed
using an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation) interacted with year fixed effects. Baseline characteristics
are demographic characteristics in the baseline 1880 census (adult population, employment shares in 10
major ISCO groups, average age) interacted with year fixed effects. Population controls is the inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation of contemporaneous population.
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Table 1.14: Robustness to different population interpolations
Population interpolation: Constant growth rate Linear Fixed
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Dependent variable: movement presence
Distance to rail -0.008 -0.199∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.199∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.198∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.073) (0.006) (0.073) (0.006) (0.073)
Panel B. Dependent variable: growth of membership per 1000 inhabitants
Distance to rail -0.540∗∗∗ -6.398∗∗∗ -0.530∗∗∗ -6.408∗∗∗ -0.695∗∗∗ -5.908∗∗∗
(0.168) (2.070) (0.168) (2.072) (0.186) (2.114)
Panel C. Dependent variable: growth of organisations per 1000 inhabitants
Distance to rail -0.018∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.048) (0.005) (0.048) (0.005) (0.048)
Panel D. Dependent variable: membership concentration
Distance to rail 0.001 0.086∗∗ 0.001 0.086∗∗ 0.001 0.087∗∗
(0.004) (0.038) (0.004) (0.038) (0.004) (0.039)
Mun. FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geogr. chars. × Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Baseline chars. × Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: OLS and IV regressions of the form: Yit = αi+γt+φDistRailit+X
′
itβ+εit. Dependent variables are
defined as follows. Panel A: indicator equal to 1 if any movement organisation is present in the municipality.
Panel B: growth rate of membership per capita: Δ Total members
Population/1000
. Panel C: growth rate of the number of
organisations per 1000 inhabitants: ΔTotal number of organisations
Population/1000
. Panel D: share of movement membership
captured by the largest organisation. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and
∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Geographical characteristics are:
distance to the capital (Stockholm), distance to nodal towns, distance to coast, elevation (all transformed
using an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation) interacted with year fixed effects. Baseline characteristics
are demographic characteristics in the baseline 1880 census (adult population, employment shares in 10
major ISCO groups, average age) interacted with year fixed effects. Population controls is the inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation of contemporaneous population.
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Table 1.15: Robustness to dropping nodal municipalities
Sample: Full Drop nodal municipalities
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Dependent variable: movement presence
Distance to rail -0.008 -0.199∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.204∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.073) (0.006) (0.074)
Panel B. Dependent variable: growth of membership per 1000 inhabitants
Distance to rail -0.540∗∗∗ -6.398∗∗∗ -0.538∗∗∗ -6.181∗∗∗
(0.168) (2.070) (0.168) (2.093)
Panel C. Dependent variable: growth of organisations per 1000 inhabitants
Distance to rail -0.018∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.048) (0.005) (0.049)
Panel D. Dependent variable: membership concentration
Distance to rail 0.001 0.086∗∗ 0.001 0.099∗∗
(0.004) (0.038) (0.004) (0.043)
Mun. FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Population controls Y Y Y Y
Geogr. chars. × Year FE Y Y Y Y
Baseline chars. × Year FE Y Y Y Y
Note: OLS and IV regressions of the form: Yit = αi+γt+φDistRailit+X
′
itβ+εit. Columns 1 and 2 report
baseline results using the full sample. Columns 3 and 4 use a subsample excluding the nodal municipalities
targeted in the plans used in the construction of the instrumental variable. Dependent variables are defined
as follows. Panel A: indicator equal to 1 if any movement organisation is present in the municipality.
Panel B: growth rate of membership per capita: Δ Total members
Population/1000
. Panel C: growth rate of the number of
organisations per 1000 inhabitants: ΔTotal number of organisations
Population/1000
. Panel D: share of movement membership
captured by the largest organisation. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and
∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Geographical characteristics are:
distance to the capital (Stockholm), distance to nodal towns, distance to coast, elevation (all transformed
using an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation) interacted with year fixed effects. Baseline characteristics
are demographic characteristics in the baseline 1880 census (adult population, employment shares in 10
major ISCO groups, average age) interacted with year fixed effects. Population controls is the inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation of contemporaneous population.
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Table 1.16: Alternative mechanisms: shares in major occupational sectors
Dependent variable: share employed in
Services Agriculture Industry
(1) (2) (3)
Distance to railway 0.010∗ -0.009 -0.012
(0.006) (0.012) (0.009)
Observations 68100 68100 68100
Municipalities 2270 2270 2270
Clusters 2270 2270 2270
Outcome mean 0.180 0.514 0.147
Mun. FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Population controls Y Y Y
Geogr. chars. × Year FE Y Y Y
Baseline chars. × Year FE Y Y Y
Note: IV regressions of the form: Yit = αi + γt + φRailDistit +X
′
it β + εit. The dependent variable is the
share of the population employed in major occupational sectors. Military and miscellaneous employment
categories not included. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Geographical characteristics are: distance to
the capital (Stockholm), distance to nodal towns, distance to coast, elevation (all transformed using an
inverse hyperbolic sine transformation) interacted with year fixed effects. Baseline characteristics are demo-
graphic characteristics in the baseline 1880 census (adult population, employment shares in 10 major ISCO
groups, average age) interacted with year fixed effects. Population controls is the inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation of contemporaneous population.
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Chapter 2
Creating ‘Us and Them’:
Racial Propaganda, Insularity and Right-Wing
Ideology
2.1 Introduction
Recent resurgences of nationalist and anti-immigration sentiment in Europe and
elsewhere have received widespread attention in popular, political and academic
spheres. When viewed as a backlash against globalisation, a potential implication of
this resurgence is the adoption of welfare-reducing inward-looking trade and migra-
tion policies. Furthermore, heightened conflict within societies may spark mistrust
and disagreement (for example regarding the provision of public goods). Despite
the growing influence of such movements, relatively little attention has been paid
to the determinants of their resurgence. In this chapter, I explore the historical
roots of such movements in the Swedish context, paying particular attention to the
This chapter has benefited greatly from discussions with Sascha O. Becker, Clément de Chaise-
martin, Mirko Draca, James Fenske, Andreas Ferrara, Mounir Karadja, Omiros Kouvavas, Alexey
Makarin, Martina Miotto, Nico Voigtländer, Fabian Waldinger, Guo Xu and Noam Yuchtman. Par-
ticipants at CAGE Research Day (Warwick), Spring Meeting of Young Economists (Halle/Saale),
Young Economists’ Meeting (Brno), CAGE-EHES-IAS Summer School (Warwick), ASREC Europe
Conference (Bologna), the Annual Meeting of the Danish Society for Economic and Social History
(Copenhagen Business School), Leicester Ph.D. Conference (Leicester), the RES Symposium of
Junior Researchers (Sussex), Warwick Ph.D. Conference (Warwick), the EBE Summer Meeting
(Munich), the World Economic History Congress (Boston) and the Workshop on Interwar Eco-
nomic History (London School of Economics) provided valuable comments.
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role of identity-based racial propaganda in creating persistent support for right-wing
movements.
The chapter documents the impact of the Swedish State Institute for Race
Biology in the first half of the twentieth century in popularising a racial worldview,
in particular through its publication of a condensed version of an anthropometric
study classifying the Swedish population according to “Nordic purity”. The book
was intended for use in schools and in public libraries, with the aim of making race
more socially and politically salient. Race-biological ideas were quickly assimilated
even into moderate right-wing rhetoric, and continue to inform the Swedish radical
right to this day.
In this chapter, I show that regions deemed particularly “Swedish” by the
Institute exhibit relatively more support for right-wing parties following the pub-
lication of the text. Additionally, using registries of the Institute’s correspondence,
I provide evidence that these regions also became more directly involved with the
work of the Institute. I link the embracing of racial rhetoric in the interwar period
to increased support for populist anti-immigration parties today. In this sense, I at-
tempt to synthesise explanations for the historical formation of political and social
worldviews with their resurfacing in the present.
I investigate the contemporaneous effect of the publication of the popular
text on support for right-wing parties by constructing a panel of election outcomes.
The panel covers all Swedish election districts in the eight elections from 1917 to
1940. Implementing a difference-in-differences framework, I show that the public-
ation caused districts of above-median “Swedishness” to exhibit a 3.4 percentage
point higher vote share for right-wing parties in the elections after the publication.
The estimated effect is robust to a number of confounders, including the potentially
differential political impacts of the Great Depression and interwar immigration.
Analyses of the heterogeneity of the effect indicate that it is driven by districts with
little immigration prior to the publication of the book, which suggests that insular
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communities may be especially susceptible to this type of racial rhetoric.
To provide evidence for the claim that the effect is driven by the publication
of the book, I collect data on state funding of public and school libraries, and use
this as a proxy for the accessibility of the book. I show that the “Swedishness”
effect is concentrated in districts with above-median library funding, in particular
those districts with above-median funding of school libraries. This result is in line
with the notion that propaganda has the largest impact at a young age.
Using data on local and national newspapers, I construct an index of media
exposure to race-biological topics to shed light on the role of media as a moderator
of the impact of propaganda. I show that districts of high “Swedishness” vote
significantly more for the right wing following the publication of the propagandistic
book only in districts of above-median media exposure. This result underscores the
central role of media in the spread of (radical) ideas.
To corroborate the claim that increased support for right-wing parties is in-
dicative of support for a racial paradigm in this period, I collect data on the incoming
correspondence of the Institute and construct a district-level panel of correspond-
ence. Difference-in-differences estimates suggest that above-median “Swedishness”
regions corresponded more intensively with the Institute following the publication
of the text.
Finally, I provide a possible explanation for the current resurfacing of right-
wing populism in Sweden: if particularly “Swedish” districts turned to the right and
embraced racial rhetoric in the interwar period, then these ideas may have persisted
locally over time. To investigate this possibility, I estimate a “long” difference-
in-differences regression by extending my analysis to include the recent election
successes of the Sweden Democrats (a populist party with roots in the extreme
right). The “Swedishness” effect persists to the present day: on average, above-
median “Swedish” regions exhibit a 0.4 standard deviation relative increase in the
vote share of right-wing parties in the extended post-treatment period. This suggests
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that propaganda efforts may have effects that extend far beyond their immediate
contemporaneous impact, in particular in light of recent evidence for the persistence
and intergenerational transmission of political preferences and social norms.
This chapter relates to a number of strands in the literature. In document-
ing the Institute’s efforts to influence the social and political landscape with its
propagandistic text, it speaks to the literature on information interventions and
their effects on preferences. A recent example is Cantoni, Chen, Yang, Yuchtman
and Zhang’s study of a textbook reform in China, which documents a shift to-
wards more positive views on Chinese governance and greater scepticism towards
free markets in affected regions (Cantoni et al., 2017). Most thematically related to
the present study is Voigtländer and Voth’s paper on the long-run effects of Nazi
indoctrination on anti-Semitic attitudes in Germany (Voigtländer and Voth, 2015).
There is also a strand of the literature on the persistence of extremist politics
over time. Such persistence can manifest itself within regions: Ochsner and Roesel
show that National Socialists migrating within Austria after the Second World War
brought their extreme politics with them, resulting in higher vote shares for right-
wing parties to the present day (Ochsner and Roesel, 2017). Persistence can also take
place within dynasties: Avdeenko and Siedler document the intergenerational trans-
mission of right-wing party preferences and anti-immigration sentiment in Germany
(Avdeenko and Siedler, 2017). Understanding the persistence of extremist politics
is particularly interesting in the Swedish case, given recent interest in explaining
the rise of the Sweden Democrats (Valdez (2014), Strömblad and Malmberg (2016),
Dehdari (2018)).
This chapter relates to the literature on cultural persistence more generally.
Theoretical contributions in this field include Bisin and Verdier’s model of cultural
transmission, in which parents pass on their preferences to their offspring (Bisin and
Verdier, 2001), and Anderlini, Gerardi and Lagunoff’s model of social memory, in
which conflicts persist due to societies’ vicarious views about their pasts (Anderlini
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et al., 2010). Empirical contributions include Nunn and Wantchekon’s study of
the slave trade as the root of mistrust in Africa (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011)
and Voigtländer and Voth’s work on the medieval origins of anti-Semitism in Nazi
Germany (Voigtländer and Voth, 2012).
To the extent that the activities of the Institute engendered intra-societal
divisions, this chapter also speaks to the literature on conflict. In a seminal the-
oretical contribution, Glaeser explores the interaction between voters’ demand for
hate-creating stories attacking “out-groups” and politicians’ willingness to supply
such stories (Glaeser, 2005). In recent empirical work, Becker and Pascali study the
economic determinants of such antagonisms in the context of German anti-Semitism
(Becker and Pascali, 2019). Highly related to the present study is Yanagizawa-
Drott’s paper on the role of mass media in the Rwandan genocide (Yanagizawa-
Drott, 2014), and Blouin and Mukand’s recent paper on its role in the reconstruction
of Rwandan identity (Blouin and Mukand, 2019).
In its exploration of the impact of a propaganda effort, this work speaks to the
recent literature on the impact of media on economic, social and political outcomes.
In a historical context, Adena, Enikolopov, Petrova, Santarosa and Zhuravskaya
provide evidence that radio played an important role in the rise of the National
Socialists in Germany, in particular in consolidating the dictatorship once in power
(Adena et al., 2015). In a contemporary setting, DellaVigna and Kaplan document
the effects of bias in news media on voting behaviour (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007).
As for social outcomes, there is growing evidence that media influences can affect a
range of outcomes, such as crime (Dahl and DellaVigna, 2009), divorce (Chong and
La Ferrara, 2009) and fertility (Kearney and Levine, 2015; La Ferrara et al., 2012).
Finally, this chapter fits into a small but growing economics literature on
Swedish political history. Recent examples include Tyrefors Hinnerich and Pettersson-
Lidbom’s study of the difference in redistributive policies between direct and repres-
entative democracies (Tyrefors Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom, 2014) and Karadja
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and Prawitz’s paper on the effects of large-scale emigration on citizens’ bargaining
power in the origin communities and its resulting impact on political institutions
(Karadja and Prawitz, 2019).
The contribution of this chapter is in its exploration of the effect of a pro-
paganda intervention in the short- and long-run. It documents how identity-based
propaganda can have both the intended contemporaneous effect and a longer-lasting
latent effect due to local transmission of preferences and culture. It seeks to fuse
the literature on the effect of the formation of political preferences with that of
long-run cultural persistence, and in so doing to propose a potential explanation for
the recent resurgence of nationalist political rhetoric.
2.2 Historical Background
2.2.1 The State Institute for Race Biology
The Swedish State Institute for Race Biology was founded in Uppsala in January
1922 for the study and public dissemination of research in eugenics and human
genetics. Its appointed head was physician Herman Lundborg, who championed the
Institute and its race-biological publications for the majority of the interwar period.
Lundborg’s ideas shaped the output of the Institute, in particular his view of race
biology as not only a science, but as a complete Weltanschauung (Broberg, 1995).
He was replaced by the more moderate Gunnar Dahlberg in 1936, after which the
Institute abandoned much of its emphasis on racial hygiene for more neutral research
in hereditary genetics.
The Institute’s key work was an ambitious anthropometric survey of the
Swedish population, with the aim of producing a systematic classification of the
predominant racial elements in different parts of the country. In the early 1920s, the
Institute carried out comprehensive physical measurements of over 100,000 Swedish
conscripts. Among the characteristics recorded were stature, hair and eye colour,
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morphological index and cephalic index.1 The results of the study were published
in the 1926 volume The Racial Characters of the Swedish Nation (Linders and
Lundborg, 1926), a work in English whose intended audience was the international
scientific community. The work was met with universal acclaim for its rigour, and
copies were distributed globally.
On Lundborg’s initiative, a popular, condensed version of the work was pre-
pared for the purpose of educating the Swedish population. The result was the
Swedish-language Svensk Raskunskap (Swedish Racial Studies (Lundborg, 1927)),
which appeared in late-1927 and was intended for secondary school students and the
general public. The study reproduced the key results of the scientific text, including
maps of the spread of the “archetypal Nordic type” (see Figure 2.1). It also included
a rich collection of photographs of racial archetypes (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Kjell-
man documents the intensely visual aspect of Swedish race biology, including the
manipulative use of younger individuals to represent the Nordic archetype and older
individuals for other archetypes (Kjellman, 2013).
In contrast with the relatively reserved vocabulary of the scientific work,
Lundborg took the liberty to engage in moralistic racial rhetoric in the popular
version:
“Archaeological research, race biology, and history have shown evidence
of the strength, entrepreneurship, organizational skill, ability, and talent
of the Nordic race. All this obligates us. May we, who now live in this
primeval abode of the Nordic race, do everything to keep this race in
good health and save it from degeneration and extinction.”2
1The morphological index concerns the proportions of the face, while the cephalic index concerns
the proportions of the skull. Individuals with long skulls (dolichocephalic) have a low cephalic index
and were considered more Swedish, while individuals with short skulls (brachiocephalic) have a high
cephalic index and were considered less Swedish.
2Quotation from Lundborg (1927). Translation as in Kjellman (2013). The original text reads:
“Fornforskning, rasbiologi och historia bära samfällt vittnesbörd om den nordiska rasens sega kraft,
företagsamhet, beg̊avning och organisationsförmåga. Allt detta förpliktigar. Må vi, som nu leva i
den nordiska rasens urhem, göra allt vad p̊a oss ankommer för att h̊alla rasen uppe, s̊a att den ej
urartar eller dör ut.”
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The book proved very popular. Its two editions, with a combined run of
10,000 copies, soon sold out, and its readership was likely much larger due to its
use in schools and libraries. It received widespread media attention in national as
well as local newspapers, and sparked a national debate about questions of race and
fertility. Figures 2.13 and 2.14 in the Appendix provide examples of this type of
media attention. The head of the Institute, Herman Lundborg, was briefly launched
into stardom, and was featured in various newspapers and journals.
The work of the Institute played no small part in shaping Swedish social
thought. Its racial ideas influenced right-wing parties of the period (Lööw, 2004),
and continues to inform white power organisations to the present day (Lööw, 2000,
2015). Its more moderate contributions to hereditary genetics influenced social-
democratic governments well into the post-war era (Broberg and Tydén, 2005).
This chapter attempts to quantify its short run impact on political outcomes and
engagement with race-biological ideas, and explores potential links between racial
paradigms of the past with the rise of populist anti-immigration parties of the
present.
2.2.2 Swedish Politics in the Interwar Period
In 1917, as a result of decades of gradual democratisation, the ruling monarch King
Gustav V formally acknowledged the parliamentary principle and Sweden became
a parliamentary democracy in the full sense. Universal suffrage for men was in-
troduced in the election of the same year, and that of women followed in the 1921
election. The 1920s were a decade of parliamentary pluralism, with five major polit-
ical camps: Social Democrats, conservative Right, Liberals, Farmers and the radical
Left. Further divisions surfaced as parties split and recoalesced, with the liberals,
farmers and leftists notably represented by more than one party in several elec-
tions. As a result, the political discourse of the period was often confrontational,
and fragile political coalitions were the norm.
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The Great Depression did not spare Sweden. Unemployment rose sharply, as
elsewhere in Europe. In response to the crisis, an agreement was struck between the
Social Democrats and Farmers. They introduced a more Keynesian fiscal policy as
well as price controls for agricultural goods. Coupled with an early departure from
the gold standard, the policy package ensured Sweden’s relatively rapid recovery
from the Depression. The period has been described as politically formative for
two main reasons (Möller, 2015). First, it saw the beginning of social-democratic
hegemony in Swedish politics: from the 1932 election until the end of the century,
the Social Democrats were only in opposition for a total of nine years. Second, it
marked the beginning of consensus politics (samförst̊andspolitik), in which broad
coalitions and agreements were the norm, and sharp political confrontation avoided.
The political trends are evident in Figure 2.4. The Social Democrats’ rise
is particularly striking, as is the slow decline of the traditional bourgeois parties
(the conservative Right and the Liberals). Of further note is the relatively modest
development of parliamentary National Socialism. The term “Nationalists” is used
here as a catch-all phrase for all the various parties with National Socialist or Fascist
streaks which broke out of local radical spheres to take part in national elections.
The various groups are documented in detail in Lööw’s landmark study of early
Swedish Nazism (Lööw, 2004).
Given that Swedish Nazi groups never developed into a serious political force,
Berggren asks - “why bother?” (Berggren, 2002). The answer she provides to this
(rhetorical) question is that it is important to explain why Fascism and Nazism
could develop at all in Sweden, given a political climate which was prima facie
infertile to such ideas. Two further, in my view more salient, reasons can be given.
First, the pioneering National Socialists inspired and informed generations of Nazi
sympathisers and white supremacists throughout the remainder of the twentieth
century. Understanding these roots therefore aids in understanding current right-
wing extremism. Second, the threat of National Socialism provoked responses in
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other political parties. Lindström studies this phenomenon, and notes in particular
the readiness of the conservative Right to accommodate the nationalists, not least
in response to the defection of some delegates and much of its youth wing to various
nationalist groups (Lindström, 1985).
The racial worldview of the Institute was partly mirrored in right-wing polit-
ical rhetoric. The National Socialists openly espoused such ideas, often with more
than a hint of anti-Semitism (Lööw, 2004). The archetypal Swede even featured
in its campaign posters as a champion of anti-capitalism and anti-communism (see
Figure 2.15 in the Appendix).
Similar sentiments were evident even in established mainstream parties. The
conservative Right had always adopted a patriotic nationalism (see Figure 2.16 in
the Appendix), but in the 1930s more radical population politics entered its election
manifestos:
“Encouragement of the forming of families. Fast and powerful measures
to the protection of the Swedish population material’s persistence.”3
This chapter explores whether the Institute’s popularisation of race biology,
as manifested in the 1927 popular text described above, influenced the development
of racial sentiment in Sweden and resulted in larger support for the right-wing
parties giving voice to such concerns. In particular, since the Institute sought to
popularise a notion of “Swedishness” based on anthropometric characteristics, and
distributed information which individuals could use to identify archetypal Swedes,
did it engender especial support for racial rhetoric in particularly “Swedish” areas?
3Translation as in (Lindström, 1985). Original text reads: “Stöd åt familjebildningen. Snabba
och verksamma åtgärder tillskydd för det svenska folkmaterialets best̊and.”
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2.3 Data
2.3.1 Data on Historical Elections
I construct a panel of electoral outcomes for all Swedish election districts (härader)
over the eight elections between 1917 and 1940. All data on voting and supporting
information are taken from various series of Sveriges Officiella Statistik (Official
Statistics of Sweden), published on a yearly basis by Statistiska Centralbyr̊an (Stat-
istics Sweden). The resulting panel consists of 383 districts and eight elections.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Panel A of Table 2.1.
2.3.2 The Institute’s Race-Biological Data
To reconstruct the “Swedishness” of each election district according to the Institute’s
criteria, I use the anthropometric data presented in Linders and Lundborg (1926).
These data are based on measurements of the universe of Swedish conscripts in the
years 1922 and 1923 (around 100,000 individuals in all), and therefore provide ample
coverage of all parts of the country.4 The source provides me with the distribution
of key anthropometric variables associated with around 2,500 settlements, which I
match with election districts to create measures of “Swedishness” on the election
district level. Descriptive statistics are presented in Panel B of Table 2.1.
2.3.3 Data from the Institute’s Archives
In Section 2.4.5, I explore the role of local newspapers in moderating the effect of
the Institute’s propaganda. To this end, I hand-collected data on the coverage of the
Institute’s activities in local newspapers using materials from the Institute’s archive
in Uppsala. These data are discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.5 below.
4Conscripts are, of course, a selected sample. This is not problematic for the present study for
two reasons. First, conscripts are likely to differ systematically from the overall population only
on height measurements, not on the key cephalic index variable (Linders and Lundborg, 1926).
Second, since in this chapter I am interested on the relative “Swedishness” of different election
districts, selection into conscription is not an issue so long as this does not differ systematically
between districts. This is unlikely due to the universality of conscription in this period.
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Besides its role in shaping electoral outcomes, I also investigate the effect of
the Institute’s propaganda on direct engagement with the Institute. Again, I draw on
material from the Institute’s archive. In particular, using registries of the Institute’s
incoming correspondence, I construct a district-level yearly panel of engagement,
which I describe fully in Section 2.5.
2.3.4 Other Data
I make use of a range of additional data sources. Using various series of Sveriges
Officiella Statistik (Official Statistics of Sweden), I compile a number of control vari-
ables, such as the population of a district, its level of urbanity and industrialisation,
measures of poverty and unemployment and measures of immigration. I present
descriptive statistics in Panel C of Table 2.1.
In exploring the mechanisms of my main effect, I make use of data on the
funding of public libraries which I hand-collected from the archives of Skolöver-
styrelsen (The Swedish Board of Education). I describe these data more fully in
Section 2.4.4 below.
Finally, in Section 2.6, I link the present-day resurgence of right-wing popu-
lism in Sweden to the historical identity-based propaganda of the Institute. I there-
fore assemble a municipality-level dataset of contemporary elections and a range of
control variables using various data freely available through Statistics Sweden.
2.4 The Impact on Electoral Outcomes, 1917-1940
To investigate the effect of the Institute’s attempt to popularise a race-biological
paradigm, I employ a differences-in-differences empirical strategy. In particular, I
estimate the following regression equation:
Rightwingict = γi + ηt + δ Postt × Swedishi +X ′ict β1 +X ′ct β2 + εict (2.1)
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Here, Rightwingict is the vote share of right-wing parties in district i in
county c in election t. In light of the discussion above, I consider the combined
votes for the conservative Right and Nationalist parties as constituting the “right-
wing” vote share in this particular setting. In an attempt to address potential
problems of omitted variables, I include district fixed effects γi to account for time-
invariant district-specific voting behaviour and time fixed effects ηt to account for
changes in political sentiment over time affecting all districts identically. Finally,
in most specifications I include district-level controls Xict and county-level controls
Xct. Such controls will be of especial importance in dispelling concerns about the
potentially confounding effects of immigration and of the Great Depression.
The key variable in equation 2.1 is the interaction Postt× Swedishi. Postt is
an indicator equal to 1 if an election took place after 1927,5 and Swedishi is an indic-
ator equal to 1 if an election district is in a region of above-median “Swedishness”
according to the cephalic index measurement in Linders and Lundborg’s anthro-
pometric study (Linders and Lundborg, 1926). Thus, the coefficient δ should be
thought of as the effect of the increased salience of “Swedishness” in particularly
“Swedish” districts on right-wing voting behaviour. If the key parallel trends as-
sumption holds, and there are no confounding changes at the same time as the
propaganda treatment, this effect can be said to be causal.
For a first impression of the relationship in question, I plot the spatial distri-
butions of three key variables in Figure 2.5. In Panel A, I show the distribution of the
measured cephalic index in Linders and Lundborg’s anthropometric study (Linders
and Lundborg, 1926). In Panel B, I show how this translates to the Swedishi in-
dicator used in equation 2.1. Finally, in Panel C, I show the election districts which
exhibited an increase in the average vote share of right-wing parties from the pre-
to the post-publication period. Broadly, it can be seen that districts with a higher
level of “Swedishness” are more likely to have seen an increase in right-wing vote
5That is, after the publication of the popular text, Svensk Raskunskap.
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shares in the interwar period. To formally investigate this spatial pattern, I employ
the differences-in-differences strategy outlined above.
Randomness of “Swedishness”
Before proceeding with the estimation of equation 2.1, I establish that assignment
to treatment (that is, a district’s identification as being of above-median “Swedish-
ness”) is plausibly random conditional on observables. In Figure 2.6, I plot the
residuals of a regression of the main “Swedishness” measure, the cephalic index of
a district, on a number of observables as well as county fixed-effects against the
district’s right-wing vote share in 1917.6 As is evident from the figure, there is
no systematic relationship between the measured “Swedishness” of a district not
accounted for by observables and that district’s support for the right wing in the
first election of my sample period. This gives me confidence that “Swedishness”,
and hence assignment to treatment, is as good as random once controlling for these
observables.
2.4.1 The Effect on Right Wing Parties
To quantify the political impact of the publication, I report in Table 2.2 the coef-
ficients of various specifications of regression equation 2.1.7 Column 1 reports the
coefficient δ from the basic specification with district and time fixed effects only.
The coefficient is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, and should be in-
terpreted as follows: on average, right-wing parties receive 3.6 percentage points
more of the vote share in above-median “Swedish” districts than in below-median
districts following the Institute’s propaganda campaign. Column 2 generalises the
difference-in-differences framework, and allows the “Swedishness” effect to vary by
year.
6Observables include urban status, industrial status, population, average wealth and average
income.
7Robust standard errors clustered by treatment region are reported in parentheses below each
coefficient.
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The remaining columns of Table 2.2 introduce controls into the regression.
Columns 3 and 4 include basic controls, such as the number of male inhabitants of
the district as well as the population density of the county.8 Columns 5 and 6 intro-
duce time-interactions of cross-sectional characteristics to address concerns that the
“Swedishness” measure is simply picking up these characteristics.9 The estimated
effect is very consistent across all specifications. Finally, in Figure 2.7, I plot the
coefficients from column 6 to demonstrate that the crucial parallel trends assump-
tion holds. There is no “Swedishness” effect prior to treatment, and a growing effect
in the elections following the publication of the text.
An effect which materialises slowly over the elections following the inception
of the Institute’s propaganda campaign is expected for three main reasons. First,
a gradual incorporation of racial elements into political parties’ manifestos would
result in a lagged matching between racial ideas and their representation in parlia-
mentary politics. Second, even with the development of mass media, the diffusion
of new ideas could not be instantaneous. Third, given that the Institute’s popular
text was intended for use in schools, its political effect could only manifest itself in
electoral outcomes when students were eligible to vote.
Having shown that right-wing parties received a relatively larger vote share in
“Swedish” districts as a result of the propaganda campaign, an important corollary
is whether this resulted in increased political power locally. To answer this question,
I estimate the same specifications of equation 2.1 with an indicator equal to one if
the right-wing parties of a district constitute the largest political block. The results
of this exercise are reported in Table 2.3, and strongly suggest that the increased
vote share was accompanied by greater political weight locally. Columns 1, 3 and 5
show that right-wing parties are around 8.5 percent more likely to be the dominant
block in “Swedish” districts following the publication of the book. Similarly to the
8I use the number of male inhabitants because this information is available for all elections,
whereas the total number of inhabitants is only available for the elections from 1921 onwards.
9These characteristics include an indicator for urban districts, an indicator for industrial dis-
tricts, income p.c. and wealth p.c. as measured pre-treatment.
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slowly materialising effect on vote shares, columns 2, 4 and 6 document a similar
gradual effect for local political power. To visually represent the effect, I plot the
coefficients from column 6 in Figure 2.8.
Robustness to potential confounders
The difference-in-differences strategy relies on the assumption that there are no
changes at the same time as the propaganda treatment which could confound the
estimated effect. In this subsection, I dispel such concerns about some key poten-
tial confounders. The results from this exercise are reported in Table 2.10 in the
Appendix. Column 1 restates the baseline result for vote shares from above, and
the subsequent columns deal with each potential confounder in turn.
In column 2, I introduce turnout as a control. If the upswing in right-
wing support comes from the activation of previously non-participating parts of the
electorate, then this would alter the interpretation of my results. Reassuringly, the
inclusion of turnout as a control variable leaves the estimated coefficient virtually
unchanged.
The two key potential confounders in this period are the Great Depression
and the migration flows of the interwar period. Both of these events were politically
salient, and if treatment and control districts were differentially affected by either
event, this may well have translated into differential electoral outcomes. Figure 2.17
in the Appendix plots the evolution of these potential confounders. I can address
separately two types of immigration flows: the number of “outsider” immigrants10
per 1,000 inhabitants as well as the number of working immigrants per 1,000 in-
habitants. To address the effect of the Great Depression, I have county-level data
on poverty (as measured by the number of people in poorhouses per 1,000 inhab-
itants) and on unemployment (as measured by the number of jobseekers per 1,000
inhabitants). As reported in columns 3 to 6, the inclusion of these controls does not
10Those from outside of the Nordic countries, Western Europe and the Anglo-Saxon offshoots.
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substantially alter the estimated coefficient δ, which should alleviate concerns that
my effect is confounded by these aspects of the interwar political climate. Finally,
column 7 includes all these controls, and the “Swedishness” effect is robust to their
simultaneous inclusion.
Robustness to other measures of “Swedishness”
The division of districts into treatment and control based on a median split according
to their cephalic index is desirable for two reasons. First, the cephalic index was
the dimension of “Swedishness” which the Institute emphasised most strongly in its
work, as evidenced by the anthropometric study (Linders and Lundborg, 1926) and
its popular version (Lundborg, 1927). Second, the use of an indicator variable for
treatment yields more easily interpretable coefficients.
This is not to suggest that the estimated effect is unique to the chosen defin-
ition of the treatment variable. In Table 2.11 in the Appendix, I report additional
specifications of equation 2.1 where the treatment variable Swedishi has been re-
placed with alternate measures of “Swedishness”. Column 1 reproduces the coeffi-
cient from the baseline specification. In column 2, I use the standardised cephalic
index of district i directly: a continuous treatment variable rather than an indicator.
As explained above, a low cephalic index corresponds to the longer skulls (dolicho-
cephalic) thought to be more “Swedish”. In my standardised measure I account
for this, such that a large number for the standardised cephalic index should be
thought of as more “Swedish”. The coefficient reported in column 2 tells the same
story as the baseline specification: more “Swedish” regions became more right-wing
following the start of the propaganda campaign.
In column 3, I introduce a different measures of “Swedishness” altogether: a
standardised continuous morphological index.11 Again, the standardisation is such
that a high index is associated with a higher degree of “Swedishness”. The estimated
11Similar to the cephalic index, which captures the dimensions of the skull, the morphological
index captures the dimensions of the face.
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effect is significant and in a direction consistent with the previous findings: more
“Swedish” regions became more right-wing.
Finally, I explore some of the non-linearities of the “Swedishness” effect in
column 4. Rather than a median split, I report results from a quartile split according
to the cephalic index, with the bottom quartile as the reference category. The
estimates show that the “Swedishness” effect is driven entirely by the top quartile.
Robustness to land and employment shares
A potential concern with the specifications used so far is that political developments
depend on the structure of the economy in complex ways. Hence, it may not be
sufficient to control for the potentially differential trends in support for right-wing
parties simply by including time interactions with indiciators for whether a district is
rural or non-rural, industrial or non-industrial, and so on. To capture local economic
structure more granularly, I construct land and employment shares for each district
using agriculture and employment censuses.12 Interacting these shares with election
fixed effects will allow me to more accurately pick up the political effect of economic
structure over time.
I report the result of these robustness checks in Table 2.12 in the Appendix.
Column 1 reports the baseline result. Columns 2 and 3 include controls for the
share of agriculture in the economy, measured either as the share of land used
for agriculture or as the share of employment in agriculture. Agricultural regions
could be more socially conservative and therefore become more right-wing during the
interwar period. This may confound the estimated “Swedishness” effect if “Swedish”
districts are those which are predominantly agricultural. Reassuringly, the effect is
stable to the inclusion of these share-time interactions.
Column 4 includes similar interactions for the share of employment in in-
dustry, and the estimated “Swedishness” effect is virtually unchanged. In column
12I use the censuses conducted most closely prior to the publication of the book: the agricultural
census of 1927 and the employment census of 1920.
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5, I conduct the same exercise for the share of employment in trade. This is an im-
portant consideration, as districts reliant on trade may be more metropolitan and
therefore respond negatively to the fundamentally exclusionary rhetoric of the Insti-
tute. The estimated effect, however, is robust to the inclusion of these interactions.
Finally, in column 6 I include all employment share interactions simultaneously, and
the coefficient estimate remains unchanged.
Robustness to various fixed effect specifications and potential outliers
As a final check of the robustness of the main results, I investigate the extent to
which they are sensitive to differential developments on the county level.13 One way
to conduct this check is to re-estimate the main specification 25 times, leaving each
county out in turn. If the estimated effects in each of the restricted regressions are
similar to the effect in the unrestricted regression, it is likely that no one county
is driving the result. I report the results of this exercise in Figure 2.18 in the
Appendix. The effect is very stable across the different restricted regressions, so it
seems unlikely that the result is peculiar to any one outlying county.
A similar, more stringent way of testing whether unobserved county-specific
characteristics are driving the results is to include richer fixed effects in the main
regression equation. I report results from such specifications in Table 2.13 in the
Appendix. Columns 1 and 2 report the baseline results from above, excluding and
including district-level cross-sectional characteristics interacted with election fixed
effects. Columns 3 and 4 augment this specification by including county-specific
time-trends, which allow the right-wing vote shares in each of the 25 counties to
follow differential linear trends in the interwar period. The estimated “Swedishness”
effect is attenuated slightly, but remains positive and significant. Finally, in columns
5 and 6 I report even more restrictive specifications including county-by-year fixed
13Counties are one level of administration above the district. There were 25 counties in Sweden
in the interwar period (24 counties in the full sense plus Stockholm city, which I consider a separate
county for the purposes of these checks).
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effects. This allows each county’s right-wing vote share to vary flexibly from year to
year. Even here, there is a positive and significant effect, which gives me confidence
that the result is not driven by unobservable yearly variation on the county level.
2.4.2 The Effect on Other Parties
Given that more “Swedish” districts became more right-wing following the public-
ation of the book, which parties were on the losing end? That is, which parties’
vote shares did the right wing usurp in these districts? In Figure 2.9, I plot the
evolution of the other parties’ vote shares over time, and in Table 2.4 I report the
coefficient on the Postt × Swedishi interaction with different parties’ vote shares as
the dependent variable in specification (2.1). From these coefficients, it appears
that the chief losers were the Farmers, but this effect is driven by a large positive
difference in 1920. There is no significant negative “Swedishness” effect in any of
the elections post-1927. For other parties, such as the Liberals, Social Democrats
or Left parties, there was no significant effect.
The rise of the right wing at the expense of the Farmers can be rationalised
with an eye on Lindström’s thesis on the interwar political manoeuvrings (Lind-
ström, 1985). While the Farmers had exhibited traditional national-romanticism
with a mixture of “racism, chauvinism, and xenophobia” in the early twentieth
century, by the 1930s their politics had taken on a more social democratic flavour.
This rapprochement was best demonstrated by the 1933 crisis agreement between
the Farmers’ League and the Social Democratic Party, which was struck primarily
in response to the Great Depression, but also as a bulwark against the rise of Na-
tional Socialism (notably, the agreement coincided with the Nazi seizure of power
in Germany (Möller, 2015)).
If the publication of the book inspired concerns about racial purity, then the
Farmers decreasingly represented an answer to that quandary. Rather, it was the
National Socialists (explicitly) and the Right Party (increasingly flirtatiously) who
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embraced the rhetoric of race biology. Such (re-)positioning on the issue of race can
go some way toward explaining why the right wing was able to grow at the expense
of the Farmers in particularly “Swedish” districts.
2.4.3 Heterogeneity of the Effect
To unpack the mechanisms of the effect presented above, I conduct a heterogeneity
analysis to identify the types of districts driving the “Swedishness” effect. These
results are reported in Table 2.5. The dimensions of heterogeneity I consider are:
urban versus rural districts, industrial versus non-industrial districts, high- versus
low-immigration districts. The columns of Table 2.5 present these in turn.
Column 1 restates the baseline result. Columns 2 and 3 present the het-
erogeneity of the effect along urban/rural and industrial/non-industrial divides.14
It could be expected that urban and rural districts respond differently to the pro-
paganda treatment. To the extent that the industrial/non-industrial distinction
captures differences in class structure, we may also expect to observe differential
responses between these two types of districts. From the reported coefficients, how-
ever, it is apparent that the “Swedishness” effect does not significantly differ along
these dimensions.
The striking result in Table 2.5 is reported in column 4. Here, I allow the
effect to differ according to levels of pre-treatment immigration. The coefficients
suggest that the result is driven entirely by those districts which experienced low
levels of immigration, which suggests that insular communities may be especially
susceptible to the type of ‘us and them’ rhetoric embodied in the Institute’s propa-
ganda campaign. This result speaks to the concept of “defended neighbourhoods”
in the political science literature, which holds that “outsider” groups will only be
perceived as threats in local areas where such groups were initially absent (New-
man, 2013). The “contact hypothesis” provides a different lens through which to
14Note that the respective post×urban and post×industrial coefficients will be subsumed in the
time × cross-sectional characteristics controls, so they are not reported.
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view my results: mutual exposure between groups can attenuate conflict.15 In this
sense, election districts which had seen little immigration before the propaganda
intervention were defended neighbourhoods with little contact with the “outsider”
group, which appears to have magnified the impact of the Institute’s propaganda.
2.4.4 The Library Effect
The analysis so far has used the publication of the race-biological text only to
identify the crucial moment when the popularisation of race biology began. Ideally,
I would like to observe exactly where each copy of the book was sent to identify the
effect of the book in a very narrow sense. Unfortunately, neither the Institute nor
the publisher of the book appear to have kept detailed records of purchases, which
renders the ideal analysis infeasible. Nevertheless, it is important to determine
whether the book was important per se, or whether it should be thought of more
widely as an embodiment of the wider popularisation of race biology.
To shed light on this distinction, I collect data on state funding of libraries
in 1926 (the year before treatment). These data provide both a very comprehensive
list of the libraries throughout Sweden (each entry states the municipality in which
the library is located) and an indication of their relative sizes (libraries received
different levels of state funding). I aggregate the library funding data on the level
of the election district, and classify districts as having high or low library funding
by way of a median split. The nature of the data allows me to perform this split
for total library funding and separately for people’s (public) libraries and school
libraries. I interpret high library funding as indicative of the accessibility of the
race-biological book. Libraries with higher funding were ceteris paribus more well-
stocked, and therefore more likely to stock the text. If the “Swedishness” effect is
stronger in regions with better library funding, then this is suggestive of an effect
associated with the text itself.
15Steinmayr explores this hypothesis in the Austrian context, where a neighbourhood’s exposure
to refugees decreases support for the far right (Steinmayr, 2016).
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In Table 2.6, I report estimations of the main regression equation which
incorporate the library data. Column 1 restates the baseline result. Column 2
introduces a triple interaction to investigate whether the “Swedishness” effect is
stronger in election districts with well-funded libraries. The results suggest that
the effect is driven by districts with high library funding: the triple interaction
Post× Swedish×High library funding is significant, while the double interaction
Post × Swedish is smaller and insignificant. Columns 3 and 4 introduce similar
triple interactions, considering people’s library and school library funding separately.
The results in these columns suggest that school libraries played a crucial role in
the efficacy of the propaganda campaign. This is consistent with the notion that
information treatments are more effective when the recipient is at a young age.
To the extent that students discuss their schooling with parents and relatives, this
result is also suggestive of a transmission mechanism by which information is diffused
within the household and the propaganda effect magnified.16
2.4.5 Exposure to Race-Biological Media
Besides the direct consumption of race-biological ideas as embodied by the book, a
different channel by which racial attitudes may have proliferated is via the exposure
to media covering these topics. In order to investigate this channel, I collect data
on the coverage of race biology in national and local newspapers. The Institute
kept a rich collection of clippings from newspapers covering its work as well as race
biology more broadly: the collection spans the years 1907-1935 and contains 1762
articles from 301 different newspapers. I use this collection to construct a measure
of exposure to race-biological media and investigate how this interacted with the
“Swedishness” effect documented above.
For each of the 301 newspapers, I identify the location of its headquarters
and assign each of the newspaper’s articles to the corresponding election district.
16See Becker et al. (2017) for an exploration of this transmission mechanism in the context of
education in Germany’s secularisation period.
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Since newspapers have a readership extending beyond its immediate election dis-
trict, I construct a distance-weighted index of exposure which takes on large values







Here, nj is the number of race-biological newspaper articles published in
district j in the period 1907-1935, Dij is the distance in kilometres between the
centroids of districts i and j. Dii is normalised to zero, which yields the property that
an election district’s own articles are unweighted, and articles from other districts
are distance-weighted.
In Figure 2.10, I plot the spatial distribution of media exposure. The media
dominance of Stockholm is clear from the map, but also the media hubs of Gothen-
burg and Malmö as well as local newspapers from smaller towns impact the index
and create local variation in media exposure.
I incorporate this information on newspapers in my analysis to explore the
role of media exposure in driving the “Swedishness” effect. Results from this ex-
ercise are reported in Table 2.7. In columns 1 and 2, I first check whether there
is a “Swedishness” effect in determining contemporaneous or cumulative media ex-
posure. In these columns, I simply use media exposure as the dependent variable
in equation 2.1. Neither coefficient of interest is significant, suggesting that that
there is no systematic increase in newspaper exposure to race-biological topics in
particularly “Swedish” regions following the publication of the book.
Rather than thinking of media exposure as an outcome of the propaganda,
it should be viewed as its moderator. I explore this interpretation in columns 3 to
5. Column 3 restates the baseline result from previous sections. Column 4 reports
the media effect in isolation: the coefficient on Post×Media is the impact on right-
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wing vote shares following the start of the propaganda campaign in districts with
above-median media exposure. This impact is positive and significant, suggesting
that media exposure may be an important channel for the “Swedishness” effect.
In column 5 I explore this channel directly by interacting high media exposure
with high “Swedishness”. The results of this exercise suggest that media indeed is
an important moderator. Districts of high “Swedishness” vote significantly more for
the right wing following the publication of the propagandistic book only in districts
of above-median media exposure. Media appears to have a central role in shaping
the spread of and response to radical ideas by granting the prerequisite step of
exposure to these ideas.
2.5 The Correspondence of the Institute
To supplement the above evidence for a turn to the right in above-median “Swedish”
districts following the publication of the book, I construct a district-level panel of
direct correspondence with the Institute. Direct correspondence is a less noisy meas-
ure of support for the racial paradigm. No political party made race biology their
sole issue and, as such, voting for a party which promotes such ideas is suggestive
but not conclusive. Writing a letter, however, demonstrates more unambiguously a
willingness to engage with the ideas of the Institute.
In the construction of the panel, I make use of the complete registries of the
incoming correspondence of the Institute. For each calendar year, the Institute kept
files of every incoming letter, including its subject and the location of the writer.
See Figure 2.19 in the Appendix for an example of the registries used. I use this
information to categorise each letter by subject and assign it to the election district
from which it was sent. Three categories in particular will be of interest: letters
concerning (i) the books of the Institute, (ii) race-biological literature more gener-
ally, and (iii) photographs. Photographs are of interest because of the inherently
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visual element of Swedish race biology (Kjellman, 2013). People would write to
the Institute to request loans of photographs from the Institute’s large collection
(primarily for the purposes of education), but also to submit private photographs
of “racial archetypes”. The resulting panel covers the same districts as the analysis
of electoral outcomes, and spans the years 1925 to 1934. This results in a total of
ten years and 383 districts.
Panel E of Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics, and Figure 2.20 in the
Appendix plots the number of incoming letters over time by category. There are pro-
nounced spikes in letters about books and literature in 1927, in part due to the large
numbers of letters requesting a copy of the Institute’s books which were published
that year. Of further note is the growth in the volume of letters about photographs,
particularly in treatment districts (districts of above-median “Swedishness”).
To estimate this effect more formally, I will once again employ a differences-
in-differences framework and estimate the following regression equation:
Letters p.c.ict = γi + ηt + ψ Postt × Swedishi +X ′ict β1 +X ′ct β2 + νict (2.2)
Here, Letters p.c.ict measures the number of letters sent to the Institute per
1,000 inhabitants of a district.
The results are reported in Table 2.8. Column 1 reports the “Swedishness”
effect on total per capita correspondence, while columns 2 to 4 split correspondence
into the three categories discussed above. The results are very consistent across
correspondence categories: more “Swedish” districts become more directly involved
with the Institute. I present the results from generalised difference-in-difference
regressions in Figure 2.11. Importantly, the parallel trends assumption is satisfied.
The increased willingness to interact directly with the Institute in particu-
larly “Swedish” regions provides corroborative evidence for the argument that they
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became more open to race-biological ideas after 1927. The results on letters sent
enquiring about race-biological literature and the Institute’s own publications espe-
cially strengthen the claim. Less strong conclusions can be drawn from the results
on letters about photographs. While the coefficients are positive, they are statistic-
ally insignificant. This may be a symptom of the relatively small number of letters
sent regarding photographs, which makes it difficult to detect effects. Alternatively,
there may simply be no systematic effect of “Swedishness” on this category of cor-
respondence. To the extent that the Institute welcomed submissions of photographs
of both “Swedish” and “non-Swedish” archetypes, it is not surprising to see letters
from both types of districts.
On the whole, however, the analysis of the Institute’s correspondence sup-
ports the main line of argument that more “Swedish” regions became more accepting
of a race-biological paradigm as a result of the propaganda campaign.
2.6 The Long Run: Swedish Right-Wing Parties Today
A large literature in economics highlights the persistence of cultural phenomena
over time and space. These enduring traits manifest themselves not least in political
preferences and electoral outcomes.17 Similar types of persistence are evident also in
the Swedish case. In the popular imagination, Swedish racism never was a problem
or at the very least was rendered obsolete in the post-war period. The work of Hélene
Lööw, however, documents the enduring undercurrents of racial ideology present in
Swedish society throughout the last half-century, as well as its recent resurfacing in
the political arena (Lööw, 2000, 2004, 2015).
The most high-profile manifestation of this phenomenon is the rise to prom-
inence of the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, henceforth SD). Formed in
1988, the party has its roots in the anti-immigration campaign group Bevara Sverige
17Some key examples are Voigtländer and Voth (2012) and Ochsner and Roesel (2017). More
immediate, intergenerational transfer of preferences is documented in Avdeenko and Siedler (2017).
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Svenskt (Keep Sweden Swedish), and its early politics were dominated by nationalist
and racist sentiments (Möller, 2015; Widfeldt, 2014). Since its early days, the party
has metamorphosed into a self-proclaimed “centrist” party and has moved toward
the political mainstream, but its right-wing, anti-immigration rhetoric remains a
defining feature. In Figure 2.21 in the Appendix, I reproduce a SD election poster
which encapsulates this rebranding of old sentiments. The poster states “less im-
migration here, more help to refugees there”, and the slogan of SD reads “security
and tradition”. The presentation is a far cry from the party’s roots, but the content
is similar.
In light of the thesis of persistence of culture and values as well as of the
political “Swedishness” effect of the Institute’s work documented above, it seems
plausible that the recent election successes of the SD - the party received 12.9 percent
of the popular vote in the 2014 general election - may be explained at least in part
by artefacts of racial and nationalist thought from before the Second World War. If
particularly “Swedish” districts turned to the right and embraced racial rhetoric in
1927, these ideas may have persisted locally over time in some form or other.
To investigate this possibility, I estimate a “long” differences-in-differences
regression. In effect, I estimate equation 2.1 from above, but rather than restrict
myself to the right-wing parties of the interwar period, I also include SD as a right-
wing party in the present. I harmonise the spatial units by assigning historical
election districts to present day municipalities, which results in 210 “municipalities”
which exist over the entire 100-year period. I keep all the elections from the above
analysis, and add the five elections in which data on SD’s performance are available
(1998, 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014), for a total of 13 elections.18 Concretely, I estimate
the following differences-in-differences specification:
18Present-day election data are from Statistics Sweden’s election statistics.
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Rightwingmt = θm + ψt + ρ Postt × Swedishm +X ′mt α+ υmt (2.3)
As discussed, Rightwingmt is the sum of Conservative Right and National
Socialist vote shares in the elections in the period 1917-1940, and the vote share
of the Sweden Democrats in the elections in the period 1998-2014. I include muni-
cipality and election fixed effects, θm and ψt, as well as municipality-level controls
Xmt. The coefficient of interest is ρ, which is the political impact of the publication
of the book in the extended post-treatment period. Some specifications will allow
ρ to differ between the interwar post-treatment period (1928-1940) and the modern
post-treatment period (1998-2014), and some specifications allow for a fully flexible
effect over time.
Importantly, because I am comparing vote shares for two different political
entities at different points in time, I standardise the right-wing vote share variable
separately for the interwar period and the modern period. While the election fixed
effects will take care of level shifts in right-wing vote shares over time, they will not
capture potential differences in the higher-order moments of their distribution. In
particular, standardising separately for the interwar and modern periods accounts
for differences in the variance of vote shares in the two periods.
I report the results from the estimation of equation 2.3 in Table 2.9. The
results carry over very consistently from the analysis of the interwar period alone.
Column 1 reports a positive and significant ‘Swedishness” effect for the combined
post-treatment period: above-median “Swedishness” regions exhibit a 0.43 standard
deviation increase in right-wing vote shares following the propaganda treatment.
The effect is in fact larger in magnitude in the modern period, as shown in column
2. Columns 3 and 4 add a further interaction with a low-immigration indicator. The
results from above carry through strongly: the “Swedishness” effect is driven by
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those regions which had been exposed to little immigration prior to the propaganda
intervention.
In Figure 2.12, I report the coefficients from a more generalised differences-
in-differences specification, where I allow the treatment effect to vary by year. It is
evident that the effect which materialised in the 1930s still persists to the present-
day elections. This suggests that interventions such as the Institute’s propaganda
campaign can have effects that persist locally over time. Viewed together with
the existing literature on cultural persistence, it is plausible to suggest that if such
a campaign was successful in the short run, then, to the extent that it influences
people’s worldview, this worldview could be passed down locally through generations
and manifest itself in voting for right-wing parties in the present. The fact that the
effects are driven by regions which had experienced little immigration prior to the
propaganda intervention suggests that the entrenchment of concepts of ‘us and them’
is particularly strong in settings where ‘us’ is insulated from ‘them’.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I have shown how the Swedish State Institute for Race Biology was
instrumental in the formation of racial paradigms in the early part of the twenti-
eth century and how this historical shift carries a legacy to the present day. The
publication of a popular race-biological propaganda piece classifying the Swedish
population according to racial “purity” achieved its aim of making race more polit-
ically salient. Following the publication of the propagandistic text, election districts
deemed particularly “Swedish” according to the Institute’s measures exhibited a
relative increase in the vote shares of the right-wing parties embracing its racial
ideas. This effect is particularly strong in districts with relatively good levels of
library funding, suggesting that access to the text was indeed crucial. Additionally,
newspaper coverage of race-biological ideas appears to have been key in mediating
101
the effect. Heterogeneity analyses show that the effect was driven by district with
low levels of pre-treatment immigration, which suggests that “defended neighbour-
hoods” respond particularly strongly to the increased salience of the threat of the
“outsider”. Using registries of correspondence, I have presented evidence that sup-
port for race-biological paradigms manifests itself not only in support for the right
wing, but also in direct interaction with the Institute. Finally, I have shown that
the impact of the propaganda campaign is persistent, with support for the Sweden
Democrats (a right-wing populist party) exhibiting a positive “Swedishness” effect
in recent elections.
My work sheds light on the potency of propaganda campaigns in shaping
preferences, particularly when such campaigns speak directly to identity. Racially-
based propaganda resonates with concepts of ‘us and them’, particularly in regions
where mutual inter-group exposure is low. The resulting entrenchment of racial
worldviews has the potential to be highly persistent. If we seek to understand the
current resurfacing of radical racial rhetoric as well as its milder expressions in




Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
A. Election Variables
Right 0.254 0.146 0 1
Farmers 0.142 0.138 0 0.871
Liberals 0.182 0.118 0 0.768
Social Democrats 0.357 0.167 0 0.787
Left 0.059 0.087 0 0.65
Nationalists 0.001 0.007 0 0.211
Others 0.001 0.005 0 0.063
Turnout 0.664 0.113 0.052 0.999
B. Race Variables
Above-median “Swedishness” 0.499 0.5 0 1
Mean cephalic index 77.152 0.626 75.400 79.236
Variance of cephalic index 9.559 1.025 5.277 13.157
Mean morphological index 92.657 1.138 88.673 95.447
Proportion light eyes 0.862 0.054 0.487 0.939
In lowest ceph. ind. region 0.59 0.492 0 1
In most Nordic region 0.313 0.464 0 1
In region with Baltic influence 0.734 0.442 0 1
Note: Election variables are taken from various volumes of statistics produced by Statistics Sweden. Right is the vote
share of the conservative right party. Farmers is the vote share of farmers’ parties. Liberals is the vote share of traditional
liberal parties. Social Democrats is the vote share of the social democratic party. Left is the vote share of far left parties.
Nationalists is the vote share of various nationalist and Fascist parties. Others is the vote share of other parties. Turnout is
the election turnout as proportion of eligible voters.
Race variables are constructed from Linders and Lundborg (1926) and Lundborg (1927). Above-median “Swedishness” = 1
if the mean cephalic index of a district is below the median of such indeces across all districts, 0 otherwise. Cephalic index
is a measure of the proportions of the skull, with a low index indicative of higher “Swedishness”. Morphological index is
a measure of the proportions of the face, with a low index indicative of higher “Swedishness”. Proportion light eyes is the
proportion of surveyed conscripts of a region with light eyes. In lowest ceph. ind. region = 1 if in region with lowest cephalic
index in Lundborg (1927), 0 otherwise. In most Nordic region = 1 if in highest class of “Nordic purity” in Lundborg (1927),
0 otherwise. In region with Baltic influence = 1 if not in region with lowest class of “Baltic influence” in Lundborg (1927), 0
otherwise.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics (continued)
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
C. Control Variables
District Level
Male population (1,000) 4.194 7.985 0.124 185.466
Urban 0.329 0.47 0 1
Industrial 0.193 0.395 0 1
County Level
Population density (per sq. km) 41.328 184.653 1.8 4307
Poor per 1,000 54.148 23.976 20.948 173.302
Total immigration per 1,000 0.992 0.603 0.226 4.005
Outsider immigration per 1,000 0.057 0.068 0 0.756
Working immigration per 1,000 0.431 0.295 0.073 1.683
Jobseekers per 1,000 99.525 78.092 5.307 429.476
D. Library Variables
Library present 0.966 0.181 0 1
Library funding (total) 818.367 750.356 0 4765.53
Library funding (people’s) 320.794 280.498 0 1643.33
Library funding (school) 497.572 526.060 0 3122.2
E. Correspondence Variables
Ever sent letter 0.606 0.489 0 1
Total 0.552 4.341 0 136
Books 0.067 1.504 0 83
Literature 0.119 1.749 0 90
Photographs 0.060 0.551 0 21
Note: Control variables are constructed from various volumes of statistics produced by Statistics Sweden. Male population
is the number of male inhabitants of a district, measured in thousands. Urban is an indicator = 1 if a district is urban.
Industrial is an indicator = 1 if a district is industrial. Population density measures the number of inhabitants per square
kilometre. Poor per 1,000 is the number of individuals in poor houses per 1,000 inhabitants. Total immigration per 1,000 is
the total inflow of immigrants per 1,000 inhabitants. Outsider immigration per 1,000 is the inflow of immigrants from outside
the Nordic countries, Western Europe and the Western offshoots per 1,000 inhabitants. Working immigration per 1,000 is
the inflow of immigrants who take up work upon immigrating per 1,000 inhabitants. Jobseekers per 1,000 is the number of
people seeking work through government employment agencies per 1,000 inhabitants.
Library variables are digitised from Education Ministry records of library funding. Library present is an indicator = 1
if a district has a library. Library funding (total) is the total amount of funding received by libraries in a district. Library
funding (people’s) is the amount of funding received by people’s (public) libraries in a district. Library funding (school) is the
amount of funding received by school libraries in a district.
Correspondence variables are digitised from the State Institute for Race Biology’s registries of correspondence. Ever sent
letter is an indicator = 1 if a district ever sent a letter to the Institute. Total is the total number of letters sent by a district
in a given year. Books is the number of letters regarding the Institute’s publications sent by a district in a given year.
Literature is the number of letters regarding race-biological literature sent by a district in a given year. Photographs is the
number of letters regarding photographs sent by a district in a given year.
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Table 2.2: Election results - effect on right wing parties: vote share
Dependent variable: vote share of right wing parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × Swedish 0.0358*** 0.0359*** 0.0342***
(0.00979) (0.00979) (0.00908)
1920 × Swedish -0.0271 -0.0271 -0.0270
(0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0174)
1921 × Swedish -0.0180 -0.0180 -0.0166
(0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0173)
1924 × Swedish 0.00637 0.00635 0.00722
(0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0179)
1928 × Swedish 0.000156 0.000200 0.00153
(0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0146)
1932 × Swedish 0.0299 0.0300 0.0283*
(0.0194) (0.0195) (0.0160)
1936 × Swedish 0.0379* 0.0381* 0.0361**
(0.0199) (0.0200) (0.0166)
1940 × Swedish 0.0365* 0.0366* 0.0346**
(0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0173)
District fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Basic controls N N Y Y Y Y
Election FE × cross-sectional chars. N N N N Y Y
Observations 3,064 3,064 3,064 3,064 3,064 3,064
R-squared 0.381 0.390 0.381 0.390 0.440 0.448
Note: Regressions of the form Rightwingict = γi+ηt+ δPostt×Swedishi+X′ict β1+X′ct β2+ εict. Robust
standard errors clustered by treatment region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Post ×
Swedish = 1 if year > 1927 and if region is above-median “Swedish”. Year * Swedish = 1 if election year
= year and if region is above-median “Swedish”. Base election is 1917. Basic controls: male population,
population density. Time × cross-sectional chars. contains each election year interacted with cross-sectional
characteristics of the election district, including: indicator for urban regions, indicator for industrial regions,
income p.c. at treatment, wealth p.c. at treatment.
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Table 2.3: Election results - effect on right wing parties: largest political group
Dep. var.: indicator = 1 if right wing largest pol. group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × Swedish 0.0879** 0.0881** 0.0855**
(0.0342) (0.0342) (0.0335)
1920 × Swedish 0.0264 0.0262 0.0218
(0.0612) (0.0612) (0.0537)
1921 × Swedish 0.0471 0.0474 0.0499
(0.0576) (0.0577) (0.0556)
1924 × Swedish 0.0209 0.0215 0.0251
(0.0593) (0.0593) (0.0566)
1928 × Swedish 0.0107 0.0112 0.0133
(0.0578) (0.0579) (0.0539)
1932 × Swedish 0.114* 0.115** 0.109**
(0.0578) (0.0579) (0.0527)
1936 × Swedish 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.164***
(0.0533) (0.0535) (0.0534)
1940 × Swedish 0.155*** 0.156*** 0.153***
(0.0542) (0.0544) (0.0543)
District fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Basic controls N N Y Y Y Y
Election FE × cross-sectional chars. N N N N Y Y
Observations 3,064 3,064 3,064 3,064 3,064 3,064
R-squared 0.174 0.180 0.175 0.180 0.220 0.225
Note: Regressions of the form Rightwingict = γi+ηt+ δPostt×Swedishi+X′ict β1+X′ct β2+ εict. Robust
standard errors clustered by treatment region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Post ×
Swedish = 1 if year > 1927 and if region is above-median “Swedish”. Year × Swedish = 1 if election year
= year and if region is above-median “Swedish”. Base election is 1917. Basic controls: male population,
population density. Time × cross-sectional chars. contains each election year interacted with cross-sectional
characteristics of the election district, including: indicator for urban regions, indicator for industrial regions,







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.5: Election results - heterogeneity
Dependent variable: vote share of right wing parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post × Swedish 0.0342*** 0.0375*** 0.0344*** 0.0318*** -0.00869
(0.00908) (0.0124) (0.0106) (0.00897) (0.0114)
Post × Swedish × urban -0.00993
(0.0163)
Post × Swedish × industrial -0.000945
(0.0194)
Post × low trade -0.00333
(0.0140)
Post × Swedish × low trade 0.00500
(0.0161)
Post × low immigration -0.00502
(0.0143)
Post × Swedish × low immigration 0.0695***
(0.0170)
District fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Election fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Basic controls Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE × cross-sectional chars. Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,064 3,064 3,064 3,064 3,064
R-squared 0.440 0.440 0.440 0.440 0.460
Note: Regressions of the form Rightwingict = γi + ηt + δ Postt × Swedishi + X′ict β1 + X′ct β2 + εict.
Robust standard errors clustered by treatment region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Post
× Swedish = 1 if year > 1927 and if region is above-median “Swedish”. Urban = 1 if district is urban.
Industrial = 1 if district is industrial. Low trade = 1 if district had below-median share of employment in
trade pre-treatment. Low immigration = 1 if district had below-median levels of immigration pre-treatment.
Basic controls: male population, population density. Time × cross-sectional chars. contains each election
year interacted with cross-sectional characteristics of the election district, including: indicator for urban
regions, indicator for industrial regions, income p.c. at treatment, wealth p.c. at treatment.
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Table 2.6: Election results - library effect
Dep. var.: vote share of right wing parties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post × Swedish 0.0342*** 0.0196 0.0302** 0.0201*
(0.00908) (0.0127) (0.0147) (0.0106)
Post × High library funds -0.00125
(0.0117)
Post × Swedish × High lib. funds 0.0306**
(0.0152)
Post × High lib. funds (people’s lib.) 0.00725
(0.0123)
Post × Swedish × High lib. funds (people’s lib.) 0.00820
(0.0169)
Post × High lib. funds (school lib.) -0.00296
(0.0127)
Post × Swedish × High lib. funds (school lib.) 0.0363**
(0.0157)
District fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Election fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Basic controls Y Y Y Y
Election FE × cross-sectional chars. Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,064 3,064 3,064 3,064
R-squared 0.440 0.444 0.442 0.445
Note: Regressions of the form Rightwingict = γi+ηt+ δPostt×Swedishi+X′ict β1+X′ct β2+ εict. Robust
standard errors clustered by treatment region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Post = 1
if year > 1927. Swedish = 1 if region above-median “Swedish”. High library funds = 1 if district received
above-median library funds pre-treament. High library funds (people’s libraries) and High library funds
(school libraries) are defined similarly. Basic controls: male population, population density. Time × cross-
sectional chars. contains each election year interacted with cross-sectional characteristics of the election
district, including: indicator for urban regions, indicator for industrial regions, income p.c. at treatment,
wealth p.c. at treatment.
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Table 2.7: Election results - media effect
Dependent variable:
Media (contemp.) Media (cum.) Vote sh. right wing part.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post × Swedish 0.254 4.735 0.0342*** 0.0178
(0.240) (4.373) (0.00907) (0.0141)
Post × Media 0.0133* -0.0108
(0.00792) (0.0118)
Post × Swedish × Media 0.0309*
(0.0163)
District fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Election fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Basic controls Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE × cross-sect. chars. Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,064 3,064 3,064 3,064 3,064
R-squared 0.983 0.987 0.440 0.430 0.443
Note: Regressions of the form Rightwingict = γi+ηt+ δPostt×Swedishi+X′ict β1+X′ct β2+ εict. Robust
standard errors clustered by treatment region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Post = 1 if
year > 1927. Swedish = 1 if region above-median “Swedish”. Media = 1 if region received above-median
cumulative media exposure by 1935. Basic controls: male population, population density. Time × cross-
sectional chars. contains each election year interacted with cross-sectional characteristics of the election
district, including: indicator for urban regions, indicator for industrial regions, income p.c. at treatment,
wealth p.c. at treatment.
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Table 2.8: Correspondence results
Dep. var.: p. c. corr. with the Institute
Total Literature Institute’s books Photographs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post × Swedish 0.0462** 0.0145* 0.0139** 0.00316
(0.0222) (0.00750) (0.00645) (0.00272)
District fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Election fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Basic controls Y Y Y Y
Election FE × cross-sectional chars. Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,830 3,830 3,830 3,830
R-squared 0.037 0.123 0.142 0.058
Note: Regressions of the form Letters p.c.ict = γi + ηt + ψ Postt × Swedishi + X′ict β1 + X′ct β2 + νict.
Robust standard errors clustered by treatment region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Post = 1 if year > 1927. Swedish = 1 if region above-median “Swedish”. Basic controls: male population,
population density. Time × cross-sectional chars. contains each election year interacted with cross-sectional
characteristics of the election district, including: indicator for urban regions, indicator for industrial regions,
income p.c. at treatment, wealth p.c. at treatment.
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Table 2.9: Election results - extended difference-in-differences results
Dep. var.: stand. vote share of right wing parties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post × Swedish 0.434*** -0.141
(0.119) (0.155)
Post (interwar) × Swedish 0.271*** -0.0146
(0.0760) (0.104)
Post (modern) × Swedish 0.569*** -0.248
(0.165) (0.214)
Post × low imm. -0.0772
(0.165)
Post × Swedish × low imm. 0.966***
(0.209)
Post (interwar) × low imm. 0.0255
(0.124)
Post (modern) × low imm. -0.153
(0.225)
Post (interwar) × Swedish × low imm. 0.454***
(0.149)
Post (modern) × Swedish × low imm. 1.380***
(0.285)
Municipality fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Election fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Election FE × cross-sectional chars. Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,728 2,728 2,728 2,728
R-squared 0.584 0.589 0.613 0.634
Note: Regressions of the form Rightwingmt = θm + ψt + ρ Postt × Swedishm + X′mt α + υmt. Robust
standard errors clustered by treatment region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Post =
1 if year > 1927. Post (interwar) = 1 if year is between 1928 and 1940. Post (modern) = 1 if year is
after 1940. Dependent variable is the vote share of right wing parties (Conservative Right and Nationalists
in interwar period, Sweden Democrats in modern elections), standardised separately for the interwar and
modern periods. Swedish = 1 if region above-median “Swedish”. Low immigration = 1 if district had
below-median levels of immigration pre-treatment. Controls: population density, immigration per 1,000
inhabitants, percent unemployed, population, turnout. Time × cross-sectional chars. contains each election
year interacted with cross-sectional characteristics of the election district, including: indicator for urban
regions, indicator for industrial regions.
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2.9 Figures
Figure 2.1: Excerpt from Svensk Raskunskap: map of “Nordic” archetypes
Figure 2.2: Excerpt from Svensk Raskunskap: “Nordic” archetypes
Figure 2.3: Excerpt from Svensk Raskunskap: “Baltic” archetypes
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Figure 2.6: Correlation between unexplained variation in cephalic index and right-
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Note: Regressions of the form Rightwingict = γi+ηt+
∑
t δtYeart×Swedishi+X′ictβ1+X′ctβ2+
εict. 1917 is the base election year. See text for details. 90% confidence intervals shown.
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Note: Regressions of the form RightwingLargestict = γi+ηt+
∑
t δtYeart×Swedishi+X′ict β1+
X′ct β2 + εict. 1917 is the base election year. See text for details. 90% confidence intervals shown.













































































































Note: Evolution of party shares normalised to 1917 levels.
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, where nj is the number of race-biological newspaper articles pub-
lished in district j until 1935 and Dij is the distance in kilometres between the centroids of
districts i and j. Dii is normalised to zero.
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Note: Regressions of the form Letters p.c.ict = γi + ηt +
∑
t δt Yeart × Swedishi + X′ict β1 +
X′ct β2 + εict. 1925 is the base year. See text for details. 90% confidence intervals shown.






































Dep. var.: vote share of right-wing parties, standard. separately in interwar and modern periods. 95% confidence intervals shown. 1917 is omitted baseline year.
Note: Regressions of the form Rightwingmt = θm +ψt +
∑
t ρt Yeart ×Swedishm +X′mt α+υmt.
1925 is the base year. See text for details. 90% confidence intervals shown.
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2.10 Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures
Figure 2.13: Newspaper clipping: Göteborgs Morgonpost, 26 November 1927.
Note: Headline: “Contemporary culture upheld to a significant degree by the Nordic race: A
popular version of Svensk Raskunskap and its lessons”. Author’s translation.
Figure 2.14: Newspaper clipping: Östersunds-Posten, 29 November 1930.
Note: Headline: “The race-hygiene problems require a rapid solution.” Author’s translation.
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Figure 2.15: Swedish National Socialist election poster, 1930s
Note: Top of poster reads: “Wake up, Sweden!”. Bottom of poster reads: “Away with the class
struggle! Forward the National Socialists! The workers of the hand and the mind. Unity and
people’s community!”. Author’s translation.
Figure 2.16: Borgerliga (Conservative Right) election poster, 1932
Note: Poster reads: “Work and self-sufficiency. Law and order. Liberty and defence. Vote for
the Borgerliga”. Author’s translation.
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Note: Raw data, per 1000 inhabitants. See text for details on variable definitions.
















Treatment effect - coefficient on Post * Swedish
Note: Each coefficient is from a regression dropping one county in turn. 90% confidence intervals
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.11: Election results - robustness to different treatment definitions
Dependent variable: vote share of right wing parties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post × Swedish 0.0342***
(0.00908)
Post × cephalic index 0.0152***
(0.00379)
Post × morphological index 0.00967**
(0.00417)
Post × Swedish Q2 -0.0237
(0.0147)
Post × Swedish Q3 0.00706
(0.0114)
Post × Swedish Q4 0.0389***
(0.00951)
District fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Election fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Basic controls Y Y Y Y
Election FE × cross-sectional chars. Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,064 3,064 3,064 3,064
R-squared 0.440 0.437 0.432 0.448
Note: Regressions of the form Rightwingict = γi + ηt + δ Postt × Swedishi + X′ict β1 + X′ct β2 + εict.
Robust standard errors clustered by treatment region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Post × Swedish = 1 if year > 1927 and if region is above-median “Swedish”. Post × cephalic index is a
standardised measure of cephalic index (such that large values are more “Swedish”) multiplied by the Post
indicator. Post × morphological index is defined similarly. Post × Swedish Q2, Q3 and Q4 are indicators
for quartiles of Swedishness multiplied by the Post indicator; the bottom quartile is omitted. Basic controls:
male population, population density. Time × cross-sectional chars. contains each election year interacted
with cross-sectional characteristics of the election district, including: indicator for urban regions, indicator
for industrial regions, income p.c. at treatment, wealth p.c. at treatment.
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Table 2.12: Election results - robustness checks by land and employment shares
Dependent variable: vote share of right wing parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × Swedish 0.0342*** 0.0336*** 0.0351*** 0.0372*** 0.0338*** 0.0362***
(0.00908) (0.00942) (0.00880) (0.00927) (0.00908) (0.00925)
Elec. FE × agr. land sh. Y
Elec. FE × agr. emp. sh. Y Y
Elec. FE × ind. emp. sh. Y Y
Elec. FE × trade emp. sh. Y Y
District fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Basic controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE × cross-sect. chars. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,064 3,064 3,064 3,064 3,064 3,064
R-squared 0.440 0.442 0.447 0.445 0.445 0.453
Note: Regressions of the form Rightwingict = γi+ηt+ δPostt×Swedishi+X′ict β1+X′ct β2+ εict. Robust
standard errors clustered by treatment region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Post ×
Swedish = 1 if year > 1927 and if region is above-median “Swedish”. Basic controls: male population,
population density. Time × cross-sectional chars. contains each election year interacted with cross-sectional
characteristics of the election district, including: indicator for urban regions, indicator for industrial regions,
income p.c. at treatment, wealth p.c. at treatment. Agr. land share is the share of land used for agricultural
activities (e.g. crop cultivation, animal rearing, etc.) as of the 1927 agricultural census. Employment shares
in agriculture, industry and trade are from the 1920 employment census.
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Table 2.13: Election results - robustness checks by fixed effects specifications
Dependent variable: vote share of right wing parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × Swedish 0.0359*** 0.0342*** 0.0173** 0.0142* 0.0212** 0.0162*
(0.00979) (0.00908) (0.00834) (0.00743) (0.0107) (0.00841)
District fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
County-specific time trend Y Y
County × election fixed effects Y Y
Basic controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Election FE × cross-sect. chars. Y Y Y
Observations 3,064 3,064 3,064 3,064 3,064 3,064
R-squared 0.381 0.440 0.475 0.519 0.579 0.615
Note: Regressions of the form Rightwingict = γi+ηt+ δPostt×Swedishi+X′ict β1+X′ct β2+ εict. Robust
standard errors clustered by treatment region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Post ×
Swedish = 1 if year > 1927 and if region is above-median “Swedish”. Basic controls: male population,
population density. Time × cross-sectional chars. contains each election year interacted with cross-sectional
characteristics of the election district, including: indicator for urban regions, indicator for industrial regions,
income p.c. at treatment, wealth p.c. at treatment.
126
Figure 2.19: Registry of incoming correspondence, 1927 (excerpt)










































Note: Incoming letters of the Institute by subject.
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Figure 2.21: Sweden Democrats election poster, 2014
Note: Poster reads: “Less immigration here, more help to refugees there!”. Subtitle reads: “The
Sweden Democrats: Security and Tradition”. Author’s translation.
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Chapter 3
Wars, Local Political Institutions
and Fiscal Capacity:
Evidence from Six Centuries of German
History
3.1 Introduction
In the European context it has long been argued that wars fostered state forma-
tion (Tilly, 1975). This includes the political representation of citizens in national
assemblies (Downing, 1993; Stasavage, 2010) and the development of sophisticated
nation-wide systems of taxation to broaden the tax base and to raise tax revenues,
for instance via income taxes.1 Examples of this are the first income taxes in Britain
This chapter is joint work with Sascha O. Becker, Andreas Ferrara and Luigi Pascali. We
thank Dan Bogart, Phil Hoffman and Jared Rubin for helpful discussions and comments. Confer-
ence and seminar participants at UCLA, NYU Abu Dhabi, Warwick, the World Economic History
Congress (Boston), the Workshop on Growth, History and Development (Southern Denmark) and
the ASREC Europe Conference (Bologna) provided valuable comments. Lander Elizondo, Evgeniia
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due to the Napoleonic Wars, or in the U.S. at the start of the Civil War (Besley and
Persson, 2009).
Representative political institutions and sophisticated tax systems, however,
evolved much earlier at the sub-national level, namely in the cities (Stasavage,
2011),2 long before the occurrence of such institutions at the national level in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For example, after a 20-months long siege by
the troops of the Archbishop of Cologne in 1389, the city of Dortmund introduced
a 5 percent income tax in 1393 to cope with the wartime debt burden. In 1400,
the citizens of Dortmund revolted and demanded more representation on the city
council (Rat). This led to a reform of the council to include the so-called Zwölfer
(“The Twelve”) who henceforth represented the citizens’ interest.
What explains this relationship between warfare, inclusive political institu-
tions, and more efficient systems of taxation at the local level? Tilly (1975) hy-
pothesises that rulers, especially those of smaller polities with a weaker position,
required the consent of their people to increase tax revenues to finance warfare.3 To
acquire such consent, Tilly claims that rulers offered political powers in exchange.
Wars are therefore crucial shocks to disturb equilibria in which rulers first tax sec-
tors of the economy over which they have more power,4 as opposed to sectors where
increased taxation requires the consent of the people which has to be acquired by
surrendering political powers. Since wars were expensive, they easily forced rulers
to raise tax revenues beyond what could be obtained without asking for consent.
This theory can potentially explain the effect of warfare on the evolution
of inclusive political institutions and the development of more elaborate forms of
taxation at the local level much before the nineteenth century when such institutions
2See Wahl (2019) for work on the evolution of representative political institutions in German
cities during the Middle Ages.
3Stasavage (2011) argues that smaller city states were able to build up fiscal apparatuses because
they were smaller and could more easily solve the coordination between taxation and spending
priorities. Rubin (2017) makes the more general observation that rulers need legitimacy and coercive
power. Assemblies can provide both: democratic legitimacy and tax revenue needed to coerce.
4As in the two-sector model of Hoffman and Rosenthal (1997) where a ruler controls one sector
which he can tax freely while in the other sector the consent of the elite is required.
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evolved at the national level. However, so far there is no empirical evidence to
support it.
Studying how warfare affected the evolution of political institutions and tax
systems at the sub-national and especially at the city level is challenging. Often-
times such data is hard to find for a sufficiently large sample and period of time.
However, the importance of cities as precursors of nation-wide systems of sophist-
icated taxation and representative political institutions can hardly be overstated.
In pre-industrial Europe, cities were the driver of political and economic innovation
(Wahl, 2019), and the primary providers of fast tax revenues to finance warfare
(Van Zanden et al., 2012). They were also fundamental drivers of growth. Bosker
et al. (2013) argue that local participative institutions in cities explain the urban
development that allowed Europe to eventually outpace the Islamic world. This
view is consistent with recent theories on citizens’ involvement in governing and the
efficiency of taxation (Acemoglu et al., 2011).
In this chapter, we present novel data on the universe of cities in the Ger-
man Lands from 1200 to 1750 which we digitised from city-level records. We show
that higher incidences of violent conflicts had a positive effect on the evolution of
representative political institutions and sophisticated tax systems at the local level.
Information on cities is observed in every decade for more than 2,300 cities and
was obtained from the Deutsches Städtebuch Keyser (1939-1974). Our data have
three important features that allow us to study the relation between warfare, repres-
entative political institutions, and sophisticated methods of taxation at a granular
level.
First, we observe crucial information each city’s political institutions to meas-
ure the citizen’s electoral power, representativeness of institutions, and the division
of power. To capture citizen’s electoral power we consider as outcome whether
citizens could elect their city council without the interference of the local ruler.
Representativeness is proxied by the size of the council which has been argued to
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be positively related (Kjaer and Elklit, 2014). We measure the division of power by
considering councils on which neither members of the executive nor the judiciary are
present. Our focus on councils as representative political institutions is motivated
by the fact that they were the “chief means of seeking consent [to tax] at which rep-
resentatives from different parts of a society would be able to express themselves”
(Stasavage, 2016, p. 147).
Second, we collected detailed information on the number and types of taxes
levied in 267 large cities that are also covered in Bairoch et al. (1988). We construct
measures of the sophistication of a city’s tax system as the share of income, wealth,
and inheritance taxes among the total taxes raised. This provides us with a novel
way to assess the impact of warfare on a city’s tax base and the quality of its taxes
over a long period of time and much before the introduction of nation-wide systems
of income taxes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Third, we observe violent conflicts that directly affect the city, such as sieges,
nearby battles, sackings, or (partial) destruction. We are the first to extend data
on violent conflicts back to the 13th century and to provide a level of detail on the
types of conflicts that is not available in conventionally used sources that focus on
battles, such as Clodfelter (2008).
A key challenge for identification is the potential endogeneity between warfare
and political institutions and taxation. This may be due to issues of reverse causality
as conflict may not only force the evolution of more efficient tax systems, but that a
higher ability to increase tax revenues could lead to increased participation in wars.
A similar argument is made by Gennaioli and Voth (2015) in the context of warfare
and state capacity.
To give our estimates a causal interpretation, we exploit changes in the nobil-
ity networks across more than 680,000 German and European nobles to instrument
for conflict intensities. To make this instrument arguably more plausible, we control
for the number of direct links of the nobles. This means that we exploit variation
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in the parts of the network that are not a direct choice of the nobles themselves (as
their direct links would be) but that affect their centrality in the network. We show
that as the centrality of a territory’s nobles decreases, the more likely it is to be
involved in subsequent violent conflicts.5
We find positive and significant effects of conflict intensity faced by cities
and the evolution of representative political institutions and a more sophisticated
tax system. We measure conflict intensity as the share of cities of a territory that
experience a violent conflict in a given decade. Our instrumental variables regres-
sions show that a one percentage point increase in this conflict measure is associated
with a 14.8 percent increase in the probability that citizens elect the council without
interference of the local ruler, a 13 percent increase in the size of the council, and
a 23 percent decrease in the probability that the executive and judiciary are rep-
resented on the council relative to the outcome averages. These findings are robust
to different definitions of territories or the instrument, assignment of conflicts from
the territory to the city-level, or sample composition. Our results can explain 27
percent of the overall increase in citizens electing their councils, and 20 percent in
the overall increase of council sizes between 1200 and 1750. While the independence
of councils over this time period has declined, it would have declined 24 percent
more in the absence of all warfare over the entire period.
The results on the relation between warfare and taxes show a negative effect
on the number of taxes raised by a city but an increase in the efficiency of the tax
system. We also find evidence of long-term dynamics that reinforce this develop-
ment. Fifty years later, a one percentage point increase in warfare is associated with
an increase in the share of sophisticated taxes by 17 to 24 percent. This result can
explain between 33 and 57 percent in the overall increase in sophisticated forms of
taxation between 1200 and 1750.
We contribute to the following strands of the literature.
5Benzell and Cooke (2018) show a link between cross-country kinship ties among European
monarchs and reduced conflict intensity in Europe over time.
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First, based on the theoretical work by Tilly (1975, 1990) a rich empirical
literature has studied the relation between warfare and political institutions (e.g.
Downing, 1993; Dincecco et al., 2011; Karaman and Pamuk, 2013; Dincecco and
Wang, 2018). However, Stasavage (2016, p. 155) points out that so far, “the evidence
suggests some causal link between warfare and representative institutions, although
of course we do not know in which direction causality runs.” We therefore contribute
two insights to this debate by i) providing evidence of a positive causal effect that
runs from warfare to representative political institutions and ii) by presenting the
first evidence of this relationship using granular sub-national data over a long period
of time.
Second, previous work studying the impact of warfare on taxation has mainly
focused on tax revenue and on the quantity rather than the quality of taxes (e.g.
Besley and Persson, 2009; Dincecco et al., 2011; Dincecco and Prado, 2012; Scheve
and Stasavage, 2010, 2012; Voigtländer and Voth, 2013; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015).
This difference matters. The inability to broaden the tax base by moving from trade
to income taxes has been related to the persistence of weak states Herbst (2000).6
We provide new evidence on the relationship between warfare and the evolution
of sophisticated systems of taxation that provide a broader tax base and a more
efficient way to raise tax revenues.
3.2 Related Literature
The historical roots of state capacity and its relationship with warfare is promin-
ently studied by Tilly (1975, 1990). He argues that the increasing cost of warfare
following military innovations in pre-modern Europe created a demand for more
efficient means of extraction of war funds. It was this need for extraction that gave
rise to systems of taxation, the expansion of state capacity, and the emergence of the
6Even nowadays poorer countries are characterised by a less sophisticated tax system and
narrower tax bases, suggesting a substantial role of taxation in development and growth (see Burgess
and Stern, 1993).
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nation state. Besley and Persson (2009, 2010) develop a formal theoretical frame-
work for modelling the determinants of state capacity.7 In their framework, warfare
and conflict are key drivers of the development of state capacity, as states develop
centralised systems of taxation to finance warfare. Inclusive political institutions
can have an impact on state capacity but are taken as exogenous. In theoretical
work, the direction of causation in the nexus between warfare, state capacity and
inclusive political institutions is ambiguous.
Downing (1993) argues that states relying on internal sources of revenue
during the military revolution built extensive autocracies. A standing army could
potentially be used for two purposes. Professional soldiers sworn to the local ruler
could not only deter and defend against outside forces but could also be employed to
oppress internal opposition from the local populace or elites. Stasavage (2016), on
the other hand, argues that the need to finance wars came with a trade-off for rulers.
To obtain more war funds rulers were compelled to offer their subjects a certain de-
gree of political power via representative institutions. This line of argumentation is
particularly relevant for Germany where the high degree of geographic fragmentation
created relatively weak rulers. Stasavage (2016, p.155) notes that: “the evidence
suggests some causal link between warfare and representative institutions, although
of course we do not know in which direction causality runs.”
Studies of the nexus between warfare, state capacity, and democratic in-
stitutions are scarce. A notable exception is Dincecco et al. (2011), who explore
correlations between the threat of external conflict, the need for taxation and sub-
sequent constitutional reform in nineteenth-century Italy. However, most previous
work has considered either conflicts and institutions, or conflicts and state capacity,
but not the joint relation between the three. In a theoretical contribution, Gen-
naioli and Voth (2015) model the effect of the military revolution on the need for
increased state capacity to finance wars. The need for fiscal innovations to raise war
7Besley and Persson (2013) point out that fiscal capacity would be the more precise term to
describe what is typically coined state capacity.
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revenues is also emphasised by Dincecco and Prado (2012) as key for the expansion
of fiscal capacity. In a recent survey, Johnson and Koyama (2017) highlight Prussia
and Russia as prime examples of “fiscal military states par excellence” due to the
bellicose underpinnings of investments in state capacity in those regions.
The relationship between inclusive institutions and state capacity is, to our
knowledge, less well-studied. Karaman and Pamuk (2013) provide evidence that tax
collection was done more efficiently by representative regimes in urban economies.
Authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, are shown to be more efficient at state
building in rural and agrarian economies. In recent work, Angelucci et al. (2018)
present causal evidence that the self-administration of tax collection in medieval
English merchant towns was instrumental in creating more inclusive institutions;
these towns were later granted representation in Parliament to allow the king to
negotiate extraordinary taxes with them.
Finally, there is a large literature on the link between conflict (in a broad
sense) and political institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) develop a model
where elites strategically grant citizens the right to vote in order to avoid social
unrest and revolution. This theory is brought to the data by Aidt and Franck (2015),
who show that the threat of revolution induced votes in favour of democratisation in
the context of the British Great Reform Act of 1832. Most related to this chapter is
the theoretical contribution by Ticchi and Vindigni (2008), who postulate a model
in which democratisation follows endogenously from the need to conscript citizens
to fight wars.
There is some evidence in the literature that suggests that both state ca-
pacity and inclusive institutions are beneficial for historic economic development.8
Dincecco and Katz (2016) relate state capacity improvements to long-run economic
8We show evidence for an effect of wars on both state capacity and inclusive institutions. We
thus provide evidence for one pathway from wars to economic development, via state capacity and
representative institutions. Of course, there are alternative explanations how wars affected long-run
development. Dincecco and Onorato (2017) argue that cities grew faster as a result of wars as they
offered a ‘safe harbour’ against pillaging. Hoffman (2015) claims that constant warfare led Europe
to develop technologies that allowed it to conquer the rest of the world.
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growth and Dincecco (2015) also to the establishment of twentieth-century welfare
states.9 Wahl (2019) shows that participative political institutions had a positive
effect on economic outcomes of German cities, with the exception of craft guilds
participating in the city council, which had had zero or negative impact.10 Our
work on the rise of state capacity and inclusive political institutions in the German
lands is therefore informative about two of the sources of the long-run development
of the German economy.
The contribution of this chapter is its focus on the nexus between warfare,
state capacity and inclusive political institutions. To identify causal relationships
between warfare and our outcomes of interest, we turn to the literature on the de-
terminants of historical conflict in Europe. In particular, we propose an instrument
for conflicts that uses shocks to the position of German nobles in the wider European
nobility network. Tilly (1975) notes a strong interrelation within the European no-
bility, a fact which according to Benzell and Cooke (2018) explains the general
decline in violent conflicts between European states. They construct a network of
the European ruling families and show that those with more interconnectedness ten-
ded to fight fewer wars. Polities governed by female rulers, on the other hand, were
more likely to engage in conflict (Dube and Harish, 2019). Married queens were
more effective at forging alliances and to use these strategically to fight wars. The
rich backdrop of nobility networks as a driver of war and peace in Europe informs
our choice of instrument, and is explained in more detail below.
9Borcan et al. (2018) take a perspective over 6 millennia and show that the current level of
economic development across countries has a hump-shaped relationship with accumulated state
history.
10This qualification on guilds supports Ogilvie (2014) who holds a sceptical view of guilds,
because they typically generated a particularised trust among its own members, but did not auto-
matically support more generalised trust supporting broader economic growth.
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3.3 Data
3.3.1 German City-Level Data
The main data source is the Deutsches Städtebuch (Encyclopedia of German Cities),
a series of volumes edited by Erich Keyser (1939-1974) that provide information
on each city in the German Empire incorporated prior to the compilation of the
Städtebuch. The book offers a systematic treatise of the history of German cities
from their foundation until the twentieth century. A separate article is devoted to
each city, following a consistent structure that divides the city history into twenty
categories. These include sections on a city’s past names, its geographic location,
its local economy, educational and church systems, and so on. Particularly relevant
for our purposes are section nine on the administration of the city, section eleven on
warfare and conflicts experienced by the city, and section 13 on its financial system
(including its means of taxation).
Political Institutions
We collect information on the different types and numbers of political institutions,
as well as information on how and by whom the institutions were chosen. The types
of political institutions we consider are the executive (mayors, sheriffs), legislative
(councils) and judiciary (judges) branches of a city’s administration. Using inform-
ation from the Städtebuch, for each institution we record the year in which it is
introduced or first mentioned, including start and (where applicable) end dates, the
number of people within a given institution,11 and the identity of members within
each institution. The latter information allows us to capture cases where, for in-
stance, the mayor of a city is also the judge or the head of the council. Finally, we
collect data on the electing body for each institution.12
11A council is typically composed of multiple members and, though less common, also several
mayors, judges or sheriffs could exist at the same point in time.
12Elections are classified into eight types: (i) direct elections by the citizens, (ii) by the citizens
but with a final say by the local lord, (iii) by the lord only, (iv) by the council, (v) by the council
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In a given century, the majority of cities were ruled by lords or bishops
and, as a result, not fully self-governing.13 City councils, however, had legislative
and administrative power in the local context. Examining various characteristics
of councils is therefore informative of the quality and representativeness of local
political institutions. To this end, we construct three main political institution
variables using the information collected from the Städtebuch. First, to capture the
opportunities for political participation by citizens, we define an indicator taking
a value of one if the council is directly elected by citizens without the interference
of the local lord. Second, to capture the strength and breadth of the council, we
define a count variable of the number of council members. Third, to capture the
independence of the council and the division of power between the branches of
administration within a city, we define an indicator taking a value of one if a judge,
mayor or sheriff is a member of the council. Concretely, larger values of the first
two variables and smaller values of the third variable are indicative of more inclusive
political institutions.
Conflicts
Our main explanatory variable is a measure of a city’s exposure to conflict. From
the relevant section of the Städtebuch, we record for each city the dates and dur-
ations of violent conflicts in which the city was involved. The conflict information
in the Städtebuch is detailed, and we are able to classify each conflict according to
its type. We capture involvements elsewhere (if the city engaged in raids or wars
in other territories), battles fought in the vicinity of the city, sieges, sackings, par-
tial destruction of the city, complete destruction of the city, and occupation. We
therefore have a rich set of information both on the occurrence of conflicts as well
as their nature.
with a final say by the lord, (vi) elections by other bodies (e.g. the court jury), (vii) unknown
electoral bodies, or (viii) unknown electoral bodies with a final say by the lord.
13The exception are imperial cities, which were entirely self-governed.
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The level of detail with which we capture city-level instances of conflict is
significantly more comprehensive than other frequently used sources, such as Brecke
(1999) and Clodfelter (2008).14 These sources begin in 1400 and 1494, respectively,
while our data allows us to extend further back in history. More importantly, these
sources focus primarily on battles. While battles are no doubt important consider-
ations for local rulers, we are also able to capture concerns related to other forms of
conflict. Indeed, extensive sieges or occupations (which can last months, years, or
even decades) plausibly exert greater pressure on rulers to tax than more short-lived
battle events.15
Taxation
The final component of the causal nexus we explore in this chapter is state capacity.
We focus on fiscal capacity - the state’s ability to levy and collect taxes - and collect
information on cities’ taxation from the Städtebuch. Due to data availability we
collect this information only for the largest cities: the 267 German cities that appear
in Bairoch et al. (1988). We are interested in exploring not only the establishment
of systems of taxation, but also their sophistication. To this end, we categorise
individual taxes into distinct types: (i) general taxation, such as head taxes and
taxes without a specifically stated purpose, (ii) taxes on obtaining or maintaining
citizen rights (Burgher taxes), (iii) property taxes (on houses or land inside the city),
(iv) land taxes (on farms or land outside the city), (v) income and wealth taxes, (vi)
inheritance taxes, (vii) tax on alcoholic beverages, (viii) business taxes (including
taxes on guilds), and (ix) trade taxes, such as tariffs and duties. We consider a tax
14Examples of the use of these battle datasets include Dincecco and Prado (2012), Kokkonen
and Sundell (2017) and Iyigun et al. (2017a,b)
15To illustrate the advantage of our data, consider the conflict data used by Iyigun et al. (2017b),
which combines Brecke (1999) and Clodfelter (2008). Their focus is on Europe, Northern Africa
and the Near East during the period 1400-1900, for which they record a total of 2,787 battles. Our
conflict data, which focuses on a much smaller geographical region (the German lands) records a
total of 4,133 city-level conflict events for the same period. This is illustrative of the greater local
detail we capture. Of course, our temporal focus is slightly different: our sample period consists of
the years 1200-1750, during which we record a total of 3,582 city-level conflict events.
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to be sophisticated if the activity to be taxed is not easily observable. Sophisticated
taxes therefore include property taxes, income and wealth taxes, and inheritance
taxes.16 Unsophisticated taxes include general taxes, Burgher taxes, land taxes,
alcohol taxes and trade taxes.
3.3.2 Data on Sovereign Territories
We link cities from the Städtebuch to sovereign territories using the Euratlas (Nüssli,
2009). In 100-year intervals, we observe the borders of all sovereign states of Europe.
This allows us to geographically link each city in the Städtebuch to the territory to
which it belonged each century. Figure 3.3 in the Appendix shows the evolution of
these territories as well as the (fixed) location of the 2,340 cities in the Städtebuch.
3.3.3 Data on the German Nobility
To build a network of German nobility and link information about nobles to the
cities in the Städtebuch, we combine two data sources. The first is the Peerage
project (Lundy, 2018) which stores data on more than 680,000 European nobles.
The Peerage database contains information on nobles’ dates of birth, death, and
marriages. In addition, we collect basic information on sex and age. Further, the
Peerage contains information which allows us to link each noble to their parents,
siblings, spouses and children. As an example, Figure 3.4 in the Appendix shows
The Peerage entry for Georg Wilhelm, Duke of Braunschweig and Lüneburg. Based
on this information, we are able to reconstruct the European nobility network at
any given point in time.
To supplement this data, we digitise information from the Europäische Stam-
mtafeln (European Family Trees, Schwennicke (1998)), in particular Volumes 1-1,
1-2 and 1-3. These volumes cover 379 family trees of ruling families in the German
16Business taxes could plausibly be considered sophisticated. In our empirical analysis, therefore,
we consider measures both including and excluding business taxes as sophisticated taxes.
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lands.17 Figure 3.5 in the Appendix shows an example of a family tree for the dukes
of Braunschweig and Lüneburg, and a detailed individual entry is shown in Figure
3.6. Note that this entry is the same individual, Georg Wilhelm, as identified in the
Peerage example above. The Stammtafeln provide additional valuable information
on locations of births, deaths, marriages and other events, which allows us to link
individual nobles to cities and territories within the German lands. Where other
information is missing in the Peerage, we also supplement this with data from the
Stammtafeln.
We use the information on the locations and lives of nobles to link them spa-
tially and temporally to the Städtebuch cities and Euratlas sovereign territories. We
use the data on parental, sibling and marital ties between nobles to reconstruct the
network of the German nobility each decade, yielding a potentially disconnected,
undirected, unweighted graph.18 We compute several statistics that characterise
the network and nobles’ relative positions within it. A commonly used measure
of centrality is degree centrality: the number of direct links a noble has to other
nobles. This simple measure, however, fails to capture the complexities of nobility
networks in this time period. Rather, we would like to capture, for example, the im-
portance of nobles whose links unite two separate dynasties. To our knowledge, the
most appropriate measure which is tractable for disconnected networks is harmonic







The harmonic centrality H(x) is a measure of the distance of noble x to the rest
of the network. The pairwise shortest-path distance d(x, y) is calculated between
17In our empirical analysis, we concentrate on the network positions of nobles from Volume
1-1 only. These are nobles from the most important 174 ruling houses in the German lands, and
therefore the key players determining war and peace in this period.
18We consider each of the following relationships to constitute a direct link between nobles:
parent, child, sibling, spouse.
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x and each other noble y. A large value for d(x, y) means that x is far from (and
therefore poorly connected to) y. Taking the inverse of this distance and summing
over all nobles y yields an intuitive measure where larger values correspond to higher
centrality. Additionally, harmonic centrality provides a straightforward way to allow
for unconnected nodes in the graph. For any two unconnected nobles x and y, we set
d(x, y) = ∞ such that an unconnected noble-pair’s contribution to H(x) is zero. We
calculate this measure for each noble alive in a given decade using the full Peerage
sample of 680,000 individuals. In Figure 3.7 in the Appendix we provide an example
of the largest component of such a network in the year 1460, with the most central
nobles (according to the harmonic centrality measure) highlighted.
3.3.4 Descriptive Statistics
For the majority of our analysis, we follow Cantoni et al. (2018) and drop cities
which are reported in a ’Small State of the Holy Roman Empire’ in the Euratlas.
This leaves 1,472 cities which we observe at decadal intervals for the period 1200-
1750. Descriptive statistics for the cities in our main sample are reported in Panel A
of Table 3.1. The first three variables capture the presence of the three main institu-
tional branches in each city-decade. Executive, judiciary and legislative institutions
are present in 47, 13 and 44 percent of city-decade observations, respectively. Turn-
ing to measures of institutional quality, 5 percent of councils are elected directly
by citizens, and the average council has around 9 members. Finally, roughly one
quarter of councils are not fully independent. That is, a mayor, sheriff or judge is
also a member of these councils.
Our main measure of conflict exposure is defined on the Euratlas territory
level. Since war and peace are determined by territorial lords, intuitively the impact
of conflict will be felt in all cities in a territory. Concretely, we use a measure of
conflict intensity, which takes the share of cities in a given territory that experience
conflict in a given decade. The summary statistics for this variable in Panel A of
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Table 3.1 reveal substantial variability: while the average city-decade is relatively
peaceful (only 2 percent of cities in its territory experienced conflict), there are
periods of intense warfare (where all the cities in the territory experience conflict).
To measure nobility network centrality, we use the harmonic centrality of the
best-connected noble in a territory. We also construct the average degree centrality
of nobles in a territory. Both these variables can intuitively be set to zero for those
cities in territories without any members of the highest levels of aristocracy. The
final four rows of Panel A of Table 3.1 report summary statistics for these variables.
There is considerable heterogeneity: some territories have very well-connected nobles
with a harmonic centrality four standard deviations above the mean, while some
territories have nobles without any links at all.
As explained above, we only observe taxation information for the larger cities
in Bairoch et al. (1988). Summary statistics for these cities are reported in Panel B
of Table 3.1. For completeness, we report the same variables as for the full sample in
addition to the taxation variables. On average, these cities have more well-developed
political institutions. Since conflict and nobility measures are defined at the territ-
orial level, values for these variables are very similar to those in the full sample.
In the average Bairoch city-decade, 1.31 taxes are levied. There are predominantly
‘simple’ taxes, with ‘sophisticated’ taxes being relatively rare. These is considerable
heterogeneity, however: some cities have four times as many sophisticated taxes as
simple taxes. This suggests that in this time period, these larger cities were already
beginning to develop relatively intricate systems of taxation, which is indicative of
high degrees of fiscal (state) capacity.
3.3.5 Motivational Evidence
Before describing our empirical strategy and presenting our results in Section 3.4
below, we conduct a suggestive ‘event study’ exercise, using the Thirty Years’ War
as a motivating example. In particular, in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, we plot the evolution
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of citizens’ involvement in electing the council, as well as the council size, separately
for those cities that experienced and for those that did not experience conflict during
this intense period of warfare. Strikingly, cities that were spared conflict stagnated
in terms of their development of inclusive political institutions, in contrast to those
cities which did see conflict in this period. This exercise is informative but, of
course, only suggestive. We now turn to a formal empirical strategy with the aim of
uncovering the joint causal effect of warfare on local political institutions and fiscal
capacity.
3.4 Empirical Strategy and Results
To study the relationship between inclusive political institutions and the kinds of
taxes raised by a city with warfare in a sovereign territory, we regress
yist = αi + λt + βConflicts,t−1 +X ′istπ + εist (3.2)
where cities are indexed by subscripts i, sovereign states by s, and decades by t. We
consider two types of outcomes yist.
The first are measures of the inclusiveness of political institutions, such as
an indicator for whether citizens elect the council without interference of the local
ruler, the size of the council, and whether members of the judiciary or executive are
present on the council and thus could potentially exert influence on the legislative.
The second set of outcomes are the total number of different taxes raised by
a city in a given decade. Simple taxes include easily observed quantities like head
taxes, alcohol, or trade taxes, whereas sophisticated taxes require more elaborate
enumeration of the population and their possessions. This includes wealth and
income taxes, or inheritance taxes, i.e. assets that require more effort to accurately
observe by the authorities. The tax outcomes are only collected for the larger
Bairoch et al. (1988) cities.
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The variable Conflicts,t−1 measures the conflict intensity in a given state in
the previous decade. This is to exclude the possibility that conflicts and changes
in the outcome fall into the same decade t in which case it would not be obvious
whether a conflict actually predates the outcome change.19 Conflict intensity is
defined as the number of cities in state s experiencing a violent conflict in decade
t over the total number of cities in that territory times one hundred. Territorial
borders are assigned to cities at the start of a given century. Border information is
taken from the Euratlas.20
The regression includes city fixed effects αi which capture time-invariant
factors that lead to differences in the outcomes across cities. Aggregate shocks
over time that affect all cities are absorbed by the decade fixed effects λt, whereas
additional time varying city and institutional characteristics are included in the
vector Xist such as an indicator for whether a council is present or the average
number of direct nobility network links of nobles in a territory.
All other variation in the outcome is left in the stochastic error term εist. To
account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, we cluster standard errors at the
territorial level. More precisely, we cluster observations at the level of ‘territorial
histories’. That is, we generate clusters of cities that shared the same history of
territorial affiliations throughout our sample period.21
A concern with the baseline specification in (3.2) is that conflicts are po-
tentially endogenous. Not only is warfare a choice of the local rulers, but also the
causality between conflicts and political institutions may run both ways (Stasav-
age, 2016). For instance, autocratic regimes tend to be more involved in conflict
(Lake, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999;
19For instance, a conflict may occur in 1404 while the political institution already changed in
1400, yet both events would be labelled with the decade 1400.
20Since border changes are potentially endogenous to conflicts themselves, we later show robust-
ness checks with fixed borders by grouping together areas that have always belonged to the same
states.
21For instance, if two cities were initially part of Duchy X and later on both part of Kingdom
Y, they will be in the same territorial history cluster.
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Jackson and Morelli, 2007). As such a simple OLS regression of equation 3.2 would
underestimate the true effect of wars on the development of inclusive political insti-
tutions. We therefore attempt to resolve these potential issues via an instrumental
variables strategy.
3.4.1 First-Stage Relation between Nobility Network Centrality
and Conflict Intensity
We use changes in the centrality of ruling families as shocks to the conflict intensities
experienced by German territories.22 As explained in Section 3.3 above, we track
the position of German nobles within the wider European nobility network, and
compute measures of connectedness for these nobles and link them to the cities and
territories in our sample. More central nobles can build on the support of a larger
set of allies which makes attacking them relatively more costly for an outside force.
The first stage regression to predict conflict intensities is specified as follows:
Conflicts,t−1 = αi + λt + γCentralitys,t−1 +X
′
istφ+ νst (3.3)
where Centralitys,t−1 is the harmonic centrality index value for the most connected
noble in the state in t − 1. The most influential noble would typically be the head
of the ruling family.23 In order to avoid concerns related to endogenously shifting
borders, we assign the nobility centrality measures on the level of the territorial
history.
An important control in the vector Xist is the average direct connectedness of
nobles in territory s. Variation in the harmonic centrality index used to construct
Centralitys,t−1 comes from two sources. First, from the direct links of nobles in
22The idea is similar to that of Benzell and Cooke (2018), who use links between European ruling
houses to explain the aggregate decline in warfare propensity over the course of European history.
Their analysis is on the level of European countries, whereas our focus is on territories within the
wider German lands.
23Other measures of centrality, such as the average or median centrality of nobles in the territory,
are possible. We use such alternative methods to probe the robustness of our results.
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territory s with other nobles in the European nobility network. Second, conditional
on nobles’ direct links, centrality may also vary due to changes in the structure
of other parts of the network. It is this second type of variation which we wish
to exploit, since network changes unrelated to the direct links of a state’s nobility
provide shocks to centrality that are exogenous to local economic, political and
strategic developments. In short, by controlling for the direct links of a state’s
nobility, we shut down the first source of variation in Centralitys,t−1, and identify
the first-stage relationship using variation from deeper in the network structure.
To illustrate the chain between nobility, conflict and local political institu-
tions, Figure 3.8 in the Appendix maps the spatial relationships of the first stage
between harmonic centrality and conflicts in the year 1630, at the height of the
Thirty Years’ War. Figure 3.9 maps the raw spatial correlation between conflict
and the number of political institutions that are elected by citizens in the same
year. Given that this measure is computed for every state in each decade, there is
no simple way of plotting these relations over time. However, the example of the
Thirty Years’ War in Figure 3.8 illustrates the hypothesised (negative) relationships
very clearly. Cities in areas with a high degree of centrality tend to be less affected
by violent conflicts during this period of intense warfare. Conversely, those with a
low level of connectedness and a high warfare frequency show a higher propensity
to have elected institutions.
More formal estimations of the first-stage relationship between nobility cent-
rality and conflict intensity are reported in Table 3.2. In columns 1 and 2, we
use the main nobility centrality definition in constructing our instrument: the har-
monic centrality of the best-connected noble in the territory. Harmonic centrality
is a strong negative predictor of conflict intensity, both with and without controls
for immediate network links (degree centrality). A one-unit increase in the max-
imum harmonic centrality index of a given territory reduces its experienced conflict
148
intensity by 1.3 percentage points.24
In the remaining columns of Table 3.2, we report first-stage results for al-
ternative specifications of the instrument. In columns 3 and 4, we use the average
harmonic centrality of nobles in a territory rather than the harmonic centrality of
the best-connected noble. As additional an additional robustness check, in columns
5 and 6 we use the centrality not of nobles in the territory itself, but of nobles
connected to nobles in the territory (we call these nobles linked nobles). Results are
robust to these alternative definitions of the instrument, and the key first-stage res-
ult holds: territories that become less well-connected due to changes in the structure
of the European nobility network see increases in their levels of conflict intensity.
3.4.2 Conflict Intensity and Local Political Institutions
Conflict Intensity and Council Elections
We now use the first-stage relationship between nobility centrality and conflict in-
tensity in the instrumental variables framework described above to explore the re-
lationship between warfare and local political institutions. The first outcome we
consider is whether a city’s citizens were involved in electing local councils. Con-
cretely, in equation 3.2 above, yist will be an indicator taking a value of one if citizens
elected the council without the interference of the local lord.
Results from this exercise are reported in Table 3.3. In column 1, we perform
a simple OLS estimation of equation 3.2, in which we regress an indicator for whether
citizens elected the council on the conflict intensity variable as well as city and decade
fixed effects. Column 2 additionally controls for the presence of a council.25 These
estimates should be interpreted with caution, however, due to the likely downward
bias arising from the reverse and negative relationship between conflicts and political
24The direction of this result is in agreement with results found by Benzell and Cooke (2018)
for wars between countries.
25The establishment of a council is itself plausibly an outcome of conflict, which could raise
concerns that it is a bad control in this specification. To dispel such concerns, throughout we will
report results both with and without this control to show that results do not change.
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institutions (that is, autocratic rulers are also likely to be more belligerent). Indeed,
we do not find a systematic relationship between conflicts and council elections
through a simple OLS regression.
We therefore turn to the instrumental variables strategy explained above,
where we use shocks to nobility network centrality to generate exogenous variation
in conflict intensity in a first stage. Column 3 reports the result from a parsimonious
second stage of this IV framework, with no additional controls. We find a systematic
positive relationship between conflict intensity and the probability that citizens elect
local councils. This relationship is robust to controlling for council presence (column
4), and the immediate links of nobles in the territory (column 5).26 Finally, in
column 6 we include both controls, and still find a robust, positive effect of conflict
intensity on the probability that citizens elect the local council.27
Concretely, for a percentage point increase in conflict intensity induced by
a reduction in a territory’s network centrality, the coefficient reported in column 6
shows a 0.003 percentage point increase in the probability that citizens elect their
council. The size of the estimated coefficient needs to be assessed with respect to
the overall magnitudes associated with a given outcome. Relative to the average
probability that citizens elect the local council, the effect reported in column 6
corresponds to a 12.6 percent increase.
To put this finding into context, consider that the average probability that
citizens elected councils rose by 3.132 percent over the sample period, 1200-1750.
Over the same period, the average city experienced a conflict intensity of 2.360
percent. Using our estimate for the effect of conflict intensity on the probability
26Recall that this allows us to exploit variation in network centrality arising only from changes
in network structure beyond local nobility links.
27In Table 3.8 in the Appendix, we report the corresponding reduced-form regressions with
and without controlling for degree centrality in columns 1 and 2, respectively. These results are
consistent with the channel we have in mind: cities in territories with well-connected nobles are less
likely to be exposed to conflict, and subsequently are less likely to adopt representative political
institutions. Columns 3-6 of Table 3.8 report similar reduced-form regressions for the size of the
council and for council overlaps. A discussion of the effect of conflicts on these variables is presented
below.
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that citizens elect their council, we can explain 0.003576×2.3600.03132 × 100 ≈ 27 percent of
the increase in council elections over the period 1200-1750.
Conflict Intensity and Council Size
Our second measure of political representativeness is the size of the city council,
where larger councils are taken to better represent the interest of the local citizenry.
In our historical setting, council expansions are often associated with greater direct
representation of citizens. The city of Braunschweig, for example, expanded its
gemeine Rat (‘common council’) in 1386 to enable direct representation of citizens
from Braunschweig’s distinct municipal areas.28 We report results using council size
as the outcome of equation 3.2 in Table 3.4. As before, OLS results (columns 1 and
2) are likely biased downwards, but we nevertheless find a weakly positive, though
insignificant, impact of conflict exposure on council size. Turning to our instrumental
variables specification, we indeed find a larger and statistically significant effect.
Taking the richest specification in column 6, a one percentage point increase
in conflict intensity causes the council to expand by 0.3 members. When compared
to the mean council size of 3.3 members, this effect corresponds to a 9.3 percent
increase. In addition to being more democratically chosen, as documented above,
councils are therefore also becoming larger in size due to exposure to conflict. Again,
putting this finding into context, conflicts explain 0.452014×2.3605.5008 × 100 ≈ 20 percent
of the increase in council size over the period 1200-1750.29
Conflict Intensity and Division of Power
As a final measure of the quality of local political institutions, we consider a measure
of the division of power between administrative branches in a city. In particular, if
executive or judiciary branches also gain influence in the council, then the council’s
28For the modern era, see Kjaer and Elklit (2014) for an empirical test of the relationship between
assembly size and representativeness.
29In our sample over the period 1200-1750, the average council size is 5.5008, the average conflict
intensity is 2.36 percent and our estimation of the effect of conflict intensity on council size is 0.452.
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independence (and therefore its ability to represent citizens effectively) is jeopard-
ised. To this end, we construct an indicator equal to one if a mayor, sheriff or judge
is part of the city council and thereby lessens the division of power within the city.
Results from this exercise are reported in Table 3.5. The OLS regressions
in columns 1 and 2 are once again likely to bias the estimated coefficient towards
zero, so we immediately turn to the instrumental variables results in columns 3- 6.
Coefficients are stable with the successive inclusion of controls, and are negative
and statistically significant (or just-insignificant at conventional levels in the richer
specifications). This suggests that conflict exposure also improves the representat-
iveness of political institutions by making councils more independent of other local
political interests. Taking the estimate from column 6, a one percentage point in-
crease in conflict intensity decreases the likelihood of overlap into the council by
19.6 percent relative to the mean.
Over the sample period 1200-1750, the probability that a city had a council
with overlaps from other branches of administration rose by 16.465 percent. Using
our estimate for the effect of conflict intensity on overlaps and the mean conflict in-
tensity, conflicts over this period increased council independence by 0.0165×2.360 ≈
3.89 percent. Hence, in the absence of wars, council independence would have de-
creased by an additional 3.8916.465+3.89 × 100 ≈ 24 percent over this period.
3.4.3 Conflict Intensity and Local Fiscal Capacity
Does the increased democratisation of political institutions come with a greater
ability to tax citizens? Due to data availability, we collected taxation outcomes
only for the subsample of cities in Bairoch et al. (1988). Table 3.6 shows the results
of regressing the number of taxes levied by rulers in these cities on conflict intensity.
Since these tax regressions also suffer from similar endogeneity concerns as the
political institution regressions above, we again instrument for conflict intensity
using the centrality of German nobles. In order to implement our instrumental
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variables framework, however, nobility data from all cities are required in order to
capture the complete network of German nobility and therefore accurately predict
conflicts in a first stage. For this reason, we use the two-sample 2SLS (TS2SLS)
estimator, which estimates the first stage in the entire sample and then uses the
predicted conflict intensity values to estimate the second stage using the Bairoch
subsample (Pacini and Windmeijer, 2016). These results are reported in Table 3.7.30
For both the OLS and the TS2SLS regressions, we report the contemporan-
eous effect of conflict on taxation in period t in the top panels. The bottom panels
show the long-term coefficient in decade t + 5 (fifty years later). This is because
the short- and long-term response of the tax system to violence can be different. In
the short run, the effect of the conflict (which in our data are mainly defensive in
nature) may disrupt the system and lower the potential to tax due to destruction.
In this case, the total number of taxes levied would decrease.
Indeed, the results in Table 3.7 show a negative effect of conflict on the
number of in the short run. Notably, however, our measure of tax sophistication (the
share of sophisticated taxes among all taxes levied by the city) increases in response
to conflict, as reported in column 2. Strikingly, therefore, while conflict disrupts
local systems of taxation, it directs efforts to tax into relatively more sophisticated
methods. This result is robust to alternative specifications of the share: in column 3,
we include general taxation in the denominator,31 and in column 4 we treat business
taxes as sophisticated.
While it is possible that a conflict may have been so severe as to send a city
on a permanently lower growth trajectory, it can also have acted as an incentive to
improve systems of taxation. Forward-looking rulers may seek to further develop
30We also estimate regressions for local political institutions for this subset of cities. As in the
taxation regressions, the analysis relies on the TS2SLS estimator in order to construct the first
stage using the whole sample. Results are reported in Table 3.9 in the Appendix. Effects are in
line with those found for the full sample, though the magnitude of the effects is larger.
31General taxes have no direct interpretation as these are mainly an unlabelled kitchen-sink
category. This happens when the text in the Städtebuch mentions the introduction of a tax but
without naming the tax or describing its purpose any further.
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the tax system in order to raise more funds for defence in the future, in particular
by developing more sophisticated means of taxation to offset distortions created by
an increased tax burden. Conflicts therefore potentially act as pressure to improve
the available taxation technology.
Our results bear out this hypothesis. The patterns in Table 3.7 suggest that,
in the long run, conflict negatively impacts the absolute number of taxes, but with
simple taxes being replaced by increasingly sophisticated methods of taxation. As
a result, in the decades following periods of conflict, cities’ tax systems stabilise at
significantly higher levels of sophistication. Previous work notes this relationship
for modern national systems of taxation (Besley and Persson, 2009). Our findings
suggest that similar pressures also shaped local fiscal capacity in much earlier time
periods.32
Concretely, our baseline measure of tax sophistication rose by 16.341 percent
percent over the period 1200-1750. Using the mean conflict intensity and our es-
timate for the impact of conflict on tax sophistication, conflicts explain 3.913×2.36016.341 ×
100 ≈ 57 percent of this increase.33
3.4.4 Robustness Checks
To assess the robustness of our results, we next relax assumptions made on the
assignment of borders, the assignment of the conflict variable to the city- rather
than the territory-level, the definition of the instrument, and the sample composi-
tion regarding the treatment of cities located in the so-called small states category.
Results from these robustness exercises are reported in the Appendix.
32To explore what drives the increase in the share, we investigate the effect on the number of
simple and sophisticated taxes separately. In the short run, conflict reduces both types of taxation,
but simple forms of taxation fall much more sharply, therefore driving up the share of sophisticated
taxes. In the long run, conflict reduces the number of simple taxes, while increasing the number of
sophisticated taxes.
33Using an alternative measure of sophisticated taxes (which includes general taxation as a
‘simple’ tax), conflicts explain 1.042×2.360
7.4811
× 100 ≈ 33 percent of the increase in tax sophistication.
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Conflict Intensity Using Fixed Territorial Borders
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 report results for political institutions and tax outcomes with
conflicts assigned using fixed borders. Since border changes are potentially endo-
genous to conflicts, we fix the border definition to territorial histories.34 This means
that we only consider borders that only contained the same set of cities over the
sample period. The results are almost identical with the benchmark results which
is true for both the political institutions as well as the tax outcomes.
Conflict Exposure at the City Level
So far, we have assigned conflicts at territory levels. The reasoning behind this is
that cities’ decisions depend not only on actual conflict, but on the threat of conflict
(for which the overall conflict intensity of the territory is a good measure). Are the
effects of conflicts different when measured at the city level? To test this, in Table
3.12 we measure conflict at the city level: the conflict treatment is now an indicator
taking a value of one if the city is exposed to conflict in a given decade. At first,
these coefficients appear to be much larger. However, since conflicts at the city-level
are now measured as an indicator variable, experiencing a conflict corresponds to an
increase in the previously used conflict intensity measure from 0 to 100 percent. For
this reason, when the effect is normalised with respect to the mean, it is comparable
to the benchmark results presented above.
Different Nobility Centrality Instruments
To probe for the robustness with respect to the definition of our instrument, we
consider the following changes in defining the nobility centrality instrument. First,
instead of taking the maximum centrality of nobles in a territory we consider the
34With time-varying borders, a concern could be that periods of warfare both increase the
numerator (more cities in a territory see conflict) and lower the denominator (territories lose cities)
of the conflict intensity measure. This would cause us to systematically overstate conflict intensity.
Fortunately, our results are almost identical when using fixed borders, suggesting that this is not a
major concern.
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average centrality in Table 3.13. The most connected noble is important for de-
termining the relationship between network centrality and conflicts, as shown in
the benchmark results. However, it is possible that several influential individuals
also drive this relationship, which would not be picked up when considering only
the most well-connected noble. The results reported in Table 3.13 are statistically
indistinguishable from the benchmark results.
The creation of links in a network is a potential choice of nobles. In our
benchmark estimates, we control for changes in centrality stemming from nobles’
immediate links by controlling for their degree centrality. A further check to shut
down this channel is to consider nobles’ network neighbours directly. In Tables 3.14
and 3.15 we use the maximum and average connectedness of a nobles’ intermediate
neighbours in the network. We call these neighbours linked nobles. A reduction in
a noble’s neighbour’s centrality is unlikely to be the noble’s own choice, but might
still affect his or her conflict exposure.35 The results in Tables 3.14 and 3.15 are
similar to the benchmark results both in terms of the first and the second stage
results. The choice of which nobles to use with respect to the formation or breaks
of their networks therefore does not appear to substantially affect our results.
Keeping Cities in ‘Small States’
As described in Section 3.3 above, our benchmark estimates omit cities in small
‘Small States of the Holy Roman Empire’ following Cantoni et al. (2018). Table
3.16 repeats the main analysis on the political institution outcomes including these
cities. The signs of all coefficients remain unchanged, although the magnitude and
significance for the council size and division of power outcomes drop. This is likely
due to the noise added by the small state cities for which border assignments cannot
be accurately made.36 The result on citizens electing their council following a conflict
35Through mutual assistance pacts where a noble has to help in their neighbour’s defence or
military campaign, for example.
36In particular, it becomes less straight-forward to determine which cities truly belong to the
same territory, hence including these cities introduces measurement error in the conflict variable.
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is as before. The results are therefore not entirely explained away by the inclusion
these cities, yet the results confirm our reasoning for excluding them from the main
estimation sample.
Dropping Individual Centuries
Finally, we test for the sensitivity of our results to events in specific centuries by
repeating the political institution regressions while excluding each century one-by-
one. The results are reported in Table 3.17, where each panel represents one of the
three political institution outcomes, and each column shows the omitted century
in a given regression. Results are mostly stable, significant and comparable to the
main results for almost all of the excluded centuries. The only period which has a
marked impact on our results is the seventeenth century in column 5 without which
results not only become significantly larger but also noisier.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
We take a novel perspective on the rise of inclusive political institutions and state
capacity by looking at the local level over 550 years. At the local level, participation
of different groups in political institutions pre-dates the rise of regional or national
assemblies, and can be considered one precursor on the way to more inclusive institu-
tions at all levels of governance. Using novel city-level data from the German lands,
we she new light on the causal link between warfare and local political institutions
and (local) fiscal capacity.
We combine city-level information on battles, existence and features of city
councils, as well as various tax types, with rich data on the centrality of German
nobles in the wider European nobility network. A reduction in the centrality of
nobles following changes in the structure of the nobility network leads to a greater
conflict intensity in the affected territories. Higher conflict intensity, in turn, shifts
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towards more sophisticated taxes, confirming (Tilly, 1990) hypothesis that warfare
underpins the expansion of the fiscal capacity of states. Furthermore, we show
that conflict had important effects on early forms of local democratisation: councils
increasingly were elected by citizens, were larger in size, and were more likely to
be independent of other institutions as a result of episodes of conflict. This is
consistent with there being an often-hypothesised tradeoff: in order to expand the
fiscal capacity of their polities to fund wars, rulers had to make concessions to their
subjects by democratising political institutions.
Taken together, these results paint a clear picture of the central role of war-
fare in shaping the course of development in the German lands.
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3.6 Tables
Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Panel A: Full Sample
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Has executive 33076 0.47 0.50 0 1
Has judiciary 33076 0.13 0.34 0 1
Has council 33076 0.44 0.50 0 1
Council elected by citizens 33076 0.02 0.15 0 1
Council elected by citizens (cond. on having council) 14453 0.05 0.22 0 1
Council size 33076 3.91 8.66 0 341
Council size (cond. on having council) 14453 8.79 11.27 0 341
Exec. or judic. overlap with council 33076 0.11 0.32 0 1
Exec. or judic. overlap with council (cond. on having council) 14453 0.26 0.44 0 1
Share of cities in territory involved in conflict (%) 33076 2.32 6.05 0 100
Harmonic centr. of best-connected noble in territory 33076 22.38 27.08 0 148
Harm. centr. of best-conn. noble in terr. (cond. on having nobles) 28438 25.69 27.54 0 148
Average degree centr. of nobles in territory 33076 0.26 0.56 0 13
Av. degree centr. of nobles in terr. (cond. on having nobles) 28438 0.30 0.59 0 13
Panel B: Bairoch Sample
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Has executive 4760 0.68 0.47 0 1
Has judiciary 4760 0.22 0.41 0 1
Has council 4760 0.70 0.46 0 1
Council elected by citizens 4760 0.04 0.20 0 1
Council elected by citizens (cond. on having council) 3331 0.06 0.24 0 1
Council size 4760 10.61 15.91 0 341
Council size (cond. on having council) 3331 14.98 17.17 0 341
Exec. or judic. overlap with council 4760 0.24 0.43 0 1
Exec. or judic. overlap with council (cond. on having council) 3331 0.34 0.47 0 1
Share of cities in territory involved in conflict (%) 4760 2.40 6.25 0 100
Harmonic centr. of best-connected noble in territory 4760 21.55 27.28 0 148
Harm. centr. of best-conn. noble in terr. (cond. on having nobles) 3885 26.18 28.02 0 148
Average degree centr. of nobles in territory 4760 0.36 0.83 0 13
Av. degree centr. of nobles in terr. (cond. on having nobles) 3885 0.44 0.90 0 13
Total number of taxes 4760 1.31 2.03 0 14
Number of simple taxes 4760 0.95 1.45 0 11
Number of sophisticated taxes 4760 0.22 0.59 0 4
Ratio sophisticated : simple taxes 1350 38.58 70.25 0 400
Note: The full sample (Panel A) covers the 1472 cities in the Städtebuch that are not in a ’Small State of
the Holy Roman Empire’ in the Euratlas at a decadal basis over the period 1200-1750. The Bairoch sample
(Panel B) covers the subset of cities also in Bairoch et al. (1988). Variables are defined as follows. Political
institution variables: ’Has executive’ is a binary variables equal to one if the city has a mayor or sheriff.
’Has judiciary’ is a binary variable equal to one if the city has a judge. ’Has council’ is a binary variable
equal to one if the city has a council. ’Council elected by citizens’ is a binary variable equal to one if the
city has a council which is elected by citizens without the interference of the local lord. ’Council size’ is a
count variable of the number of members on the council. ’Exec. or judic. overlap with council’ is a binary
variable equal to one if the mayor, sheriff or judge is a council member. Conflict variables: ’Share of cities
in territory involved in conflict’ is the count of cities in the territory involved in conflict divided by the total
number of cities in territory. Nobility variables: ’Harmonic centrality of best-connected noble in territory’
is the maximum harmonic centrality observed for a noble associated with the territory (see text for details
on calculating harmonic centrality. ’Average degree centr. of nobles in territory’ is the average number of
links that nobles in the territory have to other nobles. Taxation variables: ’Total number of taxes’ is a
count of the taxes that are active in the city. ’Number of simple taxes’ and ’Number of sophisticated taxes’
break these down into two distinct classifications (see text for a discussion). ’Ratio sophisticated : simple
taxes’ divides the number of sophisticated taxes by the number of simple taxes.
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Table 3.2: First stage - nobility centrality and conflict
Dependent Variable: Conflict Intensity (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Max. Harmonic Cent. -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Avg. Harmonic Cent. -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004)
Max. Harmonic Cent. (Linked Nob.) -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Degree Centrality -0.034 -0.016 -0.046
(0.171) (0.165) (0.173)
Observations 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076
Territories 157 157 157 157 157 157
Cities 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472
Outcome mean 2.182 2.182 2.182 2.182 2.182 2.182
Note: First stage regressions of the form Conflicts,t−1 = αi +λt + γCentralitys,t−1 +X′istφ+ νst. Conflict
Intensity (%) is the share of cities in a territory that are involved in conflict in a given decade. Harmonic
Centrality measures the centrality of a territory’s nobles within the wider European nobility network (see
text for details). Degree Centrality measures a territory’s nobles’ direct links to other nobles. All regressions
include city and decade fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the
territorial history level. Significance levels are denoted by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.3: Second stage - conflict and council elections
Dependent Variable: Citizens Elect Council (1 = yes)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
Conflict Intensity t-1 (%) 0.000 0.000 0.004∗ 0.003∗ 0.003∗ 0.003∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Council Present (1=yes) 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Degree Centrality -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Observations 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076
Territories 157 157 157 157 157 157
Cities 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472
Outcome mean 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 10.213 10.183 10.322 10.272
β × 100/(outcome mean) 14.906 14.146 13.918 12.616
Note: OLS and IV regressions of the form yist = αi + λt + βConflicts,t−1 +X′istπ + εist. Citizens Elect
Council is an indicator variable taking a value of one if citizens of a city elect the council without the
interference of the local lord. Conflict Intensity (%) is the share of cities in a territory that are involved in
conflict in a given decade, and is instrumented using the Harmonic Centrality of the most central noble in
the territory (see text and Table 3.2 for details). Council Present is an indicator variable taking a value of
one if a council is present in the city. Degree Centrality measures a territory’s nobles’ direct links to other
nobles. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
and are clustered at the territorial history level. Significance levels are denoted by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.4: Second stage - conflict and council size
Dependent Variable: Size of Council
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
Conflict Intensity t-1 (%) 0.010 0.009 0.452∗ 0.412∗∗ 0.370∗ 0.301∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.240) (0.201) (0.210) (0.163)
Council Present (1=yes) 6.169∗∗∗ 6.146∗∗∗ 6.162∗∗∗
(0.455) (0.444) (0.447)
Degree Centrality -0.233 -0.315
(0.243) (0.212)
Observations 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076
Territories 157 157 157 157 157 157
Cities 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472
Outcome mean 3.229 3.229 3.229 3.229 3.229 3.229
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 10.213 10.183 10.322 10.272
β × 100/(outcome mean) 14.000 12.757 11.466 9.336
Note: OLS and IV regressions of the form yist = αi + λt + βConflicts,t−1 +X′istπ+ εist. Council Size is a
count variable of the number of members of the city council. Conflict Intensity (%) is the share of cities in a
territory that are involved in conflict in a given decade, and is instrumented using the Harmonic Centrality
of the most central noble in the territory (see text and Table 3.2 for details). Council Present is an indicator
variable taking a value of one if a council is present in the city. Degree Centrality measures a territory’s
nobles’ direct links to other nobles. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the territorial history level. Significance levels are denoted
by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.5: Second stage - conflict and division of power
Dep. Var.: Exec. or Jud. Overlaps with Council (1 = yes)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
Conflict Intensity t-1 (%) -0.000 -0.000 -0.016∗ -0.018∗ -0.013 -0.016
(0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Council Present (1=yes) 0.247∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Degree Centrality 0.010 0.007
(0.007) (0.007)
Observations 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076
Territories 157 157 157 157 157 157
Cities 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472
Outcome mean 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 10.213 10.183 10.322 10.272
β × 100/(outcome mean) -20.457 -22.464 -16.184 -19.613
Note: OLS and IV regressions of the form yist = αi + λt + βConflicts,t−1 + X′istπ + εist. Executive
or Judiciary Overlaps with Council (‘Division of Power’) is an indicator variable taking a value of one if
the executive or judiciary branches of city administration overlap with the council (see text for details).
Conflict Intensity (%) is the share of cities in a territory that are involved in conflict in a given decade, and
is instrumented using the Harmonic Centrality of the most central noble in the territory (see text and Table
3.2 for details). Council Present is an indicator variable taking a value of one if a council is present in the
city. Degree Centrality measures a territory’s nobles’ direct links to other nobles. All regressions include
city and decade fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the territorial
history level. Significance levels are denoted by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.6: Conflict and taxation - OLS
Short-Run Effect on Taxes in t











Conflict Intensity t-1 -0.000 0.035 0.067 0.120
(0.004) (0.222) (0.074) (0.211)
Observations 4,760 1,336 2,142 1,336
Territories 96 53 71 53
Outcome mean 1.005 31.438 14.104 47.851
β × 100/(outcome mean) -0.005 0.112 0.477 0.250
Long-Run Effect on Taxes in t+ 5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict Intensity t-1 0.002 0.124 -0.009 0.229
(0.003) (0.156) (0.041) (0.177)
Observations 4,101 1,214 1,941 1,214
Territories 93 51 70 51
Outcome mean 1.055 31.872 14.334 48.118
β × 100/(outcome mean) 0.179 0.389 -0.062 0.477
Note: OLS regressions of the form yist = αi + λt + βConflicts,t−1 +X′istπ + εist. No. of all taxes counts
the total number of taxes levied in a city in a given decade. Share of sophisticated taxes is the share of
sophisticated to simple taxes (see text for details). Conflict Intensity (%) is the share of cities in a territory
that are involved in conflict in a given decade. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the city level. Significance levels are denoted by *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
164
Table 3.7: Conflict and taxation - instrumental variables
Short-Run Effect on Taxes in t











Conflict Intensity t-1 -0.105∗∗∗ 3.987∗∗∗ 1.064∗∗∗ 3.676∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.493) (0.189) (0.402)
Observations 4,760 1,350 2,149 1,350
Territories 96 59 73 59
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 15.447 15.447 15.447 15.447
Outcome mean 1.005 31.438 14.104 47.851
β × 100/(outcome mean) -10.495 12.684 7.542 7.682
Long-Run Effect on Taxes in t+ 5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict Intensity t-1 -0.031∗ 7.827∗∗∗ 2.460∗∗∗ 11.047∗∗∗
(0.019) (1.137) (0.368) (1.367)
Observations 4,112 1,230 1,957 1,230
Territories 96 60 75 60
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 15.447 15.447 15.447 15.447
Outcome mean 1.055 31.872 14.334 48.118
β × 100/(outcome mean) -2.960 24.559 17.163 22.958
Note: Two-Sample 2SLS regressions of the form yist = αi + λt + βConflicts,t−1 +X′istπ + εist. No. of all
taxes counts the total number of taxes levied in a city in a given decade. Share of sophisticated taxes is the
share of sophisticated to simple taxes (see text for details). Conflict Intensity (%) is the share of cities in a
territory that are involved in conflict in a given decade, and is instrumented using the Harmonic Centrality
of the most central noble in the territory (see text and Table 3.2 for details). All regressions include city
and decade fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the city level.
Significance levels are denoted by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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3.7 Figures














1400 1500 1600 1700 1800
time10
 No conflict during 30YW  Conflict during 30YW
Note: Evolution of probability that citizens elect council. Averages shown over time separately for those
cities that did (red) and did not (blue) experience conflict during the Thirty Years’ War (marked with
vertical red lines).










1400 1500 1600 1700 1800
time10
 No conflict during 30YW  Conflict during 30YW
Note: Evolution of the size of the council. Averages shown over time separately for those cities that did
(red) and did not (blue) experience conflict during the Thirty Years’ War (marked with vertical red lines).
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3.8 Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Fixed locations of Städtebuch cities (black dots). Sovereign territories from Euratlas outlined each
century (red lines). Sovereign territories are used to assign nobility network shocks and conflict intensity
treatments to Keyser cities (see text for details).
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Figure 3.4: The Peerage example
Note: Example from Darryl Lundy’s genealogical website The Peerage (http://www.thepeerage.com/,
accessed 04/11/2017) for Georg Wilhelm, Duke of Braunschweig and Lüneburg. Georg Wilhelm is one of
the over 680,000 nobles we use to reconstruct the European nobility network each year (see text for details).
168
Figure 3.5: Family tree example - the Lords of Braunschweig and Lüneburg, 1582-
1698
Note: Family tree example from the Europäische Stammtafeln (Schwennicke, 1998). Life events are rep-
resented by the following symbols for birth *, deaths †, marriage ◦◦, burial , battle deaths are marked by
two crossed swords. We use these family trees primarily to associate nobles to cities and territories within
the German lands, but also to supplement the information from the Peerage.
169
Figure 3.6: Family tree - individual entry
Note: Individual entry within a family
tree (zoomed in) from the Europäische
Stammtafeln (Schwennicke, 1998). The
example shows Georg Wilhelm of the
House of Braunchweig and Lüneburg.
The most relevant information of the
entry include the cities of residences
and death, year of birth, marriage,
and death, the name and title of his
wife and her family (Eleonore Desmier
d’Olbreuse).
170
Figure 3.7: Example nobility network and most central individuals, 1460
Albrecht III Achilles Kurfürst von Brandenburg Anne Prinzessin von Sachsen
Friedrich II Kurfürst von Sachsen Margarete von Habsburg
Note: An example of a nobility network in the year 1460 (only the largest component shown). The
four most central individuals (as measured by harmonic centrality, see text) highlighted. Nodes positioned
for visualisation purposes using multidimensional scaling (node positions therefore do not correspond, for
example, to geographic locations of nobles).
171








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Spatial relationship between cities’ nobles’ harmonic centrality and the occurrence of violent conflicts
in the cross-section of 1630 in the German lands.
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Note: Spatial relationship between cities’ exposure to conflict and institutions elected by citizens in the
cross-section of 1630 in the German lands.
173
Table 3.8: Reduced form
Dependent Variable:
Citizens Elect Council Council Size Council Overlaps
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Max. Harmonic Centrality t-1 -0.005∗ -0.004∗ -0.551∗∗ -0.398∗ 0.022∗ 0.021∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.234) (0.202) (0.013) (0.012)
Degree Centrality t-1 -0.001 -0.325 0.007
(0.003) (0.211) (0.006)
Observations 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076
Territories 157 157 157 157 157 157
Cities 1,416 1,416 1,416 1,416 1,416 1,416
Outcome mean 0.024 0.024 3.913 3.913 0.113 0.113
Note: Reduced-form regressions of the form yist = αi + λt + βCentralitys,t−1 +X′istπ + εist. Coefficients
on Max. Harmonic Centrality (and corresponding standard errors) have been multiplied by a factor of 100.
Citizens Elect Council is an indicator variable taking a value of one if citizens of a city elect the council
without the interference of the local lord. Council Size is a count variable of the number of members of
the city council. Council Overlaps (‘Division of Power’) is an indicator variable taking a value of one if
the executive or judiciary branches of city administration overlap with the council (see text for details).
Harmonic Centrality measures the centrality of a territory’s nobles within the wider European nobility
network (see text for details). Degree Centrality measures a territory’s nobles’ direct links to other nobles.
All regressions control for the presence of a council. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the territorial history level. Significance


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.11: Taxation results with conflicts assigned at fixed territory borders
Short-Run Effect on Taxes in t










Conflict Intensity t-1 -0.083∗∗∗ 3.156∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗ 2.909∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.412) (0.155) (0.328)
Observations 4,760 1,350 2,149 1,350
Territories 96 59 73 59
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 13.911 13.911 13.911 13.911
Outcome mean 1.005 31.438 14.104 47.851
β × 100/(outcome mean) -8.307 10.039 5.969 6.080
Long-Run Effect on Taxes in t+ 5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict Intensity t-1 -0.025∗ 6.195∗∗∗ 1.947∗∗∗ 8.744∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.991) (0.309) (1.199)
Observations 4,112 1,230 1,957 1,230
Territories 96 60 75 60
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 13.911 13.911 13.911 13.911
Outcome mean 1.055 31.872 14.334 48.118
β × 100/(outcome mean) -2.343 19.438 13.585 18.172
Note: Two-Sample 2SLS regressions of the form yist = αi + λt + βConflicts,t−1 +X′istπ + εist. No. of all
taxes counts the total number of taxes levied in a city in a given decade. Share of sophisticated taxes is the
share of sophisticated to simple taxes (see text for details). Conflict Intensity (%) is the share of cities in a
territory that are involved in conflict in a given decade, and is instrumented using the Harmonic Centrality
of the most central noble in the territory (see text and Table 3.2 for details). All regressions include city
and decade fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the territorial























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.17: 2SLS institutions results excluding centuries one-by-one
Panel A: Citizens Elect Council
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700
Conf. Int. t-1 0.002 0.004∗ 0.002 0.003∗ 0.019 0.004∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.031) (0.002)
Observations 30,422 28,733 28,061 25,683 24,784 27,662
Territories 156 155 153 150 136 140
Cities 1,461 1,441 1,447 1,414 1,365 1,358
K-P F stat 9.781 8.587 12.452 7.474 0.435 7.326
Outcome mean 0.026 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022
β × 100/(mean) 8.464 14.243 9.961 15.119 88.494 16.948
Panel B: Council Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700
Conf. Int. t-1 0.262∗ 0.380∗ 0.324∗∗ 0.372∗∗ 2.108 0.513∗∗
(0.154) (0.194) (0.161) (0.185) (3.227) (0.254)
Observations 30,422 28,733 28,061 25,683 24,784 27,662
Territories 156 155 153 150 136 140
Cities 1,461 1,441 1,447 1,414 1,365 1,358
K-P F stat 9.781 8.587 12.452 7.474 0.435 7.326
Outcome mean 3.620 3.465 3.219 2.967 2.805 2.953
β × 100/(mean) 7.249 10.960 10.075 12.541 75.151 17.364
Panel C: Division of Power
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700
Conf. Int. t-1 -0.019∗∗ -0.018∗ -0.012 -0.019∗∗ -0.066 -0.018∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.120) (0.009)
Observations 30,422 28,733 28,061 25,683 24,784 27,662
Territories 156 155 153 150 136 140
Cities 1,461 1,441 1,447 1,414 1,365 1,358
K-P F stat 9.781 8.587 12.452 7.474 0.435 7.326
Outcome mean 0.091 0.089 0.081 0.075 0.068 0.071
β × 100/(mean) -20.404 -20.176 -14.355 -24.910 -96.421 -25.265
Note: Each column re-runs the 2SLS analysis between the three institutional outcomes in panels A, B,
and C, while dropping observations from a given century. The omitted century is specified in the column
header and years refer to the beginning of a century, i.e. 1500 means 1500 to 1599. IV regressions of the
form yist = αi+λt+βConflicts,t−1+X′istπ+ εist. Conflict Intensity (%) is the share of cities in a territory
that are involved in conflict in a given decade, and is instrumented using the Harmonic Centrality of the
most central noble in the territory (see text and Table 3.2 for details). Citizens Elect Council is an indicator
variable taking a value of one if citizens of a city elect the council without the interference of the local
lord. Council Size is a count variable of the number of members of the city council. Executive or Judiciary
Overlaps with Council (‘Division of Power’) is an indicator variable taking a value of one if the executive
or judiciary branches of city administration overlap with the council (see text for details). All regressions
include city and decade fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the
territorial history level. Significance levels are denoted by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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